Temporary workers, permanent consequences:

Behavioral implications of triangular employment relationships

by

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A thesis submitted to the School of Business

in conformity with the requirements for

the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Queen's University

Kingston, Ontario, Canada

August 2004

Abstract

The modern workforce has changed dramatically from a generation ago; many workers can no longer anticipate permanent employment with a single organization. The proportion of workers who have a temporary employment relationship, and who find work through an intermediary, is increasing rapidly. However, despite this upsurge in intermediated temporary work, our understanding of the intricacies inherent in the resultant triangular employment relationship is limited.

Of the areas that require further investigation, the effect of organizational justice on the behaviors of intermediated temporary workers is of paramount importance. However, at the present time it is unclear whether workers' treatment in one context (e.g., their temporary firms or their client organizations) will affect their behaviors in another work environment (e.g., their client organizations or their temporary firms).

As a preliminary step, new measures of organizational citizenship behaviors and counterproductive workplace behaviors (towards both temporary firms and client organizations) were generated from a series of interviews with current and former temporary workers and supervisors. These metrics, which are specifically relevant to intermediated temporary workers, were pre-tested in a survey to ensure their validity, and were then used in the final study.

The final study was a survey administered to temporary workers affiliated with two branch offices of a large temporary firm. As expected, workers' perceptions of their treatment in one context affected behaviors in that context. In addition, these perceptions also affected behaviors in the "other" context. Justice from the temporary firm predicted

behaviors towards both the temporary firm and the client organization. Similarly, justice from the client organization predicted behaviors towards the temporary firm and the client organization. This study also found that negative affectivity predicted perceptions of justice in both contexts, and it also predicted whether the workers felt that their pursuit of temporary work (as opposed to permanent employment) was voluntary. This "volition" predicted temporary workers' citizenship behaviors.

Several control variables, including tenure, age, and gender, as well as moderators that included organizational identification and perceived threats of sanctions, were not found to be significant. This dissertation concludes by drawing implications for practice and suggesting directions for future research.

Acknowledgements

This dissertation is dedicated to temporary workers everywhere.

I would like to thank Dan Gallagher for sparking my interest in this topic, and for the many interesting conversations that we have had, especially in the early stages of my writing. I am especially grateful that he continued to work with me even after he returned to James Madison University. I would also like to express my gratitude for the thoughtful contributions of Jane Webster, whose guidance was invaluable. I am particularly grateful that she agreed to help me with a topic outside her discipline. Without the insights provided by these two scholars, this dissertation would not have been possible. I am particularly grateful that they worked so well together.

There are numerous other people to whom I owe thanks. I am deeply indebted to Jane Dutton, who generously used her influence to find my research site for my third study, and also to Gerry Coady and the kind people at CoTalCo Inc, which was the primary site of my first study. I am also very grateful for the assistance of Julian Barling and Bill Cooper, who helped me to broaden the scope of my research, which made it more interesting.

I would like to thank my friends in Kingston and around the world for the moral support and our many fun times. I would also like to thank my colleagues in the PhD program, for their encouragement and support. I would especially like to thank those who helped me practice my dissertation proposal (Alan, Andrew, Ann Frances, Adrienne, Chris, Dave, Dave, Dianne, Ian, Jon, Kate, Kara, Leighann, Lina, Manon, Mark,

Maureen, Michelle, Nick, Prakash, Sandy, Sandy, Sarah, Stephen, and Yannik) as well as those who kindly helped me to assemble my survey packages (Ana, Andrew, Ann Frances, Kate, Kelvin, Manon, Maureen and Sam). Finally, I would like to express my gratitude for the patience of my office-mates while I transcribed my interviews without remembering to turn on my headphones.

I would like to thank Linda, Teresa, Lisa, Anne, and Annette for their assistance with the many details that were integral to the timely completion of my dissertation. I would also like to acknowledge the financial support provided by Dan, Jane, the Queen's School of Business, Queen's University, the Province of Ontario, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

I would also like to thank Mom and Dad and Christine, for being my first teachers, and for providing me with lots of encouragement at times when I needed it most.

Finally, I thank Adam, for his love, which cannot be quantified.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

"So my supervisor said to me, 'today, we're going to do what we call a mailing. What I'd like you to do is to take one sheet of paper from this pile, and to take one sheet of paper from this pile, and to fold them together as evenly as you can. Then, I would like you to pick up an envelope, which already has an address on it. In this corner, I would like you to put a stamp. Then, I would like you to put the folded paper inside the envelope. ... Do you understand?' Well, I'm paid by the hour, so what did I say to her? 'No. Can you explain it to me one more time, please?'"

-- Joanna, temporary worker and standup comic, September, 2002

*"…how would I exact revenge on [the temporary firm]? Bad mouthing them is definitely the best way. That way you can prevent other workers from going to them and you can potentially influence those who would avail themselves of their services. Also, if you don't mind, or think you can get around a bad rep at the agency and place of employment, you could sabotage the job itself. You know, show up late, don't show up at all, be a complete f***-up..."*

-- Caitlin, former temporary worker, August, 2001

The individuals quoted above have an employment structure that poses unique challenges for workers, managers, and researchers. Whereas permanent employees and some types of temporary workers work directly for their employer, the temporary workers quoted above find work through an intermediary, and can be described as "intermediated temporary workers". These workers are affiliated with two separate organizations: (1) a temporary firm,[1] which is the employer of record, and (2) a client organization, where the work is performed. The temporary firm, such as Manpower, Kelly Services, or Adecco Career Staff, selects appropriate workers, and dictates their

[1] Academics and practitioners have introduced a number of synonyms for the term "temporary firm", including "temporary service firm", "temporary help firm", and "temporary help service firm". While the term "agency" is widely used and understood by the public, many temporary firms object to this moniker, as it may imply that the firm is legally liable for the actions of the workers that it sends out on client assignments. For this reason, and to be consistent with the preponderance of the academic literature, the term "temporary firm" will be used throughout this dissertation.

levels of compensation, the general content of the jobs to be performed, and the client organizations. In contrast, the client organizations dictate the precise nature of the tasks as well as the on-site working conditions. Because intermediated temporary workers are affiliated with two separate organizations, and because these organizations have a contractual relationship with each other, these temporary workers can be said to be part of a "triangular employment relationship". As a result of their triangular employment relationships, intermediated temporary workers have two separate contexts in which they may develop perceptions, form attitudes, and engage in positive or negative behaviors.

Common sense and some recent research both suggest that the treatment that temporary workers receive from their client organizations affects the behaviors that these workers direct towards these clients, and it also suggests that the treatment that temporary workers receive from their temporary firms affects the behaviors that they direct towards these firms. However, we are not yet aware whether or why temporary workers' perceptions of the treatment that they receive from their temporary firms might "spill over" and affect behaviors directed towards their client organizations, nor are we aware whether or why these workers' treatment by their client organizations might "spill over" into behaviors towards their temporary firms.

Although there is some evidence that in certain instances workers may keep attitudes and behaviors related to one context separate from their attitudes and behaviors related to a different context ("segmentation"), other evidence suggests that there is indeed "spillover" or a linkage between worker behaviors in separate contexts. For example, do temporary workers who perceive unjust treatment from their client organizations 'take this out' on their temporary firms? Do workers who perceive just

treatment from their temporary help firms engage in more positive behaviors when they are on assignment at their client organizations? These questions are of particular importance to both temporary firms and the organizations that engage their services; each are endeavoring to provide a high level of service and product quality and both rely on temporary workers to remain competitive.

In essence, this dissertation addresses three research questions:

1) Are intermediated temporary workers' behaviors towards their client organizations affected by their treatment by their temporary firms?
2) Are intermediated temporary workers' behaviors towards their temporary firms affected by their treatment by their client organizations?
3) What other factors directly or indirectly affect these workers behaviors in both contexts?

This dissertation addressed these research questions in three steps:

1) An interview study was the basis for new, more appropriate scales to simultaneously measure intermediated temporary workers' organizational citizenship behaviors and counterproductive workplace behaviors in the context of the temporary firms and their client organizations
2) A survey pretest refined the new measures, and improved their validity.
3) A main survey addressed the three research questions outlined above.

Contributions

The last few years have seen a dramatic upsurge in the proportion of management research that addresses the experiences of temporary workers, in proportion to the growth

in temporary work itself[2]. While the first wave of research focused on describing and explaining the growth of temporary work, the next wave focused on comparing temporary workers to permanent employees. The current focus appears to a closer examination of the attitudes and behaviors of temporary workers. This dissertation will help to deepen our understanding of these workers' experiences in a number of ways.

This dissertation's primary research contributions are three-fold. Whereas previous work on intermediated temporary work has been largely anecdotal or has focused solely on behaviors directed at the client organization, this dissertation develops and tests theoretically-based competing models that explore the experiences of intermediated contingent workers in both the context of their client organizations and the context of their temporary firms. To do so, it extends the current segmentation and spillover theories (that have been applied to research on work-leisure conflict, work-family conflict, and family-work conflict) to the context of intermediated contingent workers' relationships with their client and temporary organizations.

Secondly, this dissertation develops and tests new measures of organizational citizenship behaviors and counterproductive workplace behaviors that are appropriate for the context of intermediated temporary work (no such measures are currently available). Thirdly, this research empirically studies a number of variables (e.g., organizational

[2] Although a substantial number of people are currently engaged in contingent work, this is in contrast with the number of contingent workers a decade ago. According to Statistics Canada, "there were 514,000 workers in temporary jobs in 1991, [representing] five percent of the total employment figure" (Hamdani, 1997, p. 3). However, this proportion has doubled in the past decade. For example, an August 2002 search of the daily job listings at Monster.ca revealed that more than ten percent of the available positions were either temporary, short-term, or contract. Manpower Inc., a temporary firm with over 1.9 million employees worldwide, may be the world's largest private sector "employer" (in comparison, Walmart has 1.2 million employees). The growth of this sector is likely to continue, as employers persist in seeking employment flexibility to match fluctuations in production and service requirements, and in an attempt to reduce labor costs, buffer permanent employees from job loss, reduce managerial responsibilities, and create an extended screening process for applicants for permanent positions (e.g., Houseman, 2001; Nollen & Axel, 1996).

justice, organizational citizenship behaviors, counterproductive workplace behaviors, threats of sanctions, negative affectivity, and organizational identification) that have not previously been examined in the context of intermediated temporary work.

This dissertation also has far-reaching practical implications for temporary firms and for the organizations that engage their services. Previously, neither temporary firms nor client organizations had empirical guidance on whether to adopt a sourcing strategy that anticipates temporary worker "spillover" of behavior between contexts. By erroneously assuming a "segmentation" perspective, firms may neglect to consider all relevant factors when they choose an organization with which to do business.

Overview

This dissertation is organized in the following manner. Chapter two provides an overview of the relevant literature on contingent work and contingent workers, with specific attention to the various types of contingent employment, the types of methodologies that have been used to study contingent work, the context of the contingent work environment, the constructs that have been researched, as well as the gaps and methodological limitations in the available research. Chapter three identifies and explains the theoretical justifications for the dependent and independent variables, as well as the models, hypotheses, moderators, and control variables. The fourth chapter describes the method, analyses, and findings of the qualitative study. The fifth chapter explains the method, analyses and findings of the survey pretest, and the sixth chapter describes the method, analyses, and findings of the main survey. The seventh and final

chapter discusses the implications of these findings, as well as the limitations and potential directions for future research. References and appendices follow.

CHAPTER II: CURRENT RESEARCH ON INTERMEDIATED CONTINGENT WORK

Despite the continuing growth of contingent work around the world, the organizational behavior literature has not kept pace with this development. That is not to say that what literature that is available is trivial. In this emerging sub-field, we may find a number of thought-provoking publications that inspire future examination of the issues that are raised. The tables in Appendix A and Appendix B list a number of journal articles, conference papers, book chapters, and unpublished manuscripts that explore organizational behavior issues related to all forms of contingent work. While Appendix A deals exclusively with empirical research, Appendix B contains information on non-empirical research.

These tables were compiled by searching the ABI Inform and Web of Science databases under the key words: contingent, temporary, non-standard, and contract. In addition, the bibliographies of certain widely cited articles were examined for additional publications. Furthermore, a search was conducted on widely cited authors' names, to see if they had produced other publications that were relevant. Although the list of publications in these tables is not exhaustive (i.e., few unpublished articles are included, publications that use different terminology are potentially excluded), the intention is to provide a general overview of the available literature. As such, the table in Appendix A contains information regarding the methodologies, working definitions of contingent workers, the variables studied, the unit of analysis and the context of the research, as well as the key findings in the available empirical research on contingent workers. Appendix

B contains information regarding the working definitions, the issues discussed, and the context of the non-empirical research on contingent workers. These aspects are discussed below.

Types of Contingent Work

A dominant theme discussed in the theoretical literature on contingent work is how this construct should be defined and what sub-types of this phenomenon exist (e.g., Barker, 1995; Rousseau & Libuser, 1997). These definitions and distinctions are controversial, and in the empirical literature one may observe a wide variety of different interpretations of the construct 'contingent work'. While there are some differences in the exact definition and scope of most contingent employment contracts, a widely cited definition of contingent work describes it as occurring when workers "do not have explicit or implicit contracts for long-term employment and one in which the minimum hours can vary in a non-systematic manner" (Polivka & Nardone, 1989:11).

By far, the most commonly studied form of contingent work is temporary work. Other forms of contingent work that have also been studied empirically include substitute workers, probationary workers, seasonal workers and apprentices (e.g., Aronsson, Gustafsson, & Dallner, 2002), independent contractors (e.g., Geber, 1999), internships (Bergman, 2002), self-employed workers (e.g., Kalleberg, Reskin & Hudson, 2000), on-call workers, short-term hires and contract workers (e.g., Houseman, 2001), casual workers (Gaston & Timcke, 1999), bridge employment (e.g., Kim & Feldman, 2000), direct-hire temporary workers (e.g., Parker, Griffin, Sprigg, & Wall, 2002), and leased workers (Park & Butler, 2001). Migrant, leased, outsourced, and home-based workers are

also occasionally addressed in the theoretical literature (e.g., Matusik & Hill, 1998; Nollen, 1996; Zeytinoglu & Muteshi, 2000) but there does not appear to be a wide consensus that each of these forms of employment should be defined as contingent work per se. While temporary employment appears to be the most widely accepted and studied form of contingent work, these other forms discussed above also conform to the first part of the definition proposed by Polivka and Nardone (1989) of contingent work as occurring when an individual and his or her employer do not have an implicit or explicit expectation of on-going or continuous employment.

Other researchers do not specify the nature of the contingent work contract that they are studying, for example if the worker in question is an independent contractor or a direct-hire (Pearce, 1993). Furthermore, although many empirical researchers do note the nature of their participants' employment relationships, a close examination of other details that are provided occasionally calls these labels into question. For example, some 'independent contractors' (Ang & Slaughter, 2001; Collinson, 1999; Ho & Ang, 1998; Kochan, Smith, Wells & Rebitzer, 1994; Uzzi & Barsness, 1998) do not appear to set their own hours of work or determine for themselves how their tasks will be completed, even though these are generally considered to be prerequisites for a worker to be considered an independent contractor rather than a direct-hire temporary worker (Connelly & Gallagher, 2004). Unfortunately, many authors do not provide sufficient detail to allow their definitions to be verified or challenged. The distinction between an independent contractor and another type of temporary worker is important, because workers with different forms of contingent work contracts will not necessarily have

similar expectations with respect to the obligations of their client organization, their intermediary organization, or their employer organization as the case may be.

Similarly, some researchers do not specify the exact sub-type of the form of contingent work in question, such as whether the temporary workers being studied were hired through an intermediary or directly by the company (e.g., Davis-Blake & Uzzi, 1993; Lautsch, 1999; Porter, 1995; Sias, Kramer & Jenkins, 1997; Van Dyne & Ang, 1998; Wong, 2001). Unfortunately, no current research compares direct-hire temporary workers to intermediated temporary workers. Such distinctions may be important because temporary workers who are hired directly by the company where they will perform their duties may have much more in common with permanent employees than temporary workers who also deal with an intermediary such as a temporary firm.

A final definitional controversy relates to the issue of part-time workers. Some theoretical and empirical researchers consider part-time work to be a form of contingent work (e.g. Feldman, 1995; Kalleberg, et al., 2000; Park & Butler, 2001; Uzzi & Barsness, 1998). However, other researchers suggest that part-time workers and contingent workers are significantly different groups, because part-time work can be ongoing (Gallagher; 2002; Sverke, Gallagher, & Hellgren, 2000; Walsh & Deery, 1999). While at this point in time there is no consensus on this issue, Zeytinoglu and Muteshi (2000) suggest that part-time workers may be either permanent or temporary (i.e. contingent), and that temporary workers may work either full-time or part-time.

Methodologies

Quantitative surveys are currently the most commonly used research method for studying contingent workers. Of the available research, only a small proportion use qualitative methods such as interviews (e.g., Collinson, 1999; Galup, Saunders, Nelson, & Cerveny, 1997; Werber Castaneda, 1999), focus groups (e.g., Geber, 1999; Ho & Ang, 1998), participant observation (Henson, 1996; Rogers, 1995; 2000) or case studies (e.g., Lautsch, 1999; von Hippel, Mangum, Greenberger, Heneman & Skolind, 1997; Wong, 2001). Some of these qualitative studies also use quantitative methods as well.

Although most of the research to date focuses on contingent workers' experiences in the context of their assignments with their client organization, some researchers have explored intermediated contingent workers' relationships with their temporary firms. Much of this research is largely qualitative (e.g. Feldman, Doerpinhaus & Turnley, 1994; Henson, 1996; Rogers, 1995; Rogers, 2000), but a quantitative study by Newton McClurg (1999) examines intermediated temporary workers' commitment towards their temporary firms. Connelly, Gallagher, and Gilley (2003) also examine intermediated temporary workers' organizational commitment to their temporary firms as well as their client organizations. Finally, Liden, Wayne, Kraimer, and Sparrowe (2003) examine these variables as well as organizational justice and client organization citizenship behaviors and manager perceptions of affective commitment.

The preferred unit of analysis and context for the empirical research on contingent workers appears to be individual-level analyses. Although a number of studies have been conducted in the context of client organizations, in many cases this research is intended to examine the individual participants' reactions to their environment, rather than their

attitudes or behaviors towards any particular target. For example, a number of studies examine contingent workers' health or well-being (e.g, Aronsson, et al., 2002) or their reasons for becoming a contingent worker (e.g., Weckerle & Shultz, 1999).

A few studies use archival data to conduct firm-level analyses regarding which organizations are likely to employ contingent workers (e.g., Davis-Blake & Uzzi, 1993; Wong, 2001), or what policies have been developed with respect to integrating contingent workers along with their permanent employees (e.g., Lautsch, 2000). For such research questions, a different level of analysis would be unsuitable.

Of the available empirical studies that deal with contingent work, a substantial number focus on comparing the differences between the mean work attitudes of contingent workers and 'regular' permanent employees (e.g. see Aronsson, et al., 2002; Kochan, et al., 1994; McDonald & Makin, 2000; Park & Butler, 2001; Parker, Griffen, Sprigg, & Wall, 2002; Pearce, 1993; Van Dyne & Ang, 1998). Interestingly, Sias et al. (1997) also found significant differences between contingent workers and newly-hired permanent employees. This research is particularly important, in that it shows that the contingent workforce is distinct from the permanent employee workforce, which in turn suggests that further research is required to investigate the antecedents and consequences of contingent workers' job attitudes and behaviors. In contrast, Bergman (2002) suggests that research comparing contingent workers to permanent employees should actually be abandoned, because it relies on a false dichotomy between psychological and objective contingency. At issue is the possibility that permanent employees who believe that their position is insecure may have job attitudes that are similar to most intermediated

contingent workers, while “temporary” workers who have been with the same client for extended periods of time may have more in common with most permanent employees.

Context of the Contingent Work Environment

While the available empirical research on contingent work appears to concentrate primarily on manufacturing or administrative occupations, this is not true of the non-empirical research on contingent work. In fact, the body of theoretical research on contingent work appears to be quite balanced, in that it discusses skilled occupations such as “knowledge” workers (Drucker, 2002), professional and technical workers (Matusik & Hill, 1998), and university faculty (Barker, 1995), as well as factory workers (e.g., Klein Hesselink, & van Vuuren, 1999) and petrochemical workers (Rousseau & Libuser, 1997). However, it is common for contingent work researchers to not specify the industry or set of occupations that they are discussing, perhaps because it is felt that the themes that they are discussing apply to all contingent workers regardless of the tasks that they perform or their professional orientations. While this may be true, it is important that contingent workers not be treated as a homogenous group, and that the nuances regarding their training and employability not be ignored.

Independent and Dependent Variables

In the context of contingent work and contingent workers, some variables have been studied more than others. The existing literature may be divided into five broad categories: research that explores the characteristics of contingent workers, the working

conditions of these individuals, their job and work attitudes, their behaviors, and the perspectives of organizations that use their services.

Characteristics of contingent workers. The primary intention of some empirical research is to describe the demographic characteristics of these individuals, and to explore what factors might be conducive to someone becoming a contingent worker (e.g., Bellemore, 1999; Bernasek & Kinnear, 1999). However, this is not the only reason for the collection of such data. Other researchers control for these demographic variables in order to more accurately assess the relationships that are their primary focus (e.g., Geber, 1999; Kalleberg et al., 2000).

Of the demographic characteristics that have been examined, gender is by far the most popular (e.g., Newton McClurg, 1999; Parker, et al., 2002), but a wide variety of other variables have been studied, including, age, race, marital status, education, wages and benefits, ages of children, amount of experience, personality, tenure, and spousal income (e.g., Bellemore, 1998; Marler, Woodard Barringer, & Milkovich, 2002). In general, the individuals who have participated in studies on contingent work tend to be older, female, non-white, married with low spousal income and preschool-aged children, as well as less conscientious and more extroverted than permanent employees. However, these findings may not generalize to all types of contingent work or to all occupations or industries; for example, Kochan et al. (1994) suggest that independent contractors in the petrochemical industry are more likely to be younger, Hispanic, less experienced, and less educated than the permanent employees.

While these demographic variables are an important way of providing a more complete analysis of contingent work and contingent workers, it is possible that an examination of other relevant individual characteristics will also deepen our understanding of these workers. For example, an emerging stream of research has established that contingent workers vary in the extent to which they are voluntarily pursuing this type of employment relationship as well as the extent to which some contingent workers would prefer to be permanent employees. Volition, or the extent to which workers voluntarily choose contingent work arrangements, differs considerably by the type of arrangement. In particular, temporary workers (working with temporary firms or directly with employers) tend to prefer permanent employment (Hardy & Walker, 2003; Isaksson & Bellagh, 2002; Polivka & Nardone, 1989). Although the precise effect of this volition has yet to be determined, a number of articles investigate this issue (e.g., Ellingson, Gruys, & Sackett, 1998; Krausz, Brandwein, & Fox, 1995).

Working conditions of contingent workers. A significant body of empirical research examines the experiences of contingent workers, particularly in the context of their assignments to their client organizations. All workers' experiences are directly affected by their treatment by their employers, which is often operationalized as perceived organizational support, leadership and encouragement, or justice. While not all of these variables have yet been examined in terms of intermediated temporary workers' relationships with their employer of record (i.e., their temporary firm), many aspects of contingent workers' experiences have been examined in the context of their relationships with the client or host environments. For example, some research examines independent contractors' perceptions of justice, fairness, or organizational support (e.g., Ang &

Slaughter, 2001; Geber, 1999). Other research deals with non-permanent workers' feelings of support and encouragement from their host employer (Aronsson, et al., 2002), and intermediated temporary workers' perceptions of organizational support from their temporary firms as well as from their client organizations (Connelly et al., 2003). In general, contingent workers seem to experience levels of perceived organizational support, encouragement, and justice that are neither exceptionally high nor low, and that are comparable to the levels experienced by permanent employees. However, it must be acknowledged that little research has been conducted on these topics and that future research may not support these findings.

Perhaps because of prior research that has suggested that a large proportion of contingent workers are female, some researchers have examined a number of issues that are particularly relevant to some female workers. For example, Rogers and Henson (1997) suggest that the gender and low organizational status of many contingent workers makes them vulnerable to sexual harassment from permanent employees. Other researchers have explored contingent workers' experiences of work-family conflict and family-work conflict (e.g., Collinson, 1999; Gallagher, Gilley, Nelson, Connelly, & Michie, 2001). At this stage, it appears as though contingent workers' levels of conflict are related to a number of factors including their demographics, their occupations and skill levels, and whether or not they are pursuing contingent work voluntarily.

Other researchers have explored the experiences of contingent workers through the lenses of job stressors and job stress or anxiety (e.g., Chen, Popovich, & Kogan, 1999). A number of role stressors have been examined, including role ambiguity (e.g., Krausz et al., 1995), role overload (e.g., Parker, et al., 2002), and role conflict (e.g., Ho &

Ang, 1998). Other work-related stressors that have also been studied include job insecurity (e.g., Morishima & Feuille, 2000) and employment insecurity (Kalleberg et al., 2000). In general, it appears as though contingent workers experience higher than average levels of job and work-related stressors. A related issue is health and well-being. Unfortunately, contingent workers tend to report ill health (Aronsson et al., 2002), burnout (Porter, 1995), as well as mental distress and somatic complaints (Sverke et al., 2000). However, in some cases, contingent workers' job strain may be lower than that of permanent employees, if their job tasks are not demanding (Parker et al., 2002). The safety of contingent workers is a separate yet no less important issue that has also received some attention in the literature (e.g., Collinson, 1999; Kochan et al., 1994; Park & Butler, 2001). Unfortunately, contingent workers tend to have high rates of injury and "accidents", receive inadequate training and safety equipment, and are less likely to have health insurance.

Job and work attitudes of contingent workers. As a reaction to their experiences, contingent workers may form attitudes that may affect their behaviors towards their client organizations as well as towards their temporary firms, if applicable. A number of researchers have explored a variety of job and work attitudes, including satisfaction, commitment, and the psychological contract.

Satisfaction is a particularly popular variable of study among contingent work researchers. In fact, a wide variety of satisfaction foci have been examined in the context of contingent work, including life satisfaction (Chen, et al., 1999), retirement satisfaction (Kim & Feldman, 2000), general or overall satisfaction (e.g., Krausz, et al., 1995), satisfaction with management (Galup, et al., 1997), job satisfaction (e.g., Ellingson, et al.,

1998), as well as work satisfaction and pay satisfaction (Marler et al., 2002). It is difficult to generalize the results of these studies; while some contingent workers appear to be satisfied, these findings are dependent on a number of factors, such as the participants' communication patterns, demographics, level of integration with permanent employees, and whether contingent work was the employment type of choice.

Another important attitude that has also been examined in the context of contingent workers is commitment. From a theoretical perspective, work commitment, specifically organizational commitment, job commitment, occupational commitment, and employment commitment have been examined as they relate to independent contractors, direct hire temporary workers, and temporary workers who have been hired through a temporary firm (Gallagher & McLean Parks, 2001). While commitment is occasionally operationalized in terms of loyalty towards a host organization (Ang & Slaughter, 2001), it has also been more precisely defined in terms of general organizational commitment (Levesque & Rousseau, 1999) or as affective organizational commitment towards the client organization (e.g. McDonald & Makin, 2000; Van Dyne & Ang, 1998). Intermediated temporary workers' affective and continuance commitment towards both their client organizations and their temporary firms have also been measured concurrently, and it appears as though these contingent workers may be committed to both organizations simultaneously (Liden et al., 2003). While one might assume that contingent workers are not capable of organizational commitment, a consensus has emerged that given an appropriately supportive context, contingent workers may have high levels of commitment to their organizations.

A final attitude that may affect contingent workers' behaviors is their psychological contract. McLean Parks, Kidder, and Gallagher (1998) propose various dimensions of the psychological contract as they relate to contingent workers, and suggest that these workers' contracts vary along a number of dimensions, such as their stability, scope, tangibility, focus, and time frame. Some empirical research has been conducted on contingent workers' psychological contracts. For example Ho, Ang, and Straub (2003) suggest that permanent employees who become contractors change their psychological contracts while employers who become clients retain their original expectations. Furthermore, Levesque and Rousseau's (1999) study of adjunct university faculty suggests that workers who voluntarily pursue contingent work will be less likely to experience violations of their psychological contracts. Finally, although McDonald and Makin (2000) did not find significant differences between the psychological contracts of permanent employees and their temporary counterparts, it may be that their lack of significant findings may be due to an inadequate definition of a psychological contract or a lack of appropriate moderators.

Behaviors of contingent workers. Although contingent workers are often portrayed in the media as performing organizational tasks that are peripheral to the success of the firm (e.g. Clockwatchers, 1997), these individuals often have responsibilities that are important for organizational performance, whether they are filling in for permanent employees, working on a particular project team, or performing another role. Therefore, a number of researchers have examined contingent workers in-role behaviors (e.g., Ang & Slaughter, 2001), and task performance (Marler, et al., 2002), as well as withdrawal (Bergman, 2002), and turnover intentions (Isaksson, 1998). While in-

role or task performance is of concern to practitioners and academics alike, extra-role or organizational citizenship behaviors have also received some attention in the literature (e.g., Kidder, 1995; Liden et al., 2003; Geber, 1999; Van Dyne & Ang, 1998).

Some limited research has been conducted on contingent workers' knowledge sharing and communication patterns, especially in comparison to other types of workers. This is an important area for organizations that use the services of contingent workers to consider, because as Matusik and Hill (1998) note, the use of contingent workers can add knowledge to a firm or it can cause proprietary knowledge to leak into the public domain. Some empirical research has been conducted on contingent workers' knowledge sharing and communication patterns; for example, Sias et al. (1997) suggest that temporary workers seek appraisal information less frequently, and also share little of their knowledge with permanent employees, in comparison to new permanent employees. Weber Castaneda (1999) suggests that contingent workers use social ties to secure contracts and to gather information. In addition, other research has been conducted on whether contingent workers' communication patterns affect their work attitudes; Chen et al. (1999) suggest that there is no relationship between life satisfaction and positive communication with coworkers unless the temporary workers also held a permanent job.

Perspectives of organizations that use contingent workers' services. A common theme among theoretical researchers is a discussion of the growth of contingent work (e.g., Tregaskis, Brester, Mayne, & Hegewisch, 1998) as well as the benefits and drawbacks of this growth, from the perspective of both contingent workers and the organizations that avail themselves of their services (e.g., Anderson, Pulich, & Sisak, 2002; Klein Hesselink & van Vuuren, 1999; Pfeffer & Baron, 1988). In the same way

that much individual-level research has examined the characteristics of people who pursue contingent employment, a significant body of research has emerged that describes the characteristics of firms that use contingent workers (e.g., Davis-Blake & Uzzi, 1993). Subsequent related research has explored the benefits and disadvantages of these organizations' use of contingent workers (von Hippel, et al., 1997). In general, firms that use and benefit from these individuals tend to be in cyclical industries, are large and bureaucratic, and have multiple sites.

Such investigations have led to an examination of the possible strategies that organizations can use in order to successfully integrate contingent workers into their firms (e.g., Lautsch, 1999). Related research investigates the impact of the use of contingent workers on permanent employees' job design and their perceptions of the trustworthiness of their employer, which both tend to deteriorate (e.g., Pearce, 1993), as well as permanent employees' perceptions of the trustworthiness of contingent workers in their organizations, which is unfortunately quite low (Ang & Slaughter, 2001). A related area in practitioner-oriented publications discusses how contingent workers should be managed, including the role of selection, job design and job quality (Connelly & Gallagher, 2004), job insecurity, role stressors, and impacts on service delivery (Gallagher & Connelly, 2003) as well as team building and other human resource management issues (Gallagher, 2002).

Methodological Limitations of Contingent Work Research

Of the available empirical studies on contingent work, many have some significant methodological limitations that are, of course, also common to research that

does not involve contingent workers. For example, most studies on contingent workers are cross-sectional, and do not compensate for mono-method bias. In addition, a significant proportion of quantitative studies on contingent workers have somewhat small sample sizes. For instance, McDonald and Makin (2000) surveyed forty-three direct-hire temporary workers, and Kidder (1995) surveyed fifteen intermediated temporary workers. It may be that contingent work researchers are experiencing difficulty recruiting respondents. While a number of studies that use archival data have much larger sample sizes, future research should use more substantial numbers of participants.

A further difficulty with some current research on contingent workers arises from the varied ways in which their status is operationalized. As discussed above, some researchers are not clear about what type of contingent worker is being studied. This has serious implications for the generalizability of their research findings. Because different types of contingent work have appreciably different characteristics, a finding that applies to one group (e.g., independent contractors or direct-hire temporary workers) may not apply to another (e.g., intermediated temporary workers). In addition, the length of contingent workers' assignments is a further issue that may affect the generalizability of a study's research findings. For example, a contingent worker who has been at a client or host organization for an extended period of time (e.g., the adjunct instructors in Levesque and Rousseau's (1999) study had an average organizational tenure of 6.5 years) may not have much in common with contingent workers whose assignments are typically less than a week in length. More troubling is the pronounced tendency of researchers to not report this information at all.

Other constructs that are examined in the context of contingent work are also sometimes operationalized in ways that have not been tested rigorously. For example, in the mainstream organizational behavior literature, a consensus has emerged as to how certain variables should be measured. However, in the research on contingent workers, some studies use new measures that have not been adequately tested for reliability and validity, or measures that are no longer currently used in the mainstream literature. For example, there are a number of established scales to measure distributive, procedural, and interactional justice (e.g., Donovan, Drasgow, & Munson, 1998; Folger & Konsovsky, 1989; Kim, Price, Mueller, & Watson, 1996; Levinthal, 1980). In contrast, Geber's (1999) study of the impact of 'fairness' on organizational commitment and turnover intentions used a new scale that was developed after interacting with focus groups similar to the sample used in the study, and no pretest was conducted; unfortunately Geber (1999) does not provide sufficient information to establish the rigor of the methodology.

Organizational citizenship and extra-role behaviors are also subject to a variety of different operationalizations by contingent work researchers. While Pearce (1993) measures extra-role behaviors with a three-item self-report scale supplemented by supervisory ratings, Ang and Slaugter (2001) state that they are measuring extra-role behaviors but use seven items suggested by Van Dyne, Graham, and Diensch (1994) that ostensibly measure organizational citizenship behavior. In contrast, Bergman (2002) measures organizational citizenship behaviors with a seventeen-item scale created by Borman, Hanson, Motowidlo, Drasgow, Foster, and Kubisiak (1998), but Van Dyne and Ang (1998) use a seven-item scale developed by Van Dyne and LePine (1998). Liden et al. (2003) use four items from the Niehoff and Moorman (1993) altruism scale. Kidder

(1995) does not report the source of the items for in-role or extra-role behaviors, although she does note that they were drawn from the current organizational citizenship behavior literature. Furthermore, contextual performance was measured by Marler, Woodard Barringer, and Milkovich (2002) with eight items that appear to have been developed specifically for their study.

Unfortunately, these varied operationalizations make it difficult to compare the results from one study to those of another. While it is acknowledged that sometimes it is necessary to create or adapt a measure or a scale so that it is relevant to the research context (i.e. contingent workers), future research should ensure that the operationalization of the constructs that are being examined is chosen with care.

Some research employs multiple methodologies. For example, Ang and Slaughter (2001) and Galup et al. (1997) conducted qualitative interviews as well as quantitative surveys, and Geber (1999) as well as Ho, Ang, and Straub (2003) conducted qualitative focus groups as well as quantitative surveys. Marler et al. (2002) collected quantitative data from both an archival source and from new surveys. Liden et al. (2003) use managerial ratings as well as self-reports. However, despite those exceptions, most contingent work research is conducted with a single methodology and uses a single source of data. Future studies should endeavor to use multiple sources of data when available and multiple methodologies where possible.

Gaps in the Research on Contingent Work

From this analysis, one might note that research on contingent work and contingent workers is in its early stages, and that there are a number of gaps in the

available research. In the non-empirical literature that deals with contingent work, one might observe that there is a general emphasis on providing a description of the phenomenon, rather than a focus on developing theories to explain why the observed trends or effects are occurring. While it must be acknowledged that the body of theoretical research on contingent work is rather limited, future theoretical research should endeavor to move beyond describing and defining this construct, and move towards deepening our theoretical understanding of why various types of contingent workers might hold their job and work-related attitudes and engage in particular job and work-related behaviors.

Although a number of different types of contingent work have been discussed in the theoretical research on this subject, and intermediated temporary workers have been the focus of a number of publications, more research can be done on this type of contingent work. This triangular employment relationship (Connelly & Gallagher, 2004) is complex and significantly different than permanent employment with a single employing organization, and as such a more in-depth examination of the impact of the presence of an intermediary is warranted. Although research on other forms of contingent work, such as seasonal employment and direct-hire temporary work is also required, theoreticians should not hesitate to consider how intermediated temporary workers' experiences, attitudes and behaviors may be affected by the structure of their employment relationships.

While our understanding of intermediated temporary workers' experiences, attitudes, and behaviors towards their client organizations is deepening, at the present time very little research focuses on intermediated temporary workers' relationships with

their temporary firms. Considering that these organizations are intermediated temporary workers' employers of record, and considering that temporary firms determine a number of factors relevant to intermediated temporary workers' daily conditions of employment (e.g., pay, eligibility for employment, location of assignment, general content of duties to be performed, etc.), these workers' relationships with such organizations are central to their work experiences, and these relationships should therefore receive more attention from researchers.

To a certain extent, the occupations studied may not reflect the general contingent labor force. Although the stereotype of a contingent worker is someone who is employed in a clerical or administrative support role if they are female, or someone who is employed as a general laborer if they are male, this generalization is not entirely accurate. While many contingent workers do perform these duties, a significant and growing proportion of contingent workers are highly educated, skilled, and specialized workers such as accountants, translators, and management consultants. To date, no empirical research has reported studying individuals in these occupations (although not all studies report the occupations of their respondents). Unfortunately, the field's focus on a limited subset of actual contingent workers may present a skewed picture of contingent workers' experiences, attitudes, and behaviors, particularly if these overlooked highly skilled contingent workers have higher levels of autonomy, professional commitment, social norms, and motivation. While research on individuals in clerical, administrative, and general labor positions should not be abandoned, it behooves researchers to broaden their focus to provide a more representative view of contemporary contingent work.

Because such a wide variety of topics have been studied in terms of how they relate to contingent workers, it is particularly surprising that no research on this segment of the workforce has yet focused on counterproductive workplace behaviors. Although it is unlikely that contingent workers are disproportionately likely to engage in behaviors that harm either their client or host organizations or any intermediaries with which they are involved, contingent workers' counterproductive workplace behaviors do merit attention by researchers who are endeavoring to provide a more complete representation of these workers' behaviors.

CHAPTER III: EXPLAINING INTERMEDIATED TEMPORARY WORKERS' BEHAVIORS

Although organizations are increasingly depending on their temporary workforces, they paradoxically tend not to allocate a significant portion of their resources to monitoring and enhancing the performance of these individuals. Managers of temporary workers may assume that they can simply allocate these individuals simple tasks and then discontinue their contracts if these workers' contributions to the organization are unsatisfactory. Unfortunately, this strategy is less than optimal. Managers who adopt this stance assume that temporary workers' behaviors are readily observable, but in practice, this is not necessarily possible. Workers can engage in a wide variety of positive or negative behaviors when they perform their duties or interact with customers and colleagues, unbeknownst to their managers. In addition, this monitoring and correcting strategy requires a significant expenditure of time and energy on the part of managers, which could be better spent on more productive activities. Furthermore, the 'core' organizational workforce may observe managerial behavior (e.g., management by exception) that diminishes their trust or their affective commitment to their organization (Morishima & Feuille, 2000).

Temporary firms are also in a position to benefit from promoting desired behaviors among the workers that they send on client assignments. While a 'Theory X' strategy might assume that all temporary workers are naturally lazy, duplicitous, or unmotivated to perform well, and be predicated on the belief that a large supply of replacement workers exists, this is again a sub-optimal strategy. Temporary firms that

routinely ‘blacklist’ workers need to focus extra resources on recruiting additional workers to replace them. Especially in fields where the supply of temporary workers is limited or decreasing, this may be an onerous task. Unfortunately, if these firms do not examine the predictors of their temporary workers’ desirable and undesirable behaviors, it is unlikely that even their new ‘replacement’ workers will fare better than their predecessors.

An alternative strategy is to identify predictors of desired behaviors in permanent employees, and to apply these findings in the context of temporary workers. This strategy not only potentially encourages desired behaviors among these workers, but it may also avoid providing examples of negative management actions that may affect how permanent employees view their organizations. Furthermore, a careful examination of the predictors of contingent workers’ behaviors may be especially warranted, considering that their perceptions that are generated in one context (e.g. the client organization or the temporary firm) may “spill over” into behaviors in a separate context (e.g., the temporary firm or the client organization). Although there are a number of behaviors that organizations may want to encourage or discourage among their workers, it is particularly important that they examine predictors of organizational citizenship behaviors and counterproductive workplace behaviors for the following reasons.

Organizational citizenship behaviors have been linked to various positive organizational outcomes by a number of researchers. According to Podsakoff and MacKenzie (1997), there are many reasons for this close relationship; organizational citizenship behaviors enhance coworkers’ productivity, enhance managers’ productivity, free up organizational resources, help to coordinate individual and group actions,

decrease turnover, and improve organizational adaptability. Although each individual citizenship action may have a negligible effect if examined in isolation, the aggregated effect of many such actions may have a significant effect on organizational-level performance.

Counterproductive workplace behaviors cause a number of negative outcomes for the organizations where they occur. These behaviors not only cause immediate and direct negative costs (e.g., replacement and repair costs for broken equipment, replacement costs for stolen merchandise or supplies, legal and turnover costs when malfeasance is discovered, etc.) but may also indirectly affect the organization by negatively influencing morale and increasing turnover among the productive workers. These behaviors also force managers and supervisors to spend time developing policies and strategies to prevent counterproductive workplace behaviors instead of allocating these resources towards training, motivation, and innovation.

Although the predictors and outcomes of intermediated temporary workers' behaviors in the context of both the client organization and the temporary firm may be similar, it is important to note that these two organizations have somewhat competing interests. While both organizations benefit from having highly motivated and competent intermediated temporary workers affiliated with them, it is in the interest of the client organization to "extract the maximum labor power from each temporary in order to shorten the number of hours for which they are billed by the temporary agency" while the temporary firm "has an interest in placing each temporary on an assignment for as many hours as possible" (Rogers, 2000, p. 46). This divergence in interests requires that both contexts be examined separately.

For the above reasons, this dissertation will examine four important dependent variables in the context of the intermediated temporary industry: counterproductive workplace behaviors directed at client organizations, organizational citizenship behaviors directed at client organizations, counterproductive workplace behaviors directed at temporary firms, and organizational citizenship behaviors directed at temporary firms. While the initial hypotheses that are presented (i.e., H1-H2) extend prior research that has been conducted in the context of permanent employment, the subsequent hypotheses (i.e., H3-H13) are more exploratory.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Organizational Citizenship Behaviors

The definition of 'organizational citizenship behavior' is somewhat controversial. A commonly cited definition is provided by Organ (1988), who explains that it is "individual behavior that is discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system, and that in the aggregate promotes the effective functioning of the organization" (p. 4). However, Organ (1997) has since adjusted his definition to emphasize that it comprises of "contributions to the maintenance and enhancement of the social and psychological context that supports task performance" and notes that it is "less likely than task performance to be regarded by the performer as leading confidently to systemic rewards. Although research has demonstrated that exceptional displays of organizational citizenship behavior can influence performance evaluations, and that managers are willing to put a dollar value on some forms of citizenship, it is doubtful that

the persons rendering these contributions would see a one-to-one correspondence between discrete instances of such contributions and near-term payoffs" (p. 91).

Organ (1988) suggests five categories of organizational citizenship behavior, comprised of altruism, conscientiousness, sportsmanship, courtesy, and civic virtue. In contrast, Moorman and Blakely (1995) suggest that a four-component model, comprised of interpersonal helping, individual initiative, personal industry, and loyal boosterism is more appropriate. According to a meta-analysis conducted by LePine, Erez, and Johnson (2002), the various dimensions of organizational citizenship behavior are highly correlated, and represent somewhat imperfect indicators of the underlying latent construct. As such, it is important to avoid examining each or any dimension in isolation; a more accurate measure can be obtained by studying organizational citizenship behavior as a global construct.

According to some researchers, organizational citizenship behavior is a form of positive extra-role behavior, along with prosocial organizational behavior, whistle-blowing, and principled organizational dissent (Van Dyne, Cummings, & McLean Parks, 1995). Positive extra-role behavior may be defined as "behavior which benefits the organization and / or is intended to benefit the organization, which is discretionary and which goes beyond existing role expectations" (Van Dyne et al. 1995, p. 218). The definitions are indeed quite similar, but we may note some subtle differences between the broader concept of positive extra-role behavior, and the somewhat narrower definition of organizational citizenship behavior. One such difference relates to the question of intention. For example, organizational citizenship behaviors are not only intended to benefit the organization, but they must actually provide a benefit (Van Dyne et al., 1995).

This contrasts with other positive extra-role behaviors, because according to Van Dyne et al. (1995), individuals who engage in positive extra-role behaviors may merely intend to benefit the organization. An additional difference relates to the question of the nature of the behaviors themselves. Organizational citizenship behaviors are exclusively affiliative and 'promotive' and include helping, sharing, and cooperating (Van Dyne et al., 1995). In contrast, positive extra-role behaviors may also be 'prohibitive', and include such behaviors as challenging, stopping, or prohibiting (Van Dyne et al., 1995; Van Dyne & LePine, 1998). Yet another difference relates to the question of the target of such behavior. While the definition of organizational citizenship behavior is clear that the beneficiary of such behaviors is the organization, the intended beneficiary of positive extra-role behaviors is broader, and although it may include the organization, it may also include specific groups and individuals, along with other stakeholders in the wider community (Van Dyne et al., 1995).

Organizational citizenship behaviors may, in some cases, appear similar to impression management. However, individuals engage in impression management behaviors in order to influence the image that others have of them (Rosenfeld, Giacalone & Riordan, 1995). Impression management tactics may be divided into five categories: ingratiation, where individuals seek to be viewed as likable; exemplification, where individuals seek to be viewed as dedicated; intimidation, where individuals seek to appear dangerous or threatening; self-promotion, where individuals seek to be viewed as competent; and supplication, where individuals seek to be viewed as in need of assistance (Jones & Pittman, 1982). The key difference between impression management and organizational citizenship behaviors appears to be the motivation: 'looking good' instead

of ‘doing good’ (Bolino, 1999). The intended beneficiary of an individual who engages in organizational citizenship behavior is the organization (Van Dyne et al., 1995) but the intended beneficiary of an individual who engages in impression management is that same individual. A study by Rioux and Penner (2001) found no significant correlations between the motivations for impression management and the motivations for organizational citizenship behavior. While individuals performing organizational citizenship behaviors are improving the functioning of the organization without the promise of rewards, impression managers may or may not be improving the functioning of the organization, and they are doing this with the sole purpose of being rewarded.

Some researchers have suggested that contextual performance is a more apt construct than organizational citizenship behavior to describe behaviors that improve the functioning of an organization. Borman and Motowidlo (1993), for example, were concerned that performance measurement research at the time focused solely on one aspect of an individual’s behavior: task performance, and ignored behaviors such as volunteering, persisting, helping, following rules, and endorsing organizational objectives. These behaviors, which Borman and Motowidlo termed ‘contextual performance’ are also important to the organization and its members because they create an organizational context that is conducive to superior task performance. According to Organ (1997), contextual performance is different from organizational citizenship behavior because contextual performance may be rewarded by the organization, while typically, organizational citizenship behavior is not. As Motowidlo (2000) notes, research on contextual performance is conceptually different from research on organizational

citizenship behavior, although there may be some overlap in how these behaviors are manifested.

For this dissertation, the construct 'organizational citizenship behavior' is preferable to other, similar, constructs, because it will be more readily comparable to previous research on contingent workers that has focused on organizational citizenship behavior. Furthermore, although intermediated temporary workers are generally at an organization for a relatively short period of time, they still have the opportunity to engage in organizational citizenship behaviors both towards their client organizations and towards their temporary firms.

Organizational citizenship behavior towards the client firm. Because contingent workers tend to have more transactional psychological contracts than permanent employees, one might assume that they would direct fewer organizational citizenship behaviors towards their client organizations. However, a study by Kidder (1995) suggests that temporary nurses perform the same number of organizational citizenship behaviors as permanent nurses. Furthermore, while Van Dyne and Ang (1998) found that although the mean rate of organizational citizenship behaviors is lower among contingent workers than permanent employees, the relationship between organizational commitment and organizational citizenship behaviors is stronger for contingent workers. Although Liden et al. (2003) did not compare temporary workers to permanent employees, their results mirrored those of Van Dyne and Ang (1998). Essentially, firms that engage the services of temporary workers can anticipate more organizational citizenship behaviors if these individuals are highly committed to the client organization.

Temporary workers may define their job responsibilities differently from their permanent colleagues. Transactional psychological contracts, where the worker only performs exactly what is explicitly stipulated in the employment contract, have been identified by Rousseau (1995) as being less desirable than relational psychological contracts, where the worker and the employer rely on a more fluid give-and-take employment relationship. For example, independent contractors report performing more organizational citizenship behaviors than permanent employees but this may be because their contracts typically specify all required activities, while the job descriptions of their permanent counterparts are generally far more dynamic (Pearce, 1993). Similarly, temporary workers, who may have more transactional psychological and actual contracts with their client organizations, may classify their behaviors differently than their permanent counterparts, who have more relational psychological and actual contracts (Gallagher & Connelly, 2003).

The organizational citizenship behaviors performed by temporary workers towards their client organizations may be qualitatively similar to the behaviors in which a permanent employee might engage. For example, temporary workers may engage in interpersonal helping, a dimension suggested by Moorman and Blakely (1995). For a temporary worker, this behavior may be manifested by providing unexpected assistance to permanent employees, as in the example provided by Rogers (1995) where a temporary worker trained a number of administrative support workers to use some new computer equipment, although she had not been hired to perform this task. Similarly, Liden et al. (2003) found that temporary workers would help others who had heavy workloads or who had been absent from work.

In addition, temporary workers may also demonstrate individual initiative, which is another dimension of organizational citizenship behavior proposed by Moorman and Blakely (1995). For example, temporary nurses studied by Kidder (1995) reported "asking to learn how to do tasks which are not expected or required" (p. 10). Furthermore, temporary workers may exhibit the 'personal industry' dimension of organizational citizenship behavior (Moorman & Blakely, 1995) by completing their tasks as rapidly and as conscientiously as possible (Rogers, 1995; 2000). Finally, temporary workers may also demonstrate 'loyal boosterism', the fourth dimension of organizational citizenship behavior identified by Moorman and Blakely (1995), by speaking positively of the client organization to other temporary workers, to the temporary firm, and to other individuals.

In addition to the possible examples of organizational citizenship behaviors performed by temporary workers towards their client organizations that fit into the dimensions identified by Moorman and Blakely (1995), Kidder (1995) suggests a number of other relevant behaviors, such as "automatically know[ing] your way around [the] unit, where things are, etc. without orientation, [being a] 'sounding board' for complaints of permanent employees, and building positive team spirit among 'regulars'"(p. 10). In Kidder's study, these temporary nurses' permanent counterparts did not consider these behaviors to be outside of their regular duties.

Organizational citizenship behavior towards the temporary firm. Intermediated temporary workers may also engage in organizational citizenship behaviors towards their temporary firms. For example, intermediated temporary workers may demonstrate interpersonal helping behavior (Moorman & Blakely, 1995) by being flexible in terms of

the types of assignments that they will accept, by being amenable about their rates of pay, and by being acquiescent about the location of the client organizations where they will agree to work.

In addition, temporary workers may also demonstrate individual initiative. For example, intermediated temporary workers may endeavor to extend the length of their client assignments, either by asking for additional tasks or by working slowly. Alternately, these individuals may solicit temporary assignments from their existing contacts in potential client organizations (Henson, 1996). Furthermore, intermediated temporary workers may exhibit personal industry by completing their tasks exactly as required by their client organizations. Finally, intermediated temporary workers may demonstrate loyal boosterism by speaking positively of the temporary firm to other current and potential temporary workers, to members of current and potential client organizations, and to other individuals.

In some cases, intermediated temporary workers may engage in organizational citizenship behaviors that benefit one organization but that are not necessarily beneficial to the other organization in the short term. For example, intermediated temporary workers who rapidly complete their required tasks at their client organizations are assisting these organizations, while not necessarily assisting their temporary firm, which now needs to redeploy the temporary worker to another assignment in order to recapture the lost revenue from the prematurely terminated assignment. In the long term, however, such behavior may be beneficial to the temporary firm, if its reputation is enhanced by the rapid work of the workers that it deploys to its clients.

Counterproductive Workplace Behaviors

Counterproductive workplace behaviors are actions by workers that are "intended to have a detrimental effect on organizations and their members" (Fox, Spector & Miles, 2001). As noted by Fox et al. (2001) these behaviors vary along a continuum between overt and somewhat passive. Robinson and Bennett (1995) have identified four categories of such behaviors (which they term 'deviant workplace behaviors'): production deviance, property deviance, political deviance, and personal aggression. While a number of researchers tend to study only one form of counterproductive workplace behavior at a time (e.g., theft, sabotage, interpersonal conflict, violence, psychological aggression), these behaviors, sometimes described as organizational retaliatory behaviors (e.g., Skarlicki & Folger, 1997) all have a negative impact on the organization where they take place. Not only do these behaviors obviously have direct negative impacts, but they also have indirect negative effects on morale, and they force managers to spend time 'policing' their workers instead of motivating and training them.

A number of predictors of counterproductive workplace behaviors have been identified in the literature. Initial research in this area focused on identifying individual characteristics that may have predisposed an individual to engage in counterproductive behaviors, and attributed these actions to need (in the case of theft), deviant individual backgrounds, greed, temptation, or opportunity (particularly in the case of theft), widespread moral laxity, or marginal status (which might apply to many contingent workers) (Greenberg & Barling, 1996). Psychological traits, such as narcissism have also been explored (e.g., Penney & Spector, 2002). This perspective has lead to a surfeit of integrity test research (Fox et al., 2001) and a focus on selection rather than prevention.

Since then, however, the research focus has shifted towards examining cognitive and emotional responses to situational factors, such as organizational justice that might predict counterproductive workplace behaviors (Greenberg & Barling, 1996).

Although intermediated temporary workers are generally at an organization for a relatively short period of time, they still have the opportunity to engage in counterproductive behaviors both towards their client organizations and towards their temporary firms.

Counterproductive behaviors towards the client organization. As noted earlier, Robinson and Bennett (1995) suggest that counterproductive workplace behaviors may be divided into four categories: production, property, political deviance, and personal aggression. As with the permanent employees with whom they work, intermediated temporary workers may also engage in each of these damaging types of behaviors, given the motivation and the opportunity.

Intermediated temporary workers may engage in production deviance towards their client organizations by arriving late, by using billable hours for personal or non-work related tasks, by calling in sick when not actually ill, by quitting before the end of an assignment (Rogers, 1995; 2000), by deliberately but covertly working slowly in order to extend the number of billable hours (Henson, 1996), by sabotaging work processes (e.g. by not answering phone calls or emails or by transmitting misinformation), or by committing an unacceptable level of errors.

In addition, intermediated temporary workers may commit property-related counterproductive workplace behaviors towards their client organizations by damaging or sabotaging work equipment, by stealing supplies or equipment, or by wasting materials

(Rogers, 2000). Although time is difficult to define as 'property', intermediated temporary workers may also "steal" from the client organization by doctoring their time cards, for example by taking a 45 minute lunch break but writing down a break of only 30 minutes (Henson, 1996).

Furthermore, intermediated temporary workers may engage in political counterproductive workplace behaviors by gossiping about other organizational members, or by saying negative things about the client organization or its members to outside individuals or organizations. Finally, intermediated temporary workers may also perform personal aggression-related counterproductive workplace behaviors towards their client organizations by yelling at other organizational members, by threatening to harm them, by making rude gestures towards them, or by giving them the silent treatment.

Counterproductive workplace behavior towards the temporary firm. Intermediated temporary workers may also engage in counterproductive workplace behavior towards their temporary firms. However, all four of the categories of counterproductive workplace behavior proposed by Robinson and Bennett (1995) may not apply equally well. For example, it may be less likely for intermediated temporary workers to engage in property deviance towards their temporary firms, simply because they may have less opportunity to do so. Many temporary workers have little physical contact with their temporary firm, and instead communicate exclusively via telephone or email. While it is conceivable that an intermediated temporary worker could visit the office of their temporary firm and vandalize or steal some property, this would require more effort than if the intermediated temporary worker and the temporary firm were co-located.

In contrast, the production deviance that intermediated temporary workers may direct towards their temporary firm may bear a striking similarity to the production deviance that they may direct towards their client organizations. Because the goal of the temporary firm is to send workers to fulfill the production and service requirements of its client organizations, an intermediated temporary worker who engages in production deviance will affect both the temporary firm and the client organization. Intermediated temporary workers who are intending to harm their temporary firms may arrive late for their client assignments, use billable hours for personal or non-work related tasks, call in sick when not actually ill, quit before the end of their client assignments, (Rogers, 1995; 2000) lie about their abilities in order to secure desirable assignments (Henson, 1996), sabotage work processes (e.g. by not answering phone calls or emails, or by transmitting misinformation), or commit an unacceptable level of errors.

The political counterproductive behaviors that intermediated temporary workers may direct towards their temporary firm may be similar to the political counterproductive behaviors that they may direct towards their client organizations, in that they may gossip about other organizational members (if they have the opportunity and knowledge to do so), or they may say negative things about the temporary firm or its members to outside individuals or organizations. Similarly, intermediated temporary workers may also perform personal aggression-related counterproductive workplace behaviors towards their temporary firms by yelling at the people who work there, by threatening to harm them, and so on.

Separate from the above behaviors, there are also a number of counterproductive behaviors that intermediated temporary workers may direct solely against the temporary

firm, but which may actually benefit the client organization, such as arranging to work 'off the record' (i.e. working directly for a client organization, without notifying or paying the temporary firm), or agreeing to become a permanent employee. Other counterproductive behaviors may negatively affect the temporary firm without being intended to have any impact on the client organizations, such as saying negative things about the temporary firm to potential temporary workers and client organizations.

PREDICTORS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CITIZENSHIP AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE WORKPLACE BEHAVIORS

Various researchers have suggested a number of predictors of organizational citizenship behaviors. While some researchers concentrate on personality and individual characteristic predictors of organizational citizenship behavior (e.g., Moorman & Blakely, 1995; Penner, Midili & Kegelmeyer, 1997), and initial findings suggest that conscientiousness is one of the most important predictors (Organ & Ryan, 1995), the current research focuses on both individual and situational factors. Unlike individual characteristics, situational variables can be influenced by organizations and managers. Specifically, organizational justice is examined as the main predictor of behaviors in this research.

Social identity theory suggests that individuals maintain a positive self-image by categorizing themselves into in-groups and others into out-groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). This theory has been applied by Chattopadhyay and George (2001) to show why permanent employees' trust in and attraction towards their peers are negatively affected by membership in teams that are dominated by temporary workers. Similarly, permanent

employees (either at the temporary firm or the client organization) may treat temporary workers with lower levels of organizational justice, due to their status in an identifiable out-group. Organizational justice is a particularly salient construct to consider, given the relatively marginal status of temporary workers in their organizations.

Although justice is usually examined in the context of an employee-employer relationship, it is also readily applicable to the context of intermediated temporary workers. Temporary firms and client organizations may face practical constraints related to other variables, such as job security or job design, but these organizations are able to offer their workers a context that is free of injustice.

Three forms of organizational justice will be the focus of this study: distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice. These forms of organizational justice are discussed in further detail below. Organizational justice is an important construct to examine, as it is associated with a number of organizational outcomes, including organizational citizenship behavior, counterproductive workplace behavior, job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and trust (e.g., Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001).

While the hypotheses that are listed first (H1 and H2) have not been empirically tested in the context of intermediated temporary workers, it must be acknowledged that they represent a simple extension of the organizational justice literature to a new set of organizations. These hypotheses are included in order to provide the necessary foundation for the hypotheses that follow (H3 – H12).

Distributive Justice

Distributive justice depends on the social comparison of rewards rather than the absolute value of the rewards themselves (Cowherd & Levine, 1993), and deals with the perceived fairness of outcomes (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001). Distributive injustice has been related to a number of serious counterproductive behaviors. For example, employees who perceive distributive injustice may retaliate against the organization by stealing (Greenberg, 1990). Furthermore, Skarlicki and Folger (1997) found that distributive injustice was a significant predictor of a wide range of counterproductive workplace behaviors, including theft, sabotage, wasting materials, phony sickness-related absence, disobedience, gossip, and deliberate work slowdowns. These authors also suggest that a three-way interaction effect between distributive, procedural, and interactional injustice is a more significant predictor of counterproductive workplace behaviors.

While lower distributive justice may have a significant effect on counterproductive workplace behaviors, higher distributive justice may have a significant effect on organizational citizenship behaviors. Although these behaviors do have other significant predictors (e.g., perceived organizational support, job satisfaction, affective organizational commitment) Organ (1988) argues that distributive justice, in particular, is an important predictor of organizational citizenship behaviors. Studies in international contexts (e.g., Alotaibi, 2001; Farh, et al., 1997) as well as a recent meta-analysis, by Colquitt et al. (2001) both confirm that distributive justice is a significant predictor of some organizational citizenship behaviors.

Distributive justice from the temporary firm. Temporary workers are not always paid less than permanent employees. Depending on the client organizations' strategy, temporary workers may even be paid more than their permanent counterparts, although one must consider the entire compensation package, including benefits, which are often not available to contingent workers (Kalleberg et al., 2002). Clients who engage the services of temporary workers because no permanent employees are available or qualified to perform the required tasks will be more likely to try to ensure that they are compensated and treated in a way that will attract and retain their services. In contrast, clients who engage the services of temporary workers because no current permanent employees desire to perform the required tasks (e.g. because they are repetitive or boring and require few skills) will have a broad set of contingent worker applicants to choose from, and may therefore offer less compensation.

Procedural Justice

Procedural justice deals with individuals' perceptions regarding the fairness of organizational policies and procedures. It exists when procedures are perceived to follow a number of principles, such that rules must be applied consistently across people and time, the personal biases and self-interests of the decision-maker must be suppressed, accurate information must be used, decisions must be correctable or able to be appealed, the needs, values and outlooks of the affected parties must be represented, and the entire process must be perceived as ethical (Levinthal, 1980). Perceptions of procedural injustice predict a number of counterproductive behaviors, including workplace

aggression against coworkers, subordinates, and supervisors (Greenberg & Barling, 1999).

While higher levels of procedural justice may have a negative effect on counterproductive workplace behaviors, higher levels of procedural justice may also have a positive effect on organizational citizenship behaviors. For example, a number of empirical studies in North American and international contexts (e.g., Alotaibi, 2001; Farh et al., 1997; Moorman, 1991; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997), as well as the meta-analysis by Colquitt et al. (2001), all suggest that procedural justice is a significant predictor of some organizational citizenship behaviors.

Procedural justice from the temporary firm. There are many opportunities for temporary firms to demonstrate procedural justice to their workers. Individuals need to feel that the process used to allocate work and client assignments is fair and takes into account their desires and capabilities. Unfortunately, there is some evidence that this is not always so. Some individuals report that temporary firms sometimes lie to prospective workers about the likelihood of an assignment at a client organization leading to permanent employment (Feldman, et al., 1994; McAllister, 1998). In addition, temporary firms may also evaluate temporary workers on highly subjective criteria such as personal appearance (Henson, 1996), and give preferential treatment to candidates with ‘great’ or ‘warm and fuzzy’ personalities instead of those who meet or exceed specific skill requirements (Rogers, 1995). Unfortunately, some temporary workers do not believe that they have any recourse and fear that if they “complain to the agency then they’ll just pull [them] off the assignment and … future opportunities would be jeopardized” (Rogers, 1995, p. 153).

Although the current literature relevant to the influence of procedural injustice on intermediated temporary workers deals with counterproductive behaviors, this does not mean that procedural justice will not predict these workers' organizational citizenship behaviors. On the contrary, a relationship between procedural justice and organizational citizenship behaviors directed at both the temporary firm and the client organization may be inferred from previous research that has been conducted in the context of permanent employment.

Procedural justice from the client organization. In the same way that a client organization's strategy may determine its level of demonstrated distributive justice towards their contingent workers, its organizational strategy may also dictate its demonstrated level of procedural justice. Lautsch (2002) identifies two main strategies for how contingent workers are integrated into a firm with permanent employees: segregation and assimilation. With a complete segregation policy, contingent workers are kept separate from the "core" group of employees and enjoy far fewer rights and freedoms. These "ghettoized" workers have lower productivity than their permanent counterparts, but "assimilated" contingent workers, who have greater perceptions of procedural and interactional justice, also have performance levels that are equal to their permanent counterparts.

Integration strategy aside, client organizations also have a number of opportunities to demonstrate their procedural justice to their temporary workers. All individuals need to feel that the procedures that govern their work environment are fair and just. Unfortunately, there is some evidence that suggests that this is not always the case. For example, client organizations sometimes lie to temporary workers about the

likelihood of becoming permanent employees after a certain probationary period (Feldman et al., 1994). Similarly, temporary workers sometimes have their assignments cut short by their client organizations without any advance notice (Henson, 1996; Rogers, 1995), which is especially galling since these temporary workers are not permitted to end their assignments early themselves. Another concern frequently cited by temporary workers is being asked to perform undesirable tasks that they did not consider to be part of their job responsibilities, such as running personal errands or cleaning others' offices (Henson, 1996). Other intermediated temporary workers report that some client organizations require them to pay inflated amounts for work expenses such as work uniforms, safety equipment, or security 'bonds' without providing them with adequate notice or explanation (McAllister, 1998).

Such treatment may lead to counterproductive behaviors. Rogers (1995) describes one informant's reaction to not receiving adequate notice of having her assignment terminated as follows: "I had a little revenge with it too because they had these cabinets that you locked, and I had the key… I was not gonna [sic] go all the way back there just to give them their key back… I guess they had to break it. Which is fine with me."

Procedural justice may also predict intermediated temporary workers' organizational citizenship behaviors. In fact, we may infer a relationship between procedural justice and organizational citizenship behaviors directed at both the temporary firm and the client organization, based on previous research in the context of permanent employment.

Interactional Justice

Interactional justice refers to the perceived fairness and courtesy of interpersonal treatment by one person to another (Donovan, Drasgow, & Munson, 1998). When treated with interactional injustice, employees may feel anger or resentment, and be motivated to re-establish a sense of justice (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997), perhaps by retaliating against the source of the injustice (Fox & Levin, 1994). For example, interactional injustice is associated with workplace aggression and violence among graduate students, adult employees (Dupré, 2004), and teenaged part-time employees (Dupré, Inness, Connelly, Barling & Hoption, 2002). While a lack of interactional justice may have a significant effect on counterproductive workplace behaviors, the presence of interactional justice may also have a significant effect on organizational citizenship behaviors. The recent meta-analysis by Colquitt et al. (2001) confirms that interactional justice is indeed a significant predictor of some organizational citizenship behaviors.

Interactional justice from the temporary firm. Temporary workers do not always receive appropriate interpersonal treatment from their temporary firms. Some intermediated temporary workers report that their temporary firms lie to them about the nature or the length of assignments in order to increase the likelihood that they will accept these unsuitable assignments (Rogers, 1995). Also, some temporary firm supervisors sometimes refuse to return phone calls in order to punish temporary workers by increasing their job insecurity (Rogers, 2000). Other intermediated temporary workers report that their temporary firm supervisors minimized or dismissed complaints of sexual harassment that occurred during their client assignments (Rogers & Henson, 1997), and other workers report being harassed by their temporary firm supervisors themselves

(McAllister, 1998). Furthermore, temporary firms sometimes infantilize their workers by telling them what to wear to their client assignments and how they should look in terms of 'professional' appearance and personal grooming (Rogers, 1995; 2000). According to a temporary firm supervisor interviewed by Rogers (2000), about how intermediated temporary workers should be treated, "…if you're nice to somebody, they'll take advantage, you know. And you have to let them know who's in charge here" (p. 54).

While the current literature relevant to the influence of interactional injustice on intermediated temporary workers deals with counterproductive behaviors, this does not mean that interactional justice will not predict these workers' organizational citizenship behaviors. On the contrary, we may infer a relationship between interactional justice and organizational citizenship behaviors directed at both the temporary firm and the client organization, based on previous research that has been conducted in the context of permanent employment.

Interactional justice from the client organization. Because of their indeterminate status, temporary workers may be treated rudely or receive insufficient information with which to perform their tasks, or be excluded from social interactions with their permanent counterparts. For example, a Silicon Valley contingent worker reported that he was excluded from team and staff meetings because the employer did not want him to have access to proprietary data (Geber, 1999). Similarly, in the words of one worker, "in the company [I am assigned to] they make me feel so much like an outsider, a nobody. Whenever the whole office does something together, I am not included. It is as if I do not exist" (Feldman et al., 1994, p. 54). Furthermore, another worker explains that "whenever there was going to be a company party or something, the temps had to stay and work …

you could tell where the second-class citizenship started" (Rogers, 1995, p. 150). In addition, as a contingent driller observed, "…company men look down their nose [sic] at us, they think they're of a higher status" (Collinson, 1999, p. 588). These contract workers were also not provided with adequate safety equipment, and they had higher injury rates than the permanent employees.

Other temporary workers report being treated rudely or discourteously by supervisors or colleagues at their client assignments. For example, some intermediated temporary workers report that they were sexually harassed (Rogers & Henson, 1997), yelled at, told racist or homophobic jokes, blamed for others' mistakes or poor performance, and patronized by having simple tasks explained in enormous detail, supervised extensively, and then complemented effusively (Henson, 1996; Rogers, 2000). Other individuals explain that they are rarely addressed by name and are commonly referred to as 'the temp' (Feldman et al., 1994; Henson, 1996; Rogers, 1995).

Again, although the current literature relevant to the influence of interactional injustice on intermediated temporary workers deals with counterproductive behaviors, this does not mean that interactional justice will not predict these workers' organizational citizenship behaviors. On the contrary, we may infer a relationship between interactional justice and organizational citizenship behaviors directed at both the temporary firm and the client organization. Therefore, to be consistent with the previous research on the effect of interactional justice on organizational citizenship behavior, the following hypotheses are suggested:

H1: Justice from the client organization will be related

a) positively to organizational citizenship behaviors towards the client organization

b) negatively to counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the client organization.

H2: Justice from the temporary firm will be related

a) positively to organizational citizenship behaviors towards the temporary firm

b) negatively counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the temporary firm.

MODELS

As described above, intermediated temporary workers have two targets for their organizational citizenship behaviors as well as their counterproductive workplace behaviors: their client organizations and their temporary firms. However, there are two separate theories that might inform how we may view the predictors of such behaviors. According to segmentation theory, intermediated temporary workers' behaviors towards a firm (either the client or the temporary firm) will be predicted by their perceptions of their treatment by only that same organization, and would not be affected by their perceptions of their treatment by the other organization with which they are affiliated (either the temporary firm or the client). In contrast, spillover theory suggests that intermediated temporary workers' behaviors towards each organization will be affected

by their perceptions of their treatment by both the organizations with which they are affiliated (the client and the temporary firm).

The spillover and segmentation theories are extensions of theories proposed by Wilensky (1960) to explain individuals' behaviors in the context of their work and leisure environments. Wilensky also introduced the concept of "compensation", by which he suggested that some individuals might expend additional efforts in the context with which they were most satisfied, in order to balance out the negative effects of the situation that was unsatisfactory (i.e., an individual who is unsatisfied with his work life might be an enthusiastic hobbyist). Wilensky's compensation theory, which has received significantly less support in the literature than other hypotheses (e.g., Staines, 1980), is not adapted to the context of intermediated temporary workers, but the segmentation and spillover theories are described in further detail below.

Segmentation

While individuals' attitudes towards a particular target generally tend to be manifested in behaviors towards that target (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977) it is possible that individuals' attitudes towards one target might have no effect on their behavior towards a different target. This perspective is echoed by Fletcher, Higginbotham, and Norris (1993), who build upon Wilensky's (1960) definition of segmentation to conceptualize "segmental participation" as occurring when individuals' "work time and leisure are kept distinctly separate… that is, leisure activities do not extend to the limits available and work does not extend into and displace leisure" (p. 55).

A segmentation perspective would posit that although intermediated temporary workers' attitudes towards their temporary firms may lead to behaviors directed at these

firms, these attitudes would not lead to behaviors directed at their client organizations (see Figure 1). This perspective would also posit that although intermediated temporary workers' attitudes towards their client organizations may lead to behaviors directed at their client organizations, these attitudes would not lead to behaviors directed at their temporary firms.

Some recent research that examines multiple contexts within permanent employment relationships supports this perspective. For example, Fletcher et al. (1993) suggest that managers tended to segment certain aspects of their lives from influence from their work environment. Furthermore, a recent longitudinal study by Hart (1999) of 479 police officers found no significant relationship between work experiences and non-work satisfaction, and no significant relationship between non-work experiences and job satisfaction. The participants kept their attitudes related to different contexts separate. In addition, another study of police officers, by Duffy, Ganster and Pagon (2002), examined social relationships in the workplace and suggests that social support from one source is not a strong buffer of the effect of the social undermining of another source on employee well-being, counterproductive behaviors, organizational commitment, and self-efficacy. Also, a recent study of moonlighters (individuals with two jobs) suggests that segmentation occurs between employment contexts in that these workers' aggressive behaviors were situation specific (Inness, Barling, & Turner, 2003). In each of these studies, individuals' reactions to their treatment in one context did not affect their attitudes in another context.

In the segmentation model as it applies to intermediated temporary workers' behaviors towards their temporary firm, workers' perceptions of justice from their client

organizations predict their organizational citizenship and counterproductive workplace behaviors towards their client organizations, but they do not predict organizational citizenship behaviors or counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the temporary firm (see Figure 1). Similarly, when the segmentation model is applied to the client firm context, workers' perceptions of justice from the client organization will predict their organizational citizenship behaviors and counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the client firm, and will not be significantly affected by the justice that emanates from their temporary firms.



Figure 1: Segmentation Model

Some initial research on temporary workers' behaviors towards their client organizations supports the segmentation perspective. Liden et al. (2003) found that workers' commitment to their temporary firms did not predict their citizenship behaviors

towards their client organizations, although it did (negatively) predict their managers' perceptions of their affective commitment to the client organization. While these researchers also measured justice from both the temporary firm and the client organization, they do not report the relationship between these variables and citizenship behavior towards the client organization in their structural equation model. However, the correlation between "agency justice" and client citizenship behaviors is insignificant. If the segmentation perspective is indeed correct, then the hypotheses identified earlier (H1 and H2) will be supported. In addition to those earlier hypotheses, the following are also proposed:

H3: The effect of justice from the client organization will be segmented from behavior towards the temporary firm. That is, justice from the client firm **will not** be significantly related to:

a) counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the temporary firm.

b) organizational citizenship behaviors towards the temporary firm.

H4: The effects of justice from the temporary firm will be segmented from behavior towards the client firm. That is, justice from the temporary firm **will not** be significantly related to:

a) counterproductive behaviors towards the client firm.

b) organizational citizenship behaviors towards the client firm.

Spillover

Although the segmentation perspective is supported in the literature, another perspective also appears valid. In general, people create mental schemas regarding

individuals and situations, which shape their evaluations, judgments, predictions, and inferences (Markus & Zajonc, 1985). These schemas are difficult to change, even in the face of additional information or different circumstances (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Ho et al. (2003), in their investigation of the temporal spillover of the psychological contracts of permanent employees who became independent contractors working for the same organization, extend the schema literature to contingent workers. Their findings suggest that an individual's attitudes that are formed in the context of permanent employment later spill over into the context of contingent employment.

While the spillover examined by Ho et al. (2003) occurs over an extended time period, and within the same organization, perhaps spillover occurs across organizational contexts as well. Specifically, it is possible that intermediated temporary workers' perceptions of one organization will affect their behaviors in another, related, context (see Figure 2). For example, if a worker forms an attitude towards one organization but has no opportunity to demonstrate any behaviors towards it, he or she may direct behaviors that emanate from this organization towards another, proximal, target.

Alternately, or in addition to the above phenomenon, an attribution effect may take place. Attribution theory "deals with how the social perceiver uses information to arrive at causal explanations for events" (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p. 23). In the context of intermediated temporary employment, an attribution effect may influence intermediated temporary workers' behaviors if they consider one organization (e.g. the temporary firm) to be ultimately responsible for the actions of the other (e.g. the client firm), and thus direct their behaviors at the organization that they believe to be the true source of their positive or negative treatment.

Examples of attitudinal and behavioral spillover may be found in a diverse set of literatures. For instance, Wilensky (1960) describes spillover in the context of work and leisure. Based on his reading of descriptions of working-class Englishmen of the late nineteenth century and his observations of workers in the Detroit automotive industry, Wilensky suggests that workers develop sets of attitudes and learn patterns of behaviors in their work environments that are replicated in the rest of their lives, and that "killing time at work can become killing time in leisure, apathy in workplace [sic] can become apathy in politics, alienation from the one, alienation from the other" (p. 545).



Figure 2: Spillover Model

A number of studies that examine multiple contexts within permanent employment relationships appear to support a spillover perspective. For example, Liou,

Sylvia, and Brunk (1990) describe spillover in the context of non-work and on-the-job attitudes. They suggest that extra-work attitudes such as individuals' senses of social trust and institutional confidence 'spill over' into their job satisfaction. Furthermore, in their longitudinal study of hospital-based health care professionals, Leiter and Durup (1996) found that participants' sense of professional efficacy, accomplishment, and emotional exhaustion with dysfunctional coping responses spilled over from the work environment to the home environment, and to a lesser extent, from the home environment to the work environment. Also, it has been suggested that expatriates' satisfaction with their work 'spills over' into their attitudes towards non-work attitudes, and even affects their spouses' attitudes (Takeuchi, Yun, & Tesluk, 2002). In addition, Judge, Boudreau, and Bretz (1994) suggest that there is a significant reciprocal linkage between job and life satisfaction among male executives, and Rousseau (1978) also suggests that a "spillover" relationship between work and non-work satisfaction may exist. Similarly, Williams and Alliger (1994) suggest that unpleasant moods spill over from the work context to the family environment and vice versa, but pleasant moods remain segmented. Based on these studies, it appears as though individuals' internal boundaries between contexts may be quite permeable.

In the spillover model, the relationships established in the segmentation model are again preserved, but in addition to these, the worker's perceptions regarding their client organization will 'spill over' and affect their behaviors that they direct towards their temporary firm (see Figure 2). Specifically, in this proximal influences spillover model, the worker's perceptions of justice from their client organization, as well as their

perceptions justice from their temporary firm predict their organizational citizenship behavior and counterproductive workplace behavior towards their temporary firm.

In order to determine if the segmentation or the spillover pattern applies more readily to the context of intermediated temporary workers behaviors in the context of their temporary firm environment, the fit of the nested models will be examined. If the fit of the model (see Figure 2) improves when justice from the client organization is included, then we may infer that there is "spillover" of organizational justice from the client firm to behavior towards the temporary firm. However, if the fit of the model is not improved by the inclusion of justice from the client organization, then we may infer that "segmentation" occurs and that organizational citizenship behaviors and counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the temporary firm are predicted only by justice from the temporary firm.

Similarly, when the spillover model is applied to the context of the client firm, the relationships established in the segmentation model are present, but in addition to these, workers' perceptions regarding their temporary firm 'spill over' and affect their behaviors that they direct towards their client organization (see Figure 2). Specifically, the intermediated temporary workers' perceptions of justice from their temporary firms and their justice from their client organizations both predict their organizational citizenship behaviors and counterproductive workplace behaviors towards their client organizations.

Again, in order to determine if the segmentation or the spillover pattern applies more readily to the context of intermediated temporary workers behaviors in the context of their client environment, the fit of the models will be examined. If the fit of the model

(see Figure 2) changes when the justice from the temporary firm variables are excluded, then we may infer that there is "spillover" of organizational justice from the temporary firm to behavior towards the client organization. However, if the fit of the model is not affected by the inclusion of justice from the temporary firm, then we may infer that there is "segmentation" and that organizational citizenship behaviors and counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the temporary firm are predicted only by justice from this temporary firm.

If the spillover perspective is correct, then some of the hypotheses identified earlier (H1 and H2) will be supported. In addition to those earlier hypotheses, the following are also proposed:

H5: The effects of justice from the client firm will spill over into behavior towards the temporary firm. That is, justice from the client firm **will** be related

a) negatively to counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the temporary firm.

b) positively to organizational citizenship behaviors towards the temporary firm.

H6: The effects of justice from the temporary firm will spill over into behavior towards the client firm. That is, justice from the temporary firm **will** be related

a) negatively to counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the client firm.

b) positively to organizational citizenship behaviors towards the client firm.

ADDITIONAL HYPOTHESES

While the following hypotheses do not relate specifically to the central question of whether temporary workers' behaviors in one context are affected by their treatment in another context, they help to deepen our understanding of these workers' experiences, and as such they provide a more realistic assessment of the reasons underlying their behaviors.

Trait Negative Affectivity

Negative affectivity can be described as "a general dimension of subjective distress and unpleasurable engagement that subsumes a variety of aversive mood states, including anger, contempt, disgust, guilt, fear, and nervousness, with low [negative affectivity] being a state of calmness and serenity" (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988, p. 1063). Individuals who have high negative affectivity "are more likely to experience discomfort …[be] more introspective and tend differentially to dwell on the negative side of themselves and the world" (Watson & Clark, 1984, p. 465).

This trait has been linked to a number of outcomes, including job stress (e.g., Brief, Burke, George, Robinson, & Webster, 1988), workplace aggression (e.g., Douglas & Martinko, 2001), retaliatory behaviors (Skarlicki, Folger, & Tesluk, 1999), as well as other counterproductive workplace behaviors and organizational citizenship behaviors (Ball, Trevino, & Sims, 1994). While there is no evidence that temporary workers have different personality traits relative to permanent employees, measuring trait negative affectivity will enable a distinction to be made between the effects of organizational justice on the workers' behaviors, and the influence of an underlying personality trait.

Although the relationship between negative affectivity and organizational justice has not been the focus of any research on contingent workers, we see in Aquino, Lewis and Bradfield (1999) that negative affectivity is significantly correlated with both interpersonal and procedural justice (and also with interpersonal and organizational deviance). An examination of their correlation matrix suggests that the relationships between negative affectivity and interpersonal justice ($r = -.34$, $p < .05$) and between interpersonal justice and interpersonal deviance ($r = .24$, $p < .05$) are slightly higher than the relationship between negative affectivity and interpersonal deviance ($r = .22$, n.s.). This perspective is echoed in Ball et al. (1994). Therefore, this study will extend this research to the context of contingent work and test the following hypothesis:

H7: Trait negative affectivity will relate negatively to

a) justice from the temporary firm, and

b) justice from the client organization.

Volition

An increasing number of researchers are considering the impact of a temporary worker's desire to pursue temporary work or preference for becoming a permanent employee in their analyses of these workers' job attitudes and behaviors. Volition is an important factor for organizations to consider because it has been linked to a number of work outcomes, such as satisfaction (Krausz et al., 1995; Krausz, Sagie, & Bidermann, 2000), burnout (Krausz et al., 2000), and organizational commitment (Connelly et al., 2003).

Voluntary temporary status refers to workers who have actively chosen to become temporary workers and who prefer this arrangement to others (Krausz et al., 1995). In contrast, involuntary temporary status refers to workers who are not temporary workers by choice, and who would prefer another work relationship (Krausz et al., 1995). Although one might assume that voluntary temporary status and involuntary temporary status are mutually exclusive opposite ends of a single spectrum, a multidimensional measure has been introduced (Ellingson et al., 1998) that suggests that voluntariness and involuntariness are actually two separate constructs. This multidimensionality has been confirmed by Connelly et al. (2003).

Individuals' attributions regarding the reasons why they are pursuing temporary employment may be affected by their personal attributes. For example, trait negative affectivity may be negatively related to voluntariness, which may reflect a more positive way of seeing a situation, and which includes such statements as "I am a temporary worker because of the sense of freedom". In contrast, trait negative affectivity may be positively related to involuntariness, which may reflect a more negative way of interpreting events, and which includes such statements as "I am a temporary worker because of my difficulty finding permanent work." Because trait negative affectivity is a personal characteristic, it is not predicted by situational factors. As such, the directionality of this relationship can be inferred. Therefore, the following hypothesis is suggested:

H8: Trait negative affectivity will relate

a) positively to involuntariness, and

b) negatively to voluntariness.

Although volition has not yet been related to organizational citizenship or counterproductive workplace behaviors, the fact that it is related to satisfaction, burnout, and commitment suggests that it is possible that it is related to other individual outcomes, such as organizational citizenship behaviors towards both the temporary firm and the client organization. For example, a temporary worker who is voluntarily pursuing temporary work may engage in citizenship behaviors towards the temporary firm, while a temporary worker who would prefer permanent employment may engage in citizenship behaviors towards the client organization. Therefore, the following hypotheses are suggested:

H9: Voluntariness will relate positively to organizational citizenship behaviors towards the temporary firm.

H10: Involuntariness will relate positively to organizational citizenship behaviors towards the client organization.

CONTROL VARIABLES

In addition to organizational justice, there are other variables that may affect intermediated temporary workers' organizational citizenship behaviors and counterproductive workplace behaviors in Figures 1 and 2. For example, it is important to take into account workers' tenure with their temporary firms and their client organizations, whether they are pursuing temporary employment voluntarily or if they would prefer to become permanent employees, their impression management strategies, as well as their demographic qualities such as their gender and age.

Tenure

Workers' attitude formation and the conversion of these attitudes into behaviors may be affected by the degree of their exposure to the temporary firm and the client organization. Individuals with very little interaction with one firm (e.g. if they have not been employed by a temporary firm for an extended period of time) may not have formed strong impressions of their treatment. Tenure with the client organization and with the temporary firm may affect each of the dependent variables, because the worker would have more opportunities to engage in the behaviors in question. Similarly, age will also be measured.

Impression Management

Individuals engage in impression management behaviors in order to influence the image that others have of them (Rosenfeld, Giacalone & Riordan, 1995). Impression management may be of particular importance to the context of intermediated contingent workers, who seek continued employment with their temporary firms, or who may be seeking permanent employment with a client organization. According to Henson (1996), approximately one third of assignments result in an offer of continuing employment with the client.

Some intermediated temporary workers manage the impressions they convey to their temporary firms by calling them early every morning that they are available to work (this is known as the "morning glory routine"), in order to convey that they are organized and ready to be assigned to a client organization immediately (Henson, 1996; Rogers, 1995).

Temporary workers may also endeavor to manage the impression that they convey to their client organizations (Wheeler & Buckley, 2000). They may try to "portray themselves as dependable and competent workers… by minimizing the supervisor's work problems, working hard, and forging personal ties, temporaries believe they could curry favor and stretch the current assignment, maximize requests for their services in the future, or even land a full-time permanent position" (Henson, 1996, p.70). These workers also try to look busy regardless of their actual workloads and they try to have clothing, hairstyles, and personal grooming that are appropriate to the client organization (Henson, 1996).

However, there is also some evidence to suggest that temporary workers may engage in fewer impression management behaviors than permanent employees. Sias et al. (1997) suggest that in comparison to newly hired permanent employees, temporary workers were less concerned with the social costs of seeking information and more likely to ask questions. The authors conclude that temporary workers are less concerned with making a good impression than newly hired permanent employees, since they are unlikely to be at the organization long enough to benefit from any impression management behaviors.

Because previous research on organizational citizenship behavior by intermediated temporary workers has not explicitly differentiated between these behaviors and impression management behaviors, and because there is qualitative research that suggests that intermediated temporary workers engage in such actions, the current research will measure impression management in the survey pre-test to ensure

that the new measures of organizational citizenship behaviors are not merely measuring impression management behaviors.

Social Desirability

Socially desirable responding can be described as the tendency of respondents to provide answers or information that make themselves look good (Paulhus, 1991). It is not anticipated that social desirability will be highly correlated with either temporary workers' organizational citizenship or counterproductive workplace behaviors, for a number of reasons. According to the meta-analysis performed by Ones, Viswesvaran, and Reiss (1996: 660), "(a) social desirability is not as pervasive a problem as has been anticipated by industrial-organizational psychologists, (b) social desirability is in fact related to real individual differences in emotional stability and conscientiousness, and (c) social desirability does not function as a predictor, as a practically useful suppressor, or as a mediator variable for the criterion of job performance." These authors also found no effect on task performance.

In addition, social desirability has not been shown to influence the factor structure of various measures of personality (Ellingson, Smith, & Sackett, 2001) or the construct validity of personality measures used in selection contexts (Smith & Ellingson, 2002). Also, the "correction" of data with a social desirability measure is ineffective and fails to produce a corrected score that approximates an honest score (Ellingson, Sackett, & Hough, 1999). It appears that social desirability is less related to individuals' self-reports of personality than many researchers have assumed.

Furthermore, computer-based and paper-and-pencil measures are less prone to distortion than when the respondent is being interviewed face-to-face (Martin & Nagao, 1989). According to a meta-analysis conducted by Richman et al. (1999), computer-based questionnaires were less prone to social desirability distortion than paper-and-pencil questionnaires if on the computer, respondents were alone and could backtrack. Also, social desirability is less likely to be a confounding variable in the context of a survey than in a job interview, since there are no real consequences for socially undesirable answers (Richman et al., 1999).

Although social desirability may not significantly bias responses, it is important to establish that the newly created organizational citizenship behavior and counterproductive workplace behavior scales are indeed separate and distinct from other constructs such as social desirability. Therefore, this dissertation measures social desirability in the survey pretest.

Demographics

Gender is of particular importance in the context of intermediated contingent workers, since this group of individuals is composed of more women than men (Aronsson et al., 2002; Gaston & Timcke, 1999; Nollen, 1996). Gender may affect how individuals report their organizational citizenship behaviors, since many of the actions associated with organizational citizenship behavior intersect with our socially constructed ideals of appropriate behavior for each gender (Kidder, 2002; Kidder & McLean Parks, 2001). Indeed, some researchers report a significant correlation between gender and organizational citizenship behavior (e.g., Alotaibi, 2001; Organ & Konovsky, 1989)

although others do not (e.g., Farh et al., 1997). Moreover, Van Dyne and Ang (1998) found a significant correlation between gender and organizational citizenship behaviors among permanent employees, but they did not find a significant correlation among contingent workers. Because gender may affect the incidence of organizational citizenship behavior in the proposed study, gender will be measured.

Gender is also likely to affect the incidence of counterproductive workplace behaviors. A number of researchers have reported significant correlations between gender and common counterproductive workplace behaviors such as aggression and violence (Duhart, 2001; Warchol, 1998), as well as arriving late for work, leaving early from work, or using alcohol while at work (Warchol, 1998) and using workplace computers for non-work related activities (Mastrangelo, Everton, & Jolton, 2001). Although these studies have examined the relationship between gender and counterproductive workplace behaviors among permanent employees, it is possible that this linkage will also exist among intermediated contingent workers, and therefore the effect of gender will be measured.

It is also important that the proposed research control for the types of jobs held by the participants, because the nature of their duties may affect their role definitions. For example, highly skilled temporary workers may be less likely to engage in certain types of organizational behavior, such as helping other organizational members, if their duties and skills are highly specialized and unlikely to be of assistance to other individuals. However, these individuals may be well connected in the industry and be able to provide information on the larger environment or industry trends that is outside the scope of their required duties but still useful to the organization that is using their services.

MODERATORS

There are a number of variables that might inflate or minimize the effects of distributive, procedural, and interpersonal justice on intermediated temporary workers' behaviors towards their client organizations or their temporary firms, diagrammed in Figures 1 and 2. Specifically, intermediated temporary workers' organizational identification and perceived threat of sanctions from their temporary firms or their client organizations may affect the relationship between justice and behaviors in either their client or temporary firm contexts.

Organizational Identification

Traditionally, organizational identification refers to an individual's feeling of oneness with or belonging to an organization (Ashforth & Mael, 1989), includes both affective and cognitive elements (Smidts, Pruyn, & van Riel, 2001), and is actively managed by some organizations, such as Amway (Pratt, 2000). Organizational identification may be particularly important to consider, given the type of temporary work arrangement being studied. Specifically, temporary workers who are hired through a temporary firm have the potential to identify with two separate organizations.
In the context of the curent research, organizational identification relates to whether workers identify more closely with their temporary firms or with their client organizations. While some workers may see themselves as aligned primarily with their temporary firms, others may consider themselves to be primarily affiliated with their client organizations. It is important to note that temporary workers' identification with one firm or another does not necessarily mean that they are committed to this

organization, or even that they have positive feelings towards this target. Rather, these workers simply consider that they are primarily associated with this organization above all others.

Temporary workers' organizational identifications may affect the strength of the relationship between organizational justice and their behaviors. If workers identify with their client organizations, they may react more strongly to the treatment that they receive there, and may therefore be more likely to engage in either positive or negative behaviors in this context. For example, if a worker sees herself as a member of a client organization (even though she is a temporary worker), but feels that she is treated unfairly (e.g., she is not consulted on decisions that affect her, or she is patronized), then she may be more likely to engage in counterproductive behaviors than if she didn't identify with the client organization in the first place. In contrast, workers who do not identify with their client organizations (perhaps they see themselves primarily as temporary workers or members of their temporary firms) may be less likely to react strongly. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H11: Organizational identification with the client organization will moderate the relationship between justice from the organization firm and behavior towards the client organization. That is, when organizational identification with the client firm is high, then justice from the temporary firm will be more significantly related to

a) organizational citizenship behaviors towards the client organization.

b) counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the client organization.

Threats of Sanctions

Workers' behaviors may be affected by their perceptions of the threats of sanctions against their potential actions, and temporary workers may be particularly vulnerable, given their indeterminate status within their organizations. As noted earlier, social identity theory suggests that individuals maintain a positive self-image by categorizing themselves into in-groups and others into out-groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Because temporary workers who are hired through temporary firms are already identifiable as different from permanent employees, temporary workers may face undue scrutiny from their colleagues and supervisors at their client organizations, to a greater extent than experienced by permanent members of the "in-group".

A low perceived threat of sanctions occurs when workers perceive that certain inappropriate behaviors will go unnoticed or unpunished. The three variables that affect these perceptions are "perceived certainty (risk of being discovered), perceived severity (perceived … punishment options), and visibility of punishment" (Greenberg & Barling, 1996, p. 55). A perceived low threat of sanctions has been associated with workplace aggression and violence against supervisors by adult students and employees (Dupré, 2004) and part-time teenaged employees (Dupré et al., 2003). Consistent with this literature, the following hypotheses are proposed:

H12: Threat of sanctions from the client organization will moderate the relationship between justice (from the client organization or the temporary firm) and counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the client organization. That is, when the threat of sanctions from the client organization is high, then the relationship between justice and

counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the client organization will be weaker.

H13: Threat of sanctions from the temporary firm will moderate the relationship between justice (from the client organization or the temporary firm) and counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the temporary firm. That is, when the threat of sanctions from the temporary firm is high, then the relationship between justice and counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the temporary firm will be weaker.

Summary

In this dissertation, two models are proposed: a "segmentation" model, shown in Figure 1, which tests hypotheses H1, H2, H3, H4, H7, H8, H9, and H10, as well as a "spillover" model, shown in Figure 2, which tests hypotheses H1, H2, H5, H6, H7, H8, H9, and H10. Figure 1 is nested within Figure 2, as H3 and H4 hypothesize no relationship between the variables. Furthermore, three potential moderators are suggested (H11, H12, and H13). However, before these hypotheses can be tested, measures of organizational citizenship and counterproductive workplace behaviors, specifically relevant to the experiences of temporary workers, need to be developed. The first stage of this process is described in the interview study, which follows in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV: INTERVIEW STUDY

In order to develop measures of organizational citizenship and counterproductive workplace behaviors that are appropriate to the context of the temporary firm and the client organization, a qualitative study was conducted.

Method

This study was conducted at an individual level of analysis. Data were collected in a series of ten one-on-one interviews, six of which were conducted in person, four of which were conducted over the phone. With the participants' permission, nine of the interviews were recorded, and were subsequently transcribed. Details follow concerning the participants, emergent themes, the analyses conducted, and the results.

Participants

Of the ten participants, three were female and seven were male. Eight were currently affiliated with the temporary help industry, one had recently become permanently employed, and one had recently left the work force to become a full-time student. One of the participants was the owner of a temporary firm, another participant worked part-time as a Director of Administration for this firm (and part-time as a temporary worker), and one participant had formerly worked as a supervisor at a temporary firm in addition to her experience as a temporary worker. The participants' experience with temporary work ranged from two months to seven years, and their prior

permanent work experience varied from very little (i.e. part-time jobs during high school and university) to a full career (i.e., 35 years, now retired).

In total, the participants' primarily affiliations were comprised of six different temporary firms; five respondents were affiliated with a Kingston-based temporary firm with offices in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. The respondents' jobs included clerical work, project management, and information technology specialists. Further details on the participants are shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Characteristics of Participants in Interview Study

Female	In-person Interview	Current Temporary Worker	Supervisor of Temporary Workers	Job Type	Years Experience as Temporary Worker	Years of Previous Work Experience
	X	X		IT	4 yrs	29
		X		Acct	4 mo	5
X				Clerical	4 yrs	Little
	X	X		Mngr	5 yrs	35
	X	X	X	Owner		35
X		X		Clerical	3 yrs	
X	X		X	Clerical/HR	2 yrs	Little
	X	X		Mngr	5 yrs	
		X		Clerical/IS	2 mo	3 yrs
	X	x	X	Mngr	7 yrs	35

Themes Explored

The primary purpose of these interviews was to aid in the development of appropriate scales to measure intermediated temporary workers' counterproductive and organizational citizenship behaviors towards both their client organizations and their temporary firms. To this end, participants were asked a number of pre-determined open-ended questions to determine how intermediated temporary workers could help or harm

both their client organizations and their temporary firms. Participants were prompted with questions such as “what do you mean by that?” and “how important do you think that is?” The interview protocol is described in Appendix C.

A secondary purpose of these interviews was to discover other issues of importance to the participants. Some of the subjects raised by respondents related to the hypotheses outlined in Chapter Three (i.e., impression management, threats of sanctions, compensation, and relationships), while others were unrelated to the models shown previously and suggest areas for future research (i.e., professional commitment, advantages, and challenges).

Analyses

The interview transcripts were analyzed with version QSR N6 of the NUD*IST (i.e., Non-numerical Uniform Distribution Indexing Searching and Theory-building) qualitative data analysis software. This software is designed to assist with the organization of qualitative data, by allowing sections to be classified, or “coded” into categories, called nodes. These nodes can remain independent of other nodes, in which case they are referred to as “free nodes”, or they can be subdivided into hierarchical subcategories, and are then referred to as “tree nodes”.

The transcript of each interview was read closely, repeatedly, and then coded according to eleven categories, or free nodes, which emerged from the texts. The eleven free nodes that were created are: (1) negative behaviors towards clients, (2) negative behaviors towards temporary firms, (3) positive behaviors towards clients, (4) positive behaviors towards temporary firms, (5) impression management, (6) compensation, (7)

challenges, (8) relationships, (9) threats of sanctions, (10) professional commitment, and (11) advantages of being a temporary worker.

Next, four of the free nodes were copied as tree nodes. That is, two tree nodes were created for counterproductive workplace behaviors, based on the two free nodes representing negative behaviors towards the client and temporary firms, and two tree nodes were created for organizational citizenship behaviors, based on the two free nodes representing positive behaviors towards the client and temporary firms. Subsequently, each of these newly created tree nodes were divided into a number of further subcategories or sub-nodes that again emerged from repeated close readings of the texts.

Finally, each sub-node of participants' responses was examined closely, and was used to generate sample items. These items were then compared to pre-existing measures that have been developed in the context of permanent employment (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Moorman & Blakely, 1995). Where practical, pre-existing items were adapted for use in the context of temporary employment. However, in some cases, the new items were sufficiently different from pre-existing items, and were thus kept. In other cases, items that were created in the context of permanent employment were considered to have insufficient relevance to the employment experiences of intermediated temporary workers (based on the interviews that were conducted), and were therefore omitted. Appendices D and E show the list of items that measure organizational citizenship behaviors and counterproductive workplace behaviors among intermediated temporary workers, in the context of their temporary firms and their client organizations, and compares them to the measures that have previously been used for permanent employees.

RESULTS

Counterproductive Workplace Behaviors

Robinson and Bennett (2000) divide counterproductive workplace behaviors into two distinct categories: interpersonal deviance and organizational deviance. According to Robinson and Bennett (2000), interpersonal deviance should be measured with seven items, including “made fun of someone at work” and “said something hurtful to someone at work”. Organizational deviance is measured with twelve items, including “intentionally worked slower than you could have worked” and neglected to follow your boss’s instructions”.

In contrast, the interview results suggest that the node ‘negative behaviors towards client’ is subdivided into seven sub-nodes, (1) production, (2) property (which was further divided into (2a) theft, (2b) sabotage, and (2c) industrial espionage), (3) political, (4) personal, (5) confidentiality, (6) reputation, and (7) refusing work. Finally, the node ‘negative behaviors towards temporary firms’ was subdivided into five sub-nodes: (1) refusing work, (2) doing a bad job, (3) reputation, (4) multiple agencies, and (5) personal.

Interpersonal Deviance: Client Organizations. Based on the responses of the individuals interviewed for this study, it appears that certain items developed in the context of permanent employment are inappropriate for intermediated temporary workers. For example, it is unlikely that intermediated temporary workers, with somewhat precarious positions within the organizational hierarchy, would engage in obvious interpersonal counterproductive workplace behaviors such as “made an ethnic,

religious, or racial remark at work" or "cursed at someone at work". For example, one participant stated:

> *"Well I don't think I have a lot of power in that sense, because I'm a temp. And really they could care less. I'm not going to be here for that much longer. And if I do put myself in that situation, I'm sure it would result in me being gone, obviously not them… I wouldn't do anything drastic because it would just result in me losing this job."*

It is also difficult for temporary workers to engage in behaviors that target a specific person. For instance, one participant remarked:

> *"I suppose you could say bad things about that person, but you wouldn't have a personal relationship with other people enough to say "oh, my supervisor is this or that" and to be able to direct it at the appropriate source."*

However, temporary workers are able to engage in certain subtler counterproductive workplace behaviors that may be less likely to arouse suspicion, such as ignoring co-workers, wasting their time, or disrupting their work:

> *"As to coworkers, I don't really think that temp people would be in much of a position to do anything other than ignoring the individual and not working with them."*
>
> *"… just not giving them their messages or not giving them their mail…"*

Therefore, three new items to measure intermediated temporary workers' interpersonally deviant counterproductive workplace behaviors are suggested: "ignored a co-worker", "wasted a co-worker's time", and "disrupted a colleague's work". Please see Appendix D for a complete list of items.

Interpersonal Deviance: Temporary Firms. Temporary workers may face many of the same behavioral constraints with their temporary firms that they do with their client organizations. They face serious and immediate consequences for obvious interpersonal deviance, and adjust their behavior accordingly. While these temporary workers

acknowledge that interpersonal deviance against a contact at their temporary firms is possible, they suggest that it is not something that they would recommend:

> *"We can easily be replaced… I don't know if there's much that you can do. I guess if you really know your rep, you could have it out with them, over the phone. Send them a nasty email. But I think we're pretty replaceable."*
>
> *"I think it would be difficult to get back at the agency, unless you really wanted to go in and give somebody a piece of your mind, which I guess you could do, but I don't think it would get you anywhere."*

It appears that intermediated temporary workers may abstain from certain interpersonally deviant behaviors that would harm their temporary firms. Therefore, certain interpersonally deviant counterproductive workplace behaviors that may occur in the context of permanent employment are not relevant to intermediated temporary workers' relationships with their contacts at their temporary firms. Certain behaviors are too serious and too obvious (e.g., "made an ethnic, religious, or racial remark at work" or "cursed at someone at work") and temporary workers would face immediate sanction. Other items are not appropriate given the low direct contact between the temporary worker and the employees at the temporary firm (e.g., "publicly embarrassed someone at work" or "made fun of someone at work"), because these items imply that an audience is present, while temporary workers' interactions with temporary firm employees generally take place privately. However, one item that captures a more subtle and private behavior among permanent employees (i.e., "acted rudely toward someone at work") can be adapted to the context of intermediated temporary work by changing the wording slightly to "acted rudely to my contact at my temporary firm."

Other items appropriate for measuring intermediated temporary workers' interpersonally deviant counterproductive workplace behavior have also been developed.

"Ignored my contact at my temporary firm (e.g., didn't return phone calls)" is similar to another item that measures these workers' behaviors towards their client organizations, and represents a harmful behavior that would not arouse undue suspicion. In contrast, "said negative things to other people about my contact at my temporary firm", while also a harmful behavior that temporary workers are likely to engage in, is not readily applicable to the context of these workers' behaviors towards their client organizations, as outlined above. See Appendix D for a complete list of items.

Organizational Deviance: Client Organizations. Because much of the work conducted by temporary workers is similar in nature to that which is performed by permanent employees, many of the items designed to measure organizationally deviant counterproductive workplace behavior among permanent employees also apply to intermediated temporary workers' behaviors in the context of their client organizations. For example, temporary workers can engage in theft, waste time, take extra breaks, neglect to follow instructions, or share confidential information with unauthorized people. These behaviors are reflected in the participants' comments shown here:

> *"Well, I don't know, I guess I could steal files. Or paperclips. I did help myself to paperclips... And there's staples, and pens. ...Oh, and free postage! At one of the places, there was a postage stamp machine. I helped myself to that. I pre-stamped a few envelopes, to take home with me. I figured it was due me."*

> *"Prolonged breaks. Talking to people. Managing by wandering around, even though you're not a manager."*

> *"Maybe you mosey on in a little bit late … I definitely take advantage of that sometimes. Not significantly, but to a point where if I had to go out doing something and it was longer than an hour for lunch, and because it's a temp job, it's easy to not worry about that. Because if I did lose this job, I don't think that I would be all that heartbroken. So I think you can quite easily take advantage, depending on the situation."*

"In accounting, in my case, even though there's a lot of checking going on, you're left alone a lot. So you could, in essence, not do as good a job. Maybe not do as much detailed work, or not record journal entries as you should. In other types of temp positions, I guess just putting in a half-assed job would more or less be it."

"I would think, that rightfully so, organizations would be fairly wary about giving anybody who is a temporary access to anything particularly confidential… I remember at the organization that I did the recruiting for, I … certainly had access to different people's salaries! So I guess if I wanted to say, I could have told it around the floor that so-and-so makes so much because that's apparently very devastating within an organization: the salaries."

Some other items, that were originally designed to measure permanent employees' organizationally deviant counterproductive workplace behaviors, can be adapted to the context of intermediated temporary workers' behaviors towards their client organizations. For example, while a permanent employee may have "dragged out work in order to get overtime", overtime is typically not available to temporary workers. However, they may be interested in extending the length of their assignment, as noted by the comments of an intermediated temporary worker who supervised other temporary workers:

"I think maybe there are more subtle situations, for example a contractor might take a job and extend it beyond its natural life. Simply to stay on the contract. In other words, I can do this in three months, but let's take five."

Other participants explained that they would end an assignment prematurely, refuse to perform certain tasks, or say negative things about the client organization to other individuals.

"It was a really busy office, and sort of high stress, and the doctors were really unpleasant and I just decided that I couldn't take it any more. I couldn't hack it. So I simply didn't return on Monday… I had another job working for a bank … and actually I was working alongside another temp and she was from a different agency, and she was really, really

unpleasant… So that was another job where I decided that I was not going to go back tomorrow."

"I have refused to do things. Told them I am not going to work on this project. One reason was that I thought it was too much work. I'm prepared to work at a certain level but at the age of 60 I am not inclined to work myself into a frazzle.... My evenings I would like to have as my own as much as possible. The old bugger did con me into one of them last year he needed a major writing contract for [client], he wanted me as the coordinator. I said I can't do that and teach here too. So they got someone else to do it."

"No organization, and I include this place, is perfectly contiguous with how you think things should be run as an individual. There will be decisions made which you won't like. Focus on those, talk about them in the wrong place, you could skewer someone quite nicely. And if you choose to do it deliberately, oh boy. And again every organization is going to have its points. Provide the right people with the right spade, and you can do an immense amount of damage."

Organizational Deviance: Temporary Firms. Intermediated temporary workers can also direct organizationally deviant counterproductive workplace behaviors against their temporary firms. However, because the temporary worker is not co-located with their temporary firm, their negative and harmful behaviors deal more with reputation and flexibility issues, as opposed to harming productivity or property. For example, intermediated temporary workers can refuse to accept assignments that they find unpalatable, or they can cut these assignments short if they find them to be unpleasant.

"If the job is really horrible, you don't have to take it."

"You're not earning a heck of a lot of money, and you perhaps won't get a permanent job out of this, so you don't have a lot to lose by walking out on a job. Your agency might not send you out on other jobs, but if that's a risk that you take."

In addition, these workers can say negative things about their temporary firm either to other potential temporary workers or to potential clients. This can have the negative impact of diminishing the temporary firm's ability to find client assignments for

their existing temporary workers, as well as hindering their ability to recruit temporary workers to assign to current clients.

> *"Well certainly in the context of this town, all you have to do is put the word out in the database. I got shortchanged. I got stiffed by [temporary firm owner]. That's all you have to do. For example, people will come to me and say who are you working for? I can say you wouldn't want to do it... Dead easy to do. That's the easiest way you'll find."*

> *"Well I guess the biggest thing that they could do would be to say to a client, because it's a very competitive market, don't use this agency, they're bad for this reason, that reason, I'm a temp for them, they treat me really badly, they're maybe charging you more than another agency would be, reconsider using them."*

Finally, intermediated temporary workers are able to register with a number of different temporary firms, and they also have the option of surreptiously going to work for a client organization without notifying their temporary firm (which would ordinarily receive a placement fee). Registering with multiple temporary firms negatively affects these organizations because it leaves them with a distorted impression of how many workers they have available to send on assignments. Working directly for a client organization cheats the temporary firm from the 'finder's fee' that they would typically be entitled to.

> *"Also, playing off competing agencies against each other. They hate it if you work for more than one of them."*

> *"The position I was actually at, they wanted me full- time, but the huge problem with temp agencies is their buyout. These guys wanted thirty percent buyout on my salary. If a company is trying to hire you, and for my salary I wanted forty grand, they would have to pay thirty percent on top of the forty grand."*

Organizational Citizenship Behaviors

Moorman and Blakely (1995) divide organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) into four distinct categories: interpersonal helping, individual initiative, personal industry, and loyal boosterism. A complete list of items is provided in Appendix E.

In contrast, the interview results demonstrate that the category or node 'positive behaviors towards clients' in divided into nine subcategories: (1) initiative, (2) efficiency, (3) doing exactly what is required, (4) extra tasks, (5) interpersonal skills, (6) flexibility, (7) dependability, (8) reputation, and (9) knowledge and skills, which was further subdivided into that which related specifically to the organization where the temporary worker was presently assigned, and that which related more generally to pre-existing experiences and capabilities. The node 'positive behaviors towards temporary firm' was also divided into nine sub-nodes: (1) flexibility, (2) dependability, (3) reputation, (4) doing a good job, (5) close relationship, (6) recruit more clients, (7) recruit more temps, (8) stay up-to-date, and (9) give feedback.

Interpersonal Helping: Client Organizations. Certain items, designed to measure interpersonal helping organizational citizenship behaviors for permanent employees (Moorman & Blakely, 1995), are not appropriate for temporary workers' behaviors towards their client organizations. This is because they focus on behaviors that would be difficult for a newcomer or an outsider to perform. For example, the items "voluntarily helps new employees settle into the job" and "always goes out of the way to make newer employees feel welcome in the work group" would be difficult for a temporary worker to do, especially if they were new to the organization.

However, other items are applicable to the context of intermediated temporary workers' behaviors towards their client organizations, because they relate specifically to providing assistance to other workers, being flexible about scheduling, as well as being particularly sociable. These positive behaviors are reflected in the comments made by interview participants:

> *"I guess instead of trying to do just the regular stuff like whatever is asked, see if you could go out of your way and maybe complete other tasks that might be necessary. Just because it's not in your job description, if you're capable of it, you know, whatever it takes to help out, more or less. …Specifically, in my case, even though my role was accounting, and even though that was all that was required of me, I worked at a school, and they get new kids in, it was basically overwhelmed everywhere, like uniform fitting, getting kids textbooks. So instead of just doing the accounting crap, which is what I could have done, I tried to help out in the other departments, like I was actually fitting kids for uniforms. So I just look at it like do whatever is necessary. I mean, maybe not just in your position, per se. Help out wherever you can."*

> *"Not being overly concerned about the occasional request to maybe work a little extra and then we'll give you a long lunch next week."*

> *"You might not be terribly familiar with the guy you're going to work for, or the girl you're going to work for, you therefore, I think, the personality thing is important, to be able to deal with people and to be relaxed and not to get over-critical because you see something that you don't like."*

In addition, the participants' responses also indicated that a number of other behaviors are also important. That is, intermediated temporary workers can engage in interpersonal helping organizational citizenship behaviors by adapting to the client organization where they are working, and by being flexible about their work schedule as well as the types of tasks that they'll perform. These dimensions are reflected in the following responses:

> *"Well I guess it would be flexibility, you have to be somebody who is fairly adaptable, and when you go into a situation, oftentimes you don't have a lot of directives, so you kind of have to be able to go with the flow, when*

somebody gives you work, be able to figure things out, as if you were normally in the job."

"Often, I'm there until 5:30 dealing with things and you need some flexibility."

"I mean, when you go in to an organization and you're filling in for someone, usually they only give you about two-thirds of the guy's job to do, because they don't like to think that you can just walk in and do the guy's job, just like that. So, you should try to figure out and do the extra third that they didn't tell you about. Some people find that threatening, but it's good for the organization."

Therefore, three new items have been created to measure intermediated temporary workers' interpersonal helping organizational citizenship behaviors: "adapt as much as possible to the way things are done at this place", "work late or come in early if I'm asked to", and "am flexible about what kinds of tasks I'll agree to do". A complete list of items is shown in Appendix E.

Interpersonal Helping: Temporary Firms. Not all of the items that were developed by Moorman and Blakely (1995) to measure interpersonal helping organizational citizenship behaviors are appropriate to the context of intermediated temporary workers' behaviors towards their temporary firms. For example, these workers are unlikely to have the opportunity to help "new employees" feel like part of their temporary firm, considering that temporary workers are typically isolated from each other, and have little if any contact. However, as with permanent employees and the client organization context, intermediated temporary workers do have the opportunity to treat temporary firm staff with courtesy and respect.

Furthermore, these workers can also be helpful to the contact at their temporary firm by being very flexible in terms of the assignments that they are willing to accept, as well as keeping their temporary firm colleague as up-to-date as possible about their

qualifications and work availability. These novel dimensions are reflected in these participants' responses:

> *"They also like the fact that I don't want a permanent position, that I'm willing to take the two-day jobs. I think that's beneficial to them."*

> *"Oh yeah, absolutely, being willing to take a job that other people might not consider. I think they were having a hard time finding someone who would go in and do clerical, and sometimes I think the data entry or the filing jobs are very, very hard to fill because no one wants to do them. It's boring. So I think if you're willing to go in and say "hey, this is a paycheck, I'm going to do this", I would assume that they would find that very helpful."*

Based on these responses and comments similar to these, new items have been developed to measure intermediated temporary workers interpersonal helping organizational citizenship behaviors. These include: "am flexible about what types of jobs I'll agree to do" and "am willing to take short-term or long-term jobs; whatever is required". A complete list of items is shown in Appendix E.

Individual Initiative: Client Organizations. Other items designed by Moorman and Blakely (1995) to measure permanent employees' individual initiative are also applicable to intermediated temporary workers' behaviors towards their client organizations. For example, a number of respondents commented that they would take the initiative to improve how clients operated.

> *"If you notice that there's a better way to twist the widget, then you should point that out to your supervisor, because that might be one of the talents that you brought with you, and that you have developed over the years…I'm not bashful about suggesting that maybe that is not what they want, that they want something else. They need something else."*

> *"I'm putting a chap in to take a look at some financial dealings, next week, with a local organization. And the rationale behind putting a unit in from outside is he has the background, the experience, he knows how to do it, … and he goes in and tells them the truth. Here is where you've got problems... And our people will go in, and they'll sit there, and take a look at what's going on, operate the systems, then they'll take a look at it from their long-*

term knowledge, and say this isn't as efficient as you might want it to be. It's costing you money to do this."

In addition to these behaviors, there are other individual initiative organizational citizenship behaviors that an intermediate temporary worker could engage in that would benefit their client organization, but that are not part of the measure developed by Moorman and Blakely (1995). For example, based on participants' responses, it appears that intermediated temporary workers can demonstrate initiative by being a "self-starter" and performing their assigned roles with very little direction.

"Don't need to be told. I don't need to be told. I've been around people long enough to know what's going to get up the hills and what isn't. Similarly, I don't need to be told to fix it, that's part of the background that I bring to the job."

"They can walk into a position, nine times out of ten, can be instantly at work, and can be up and running, successfully, and providing, if you want, input to the company in a hurry, so they don't take a long learning curve to get up there, and they know what they're doing, they're trustworthy, they're responsible, they are self-starters…"

"I think people want to be able to give you things, and just be able to expect that you can just pick up on it and just do it."

Therefore, based on such comments, new items have been developed to measure intermediated temporary workers' individual initiative organizational citizenship behaviors towards their client organizations. These are: "perform my duties without being told what to do", 'jump right in and start working right away", "figure things out on my own", and "think of ways to do my job more efficiently". A complete list of items is shown in Appendix E.

Individual Initiative: Temporary Firms. Intermediated temporary workers may not have opportunities to engage in certain individual initiative organizational citizenship behaviors such as suggesting ways in which temporary firm employees could improve

how they do their jobs, or encouraging other temporary workers to express their opinions, since they may not have much contact with other temporary workers from the same temporary firms. However, these workers may demonstrate individual initiative by honestly expressing their opinions about issues with serious consequences. Such a behavior is reflected in these participants' comments:

> *"I feel that I am a close enough friend of [temporary firm owner] that I'll tell him when I disagree with him. He was very keen to take a project last spring over at [client] this was spring of last year. I took the RFPOA and he got three pages why he shouldn't go near it with a barge pole. And after sucking his gums for a while and talking to a couple of others, he realized that I was right. And so he went back to the [client] and said you can't sell it this way. And they changed it to something that was more manageable. But as written it was suicidal."*

> *"You can also keep in close contact with the temp firm. Keep them updated. Let them know what's going on, if there are any issues or problems."*

Based on the interviews with participants, one new item was deemed appropriate to measure intermediated temporary workers' individual initiative organizational citizenship behaviors towards their temporary firms. It is "for issues that may have serious consequences, I express opinions honestly even when others may disagree". A complete list and comparison of items is shown in Appendix E.

Personal Industry: Client Organizations. In the context of their client assignments, intermediated temporary workers are able to engage in personal industry organizational citizenship behaviors, much like their permanent employee counterparts. For example, they can be particularly diligent about their attendance, accuracy, and deadlines. In addition to these behaviors, these workers can also demonstrate their personal industry by learning about the organization where they are assigned, and by applying their experience

in other organizations to their current assignment. These positive behaviors are reflected in these participants' responses:

> *"I would guess actually taking an interest in the company. Because I find with a lot of these jobs, for one, I don't do any research. Because I know, if I'm only there for a week, I'd really rather not know who I'm working for. For the cup cleaning job, I really had no clue what sort of job it was for at least a week or two... I didn't really care! I guess I'm not the ideal temp worker."*

> *"I understand because I spent a fair amount of my time in the education business how education works, specifically distributed learning. I understand their strengths and limitations. I bring this bag of tools, management tools, leadership tools, coordination, planning, project management, all that sort of stuff. ...Most problems that I see in the context of my work here, I've seen before."*

Based on such responses, two additional items to measure intermediated temporary workers' personal industry organizational citizenship behaviors towards their client organizations were developed. They are: "learned about the organization where I was working (e.g., jargon, organizational chart, mission, etc.)" and "applied what I've learned in other companies to my current assignment". A complete list of items is shown in Appendix E.

In addition to the personal industry behaviors identified by Moorman and Blakely (2000), a number of participants also stressed the importance of actively ensuring that they completed their assigned tasks exactly as the client organization wanted them to be done. This might entail asking for clarification about task assignments, or periodically double-checking with supervisors if there are changes to what is required.

> *"Certainly from my experience, it's that if the contract says that you're to do x, y, and z, then you'd better be doing x, y, and z."*

> *"You have to sit down and really get into the depth of it, because sometimes they don't know themselves. They come to you and they want something done but they're not too sure about what they want or need. So you have to*

really explore all of these things in an initial meeting with them. Just get down to exactly what you want and how do you want it completed?"

"Of course, you also have to in some cases maintain liaisons with people, because not only is the deliverable at the end of the contract, due by the end of the contract, but there may also be intermediate stages, that you have to show them the work and then let them look at it, so and this is a benefit to both parties because you don't go way off on a tangent, and they are part of the process, and then when you've reached the conclusion and you've finished it, then everybody's happy."

Therefore, based on such responses, two additional items were added to the measure of intermediated temporary workers' personal industry towards their client organizations: "ask for clarification if I am unsure what to do" and "double-check with my supervisor if there are changes to my duties".

Personal Industry: Temporary Firms. Although not all of the items that were developed by Moorman and Blakely (1995) to measure permanent employees' personal industry organizational citizenship behaviors can be applied to intermediated temporary workers' behaviors towards their temporary firms, some select items remain relevant. For example, as with permanent employees, intermediated temporary workers can avoid absences. Furthermore, these workers can also make a particular effort to make themselves more valuable to their temporary firms, by upgrading their skills. Such behaviors are reflected in comments made by interviewees as follows:

"They do offer training, different computer training, for different programs. I've gone in to learn. I guess that's beneficial to them, because then they can send me to jobs where I need to know things like PowerPoint or Corel, or things like that."

"The real challenge for a guy like [temporary firm owner] is to decide where the people are going to require help, and have the shelf stocked ahead of time. Oh, you need a such and such. Maybe the technology didn't even exist five years ago. Well, as it happens, I've got two people who can do that. That's how [temporary firm owner] builds his reputation. And if he

can answer that question two or three times for various people the word gets out and more people ask him."

Therefore, two new items have been developed, in order to measure intermediated temporary workers' personal industry organizational citizenship behaviors. They are "keep my skills up-do-date and improve my qualifications" and "spend time learning new things that might help me get better assignments". A complete list of items is shown in Appendix E.

Loyal Boosterism: Client Organizations. The items that measure permanent employees' loyal boosterism organizational citizenship behaviors (Moorman & Blakely, 1995) are readily applicable to the context of intermediated temporary workers behaviors towards their client organizations. For example, these workers can say positive things about the organization to co-workers and outsiders, and they can also actively promote the organization wherever possible. These dimensions are reflected in this respondent's comments:

"Basically, you defend the external perception of the organization. You defend it at any and every occasion that requires it. That's the most important thing you can do."

No additional items have been added to measure intermediated temporary workers' loyal boosterism of their client organizations.

Loyal Boosterism: Temporary Firms. The loyal boosterism organizational citizenship behavior items that were developed in the context of permanent employment are also applicable to intermediated temporary workers' behaviors towards their temporary firms. In addition, these workers can also informally act as emissaries of the firm by actively recruiting either additional clients or more temporary workers. These activities are reflected in participants' comments below:

"Referring good workers to your agency, and also putting out the word that they were a good agency, those are the two things that you could do that would help your agency the most…If I was talking to people who were friends of my family who were in business, I would say, "I'm working for this particular agency. They're a really good agency. If you're looking for temps you might consider them." I don't know if anything ever came of that but that might be one thing that you could do that might help your agency."

"Well, one thing would be to recruit extra positions or business for them, basically "smelling around for work". You could do that by encouraging the client to call your agency, or by telling the agency about potential contracts so that they can call them.... also, promoting the agency to other people that you work with. That helps them recruit other temps maybe, and it might get them other business."

Therefore, based on such comments by the participants, the original measure developed by Moorman and Blakely (1995) for permanent employees were only slightly adapted to become appropriate for intermediated temporary workers. A complete list of items is shown in Appendix E.

Spillover: Counterproductive Workplace Behavior

As discussed in Chapter Three, there is a possibility that intermediated temporary workers may engage in counterproductive workplace behaviors with the intention of harming one organization, but by engaging in behaviors towards another organization. That is, behaviors may 'spill over' from one context into another. A number of participants, when asked how intermediated temporary workers could harm their temporary firms, spontaneously highlighted the possibility of spillover:

"Again the biggest thing would be to do a half-assed job, because it can reflect on the agency. It will reflect on you, but probably more so on the agency, because their client will think that obviously the agency didn't do a good job in matching skills with the client. They might not necessarily think that the person doesn't have the skill set required. It's more of the agency's fault, because they're the ones who are supposed to be matching the skill set.

The biggest thing would be to not do a good job, because that would reflect pretty bad on the agency."

"I'm not saying that you can't have a lot of power, because obviously you can do things that are potentially devastating, especially if you are in an office working with confidential things, that would probably be devastating to the client and to the agency because they would then probably not use that agency who sent such a psychopath!"

"Well, I can't really think of anything at the moment, other then do a bad job. For example if they were to do a bad job, it would of course be a definite reflection on the company."

However, one interviewee expressed the opinion that such behavior was irrational and inadvisable. On the other hand, he also acknowledged that it does occur. In his words,

"If you want to do in the company for which you work, you don't, unless you're really psychotic, and there are those that are, you don't do it by bad work, because then you're marking yourself at the same time. If it's a calculated thing you don't do it that way at all. As you say, there are the psychotics who will do it anyway, the fact that they will wear a body bomb onto a bus in Tel Aviv, it happens but it's not exactly my approach to life nor the approach of any sane person as far as I'm concerned. So you want to do it while preserving yourself."

The respondents' comments suggest that counterproductive "spill over" is indeed an issue that should be studied further. It is interesting to note that while many interviewees suggested the idea of harming their temporary firms by acting against their client organizations, no one suggested harming their client organizations by acting against their temporary firms. No additional items have been created to specifically assess counterproductive workplace "spill over" among intermediated temporary workers. Rather, this phenomenon was studied statistically using the newly created measures described earlier.

Spillover: Organizational Citizenship Behavior

As with counterproductive workplace "spill over" among intermediated temporary workers, a similar phenomenon may occur with organizational citizenship behaviors. Some respondents explicitly noted that intermediated temporary workers can positively affect their temporary firms through their actions towards their client organizations.

> *"Do the best job you can because then that reflects back on the actual temp firm."*

> *"I think obviously by performing well, they're going to ensure likely that they will continue to use that agency. Again, I think just offering yourself up to do whatever they want you to do, beyond what you were hired to do, is going to look good on the agency. … And then by motivating the other people that you're working with, I think, and working efficiently and hard, yourself, it's definitely going to look good on the agency, because they'll obviously continue to use them."*

Such comments, while more sparse than those relating to counterproductive workplace "spillover" behaviors suggest that organizational citizenship "spillover" is also an issue that should be studied further. Again, while many interviewees suggested the idea of positively affecting their temporary firms by helping their client organizations, no one suggested helping their client organizations by acting towards their temporary firms. No supplementary items have been created to specifically assess organizational citizenship "spillover" among intermediated temporary workers. Again, this phenomenon will be examined statistically with the newly created measures described previously.

Other Findings

In addition to discussing counterproductive and organizational citizenship behaviors, respondents were also prompted to discuss several other issues. Some of these attitudes and behaviors relate to the research model described in Chapter Three.

Impression Management. In order to develop accurate and reliable measures of intermediated temporary workers' organizational citizenship behaviors, it is necessary to consider how these behaviors may differ or overlap with impression management behaviors, which may appear similar although they are motivated by self-interest. Indeed, certain organizational citizenship behavior items, such as "goes out of his/her way to help co-workers with work-related problems", "perform my duties without being told what to do", or "always meets or beats deadlines for completing work" may be motivated by a desire for permanent employment or an extended contract, rather than an altruistic desire to help the client organization.

However, subtle but important differences exist between organizational citizenship behaviors and impression management behaviors. For example, impression management involves behaviors such as "I do tasks that are not really part of my job description so that I will seem flexible or dedicated", "I take on more than my fair share of the workload so that other workers will see me as dedicated", and "I arrive at work on time and stay until the end in order to look dedicated". It is important to note that the items that are used to measure such behaviors also stipulate the motivation behind the actions (i.e., to appear dedicated). Organizational citizenship behaviors have no such stipulation. In addition, other impression management behaviors, such as "I make other workers aware of my talents or qualifications", "I try to gain assistance or sympathy from other workers by appearing needy in some area", and "I let other workers know that I am not willing to be pushed around or dictated to" are not similar to organizational citizenship behaviors.

Based on the interviewees' responses, it appears that intermediated temporary workers' impression management behaviors are in some cases similar to those performed by their permanent counterparts. In the following comments, note the element of deception, the deliberateness of the actions, and the outward appearance of propriety:

> *"Well if every time your boss comes by, and you look busy, but when the boss is gone you are sitting down reading your magazine. So say you have that same filing job, and they don't know how much filing you're going to do during the day, right, because they really have no idea, you have this big stack here. And every time they come by you look like you're busy, filing away, you know, a smile on your face. They go, and you sit down, and you read your magazine, or have a snack, or walk around the office, or do something like that, I guess you could do something like that."*

As these subsequent comments indicate, other intermediated temporary workers appear to focus on exaggerating their abilities, in their dealings with their client organizations:

> *"…giving briefings which have an element of exaggeration. For example I've just done a little job for you and I'm going to give you a briefing, a PowerPoint presentation with colours and piped in music and make you cuckoo when you walk out and there were big hole in it that we didn't talk about. I've seen that. I've seen that. Again, often, the reason for it is that the contractee is not as familiar with the work as he or she ought to be. Therefore the contractor can walk all over them."*

> *"Well, there's always the person that has (pause) there's the showboat, as we used to call them. The person that's all flash and dash and we can do this and we can do that and in the long run the result isn't what it was advertised to be."*

In addition, other intermediated temporary workers manage their impressions on their colleagues in their client organizations by carefully paying attention to their appearances:

> *"So when you walk into a company that's maybe a little high-collared and a little more formal, then swing up to that. If it's a little more dressed down, like some of the computer companies, the young computer companies were, who are changing by the way, then dress down too. ...but if you haven't got*

the damn jacket or tie with you, and you walk into a meeting or whatever that requires it, then you've got problems."

"Well I guess making sure you're always on time, you're punctual, you don't take extended lunches, if you have to wear a suit and a tie make sure you do, I had to wear a shirt and a tie every day. Make sure you look kept."

These comments suggest that impression management is an issue that should be examined further. Although participants did not indicate that intermediated temporary workers could manage the impressions that they present towards their temporary firms, this does remain a possibility. Impression management towards both client organizations and temporary firms will be assessed with measures adapted from the scale created by Bolino and Turnley (1999) in the context of permanent employment.

Relationships. Because intermediated temporary workers are in the unusual situation of having two "employers", it was important to study the nature and strength of their relationships with both their client organizations and their temporary firms. In Chapter Three, the possibility of organizational identification moderating the relationship between justice and behavior was raised. The following comments suggest that intermediated temporary workers have relationships of varying strengths, with both their client organizations and their temporary firms.

Temporary Firms. The relationships between intermediated temporary workers and individuals at their temporary firms vary in intensity. While some individuals appear to have a very limited and narrow relationship with their temporary firms, others seem to have more frequent contact, and still others enjoy a more social and friendly connection.

"[Temporary firm] is really just a facilitator. There's really no involvement between me and the company except to [temporary firm owner] once a month when I hand in my invoice."

"What they do is they call me every week, to see how things are, and they'll call the employer to see how things are. Make sure everything's running smoothly. Make sure there are no questions or concerns. There's a few of them who work there. They call to basically keep updated, keep me updated. If they need any additional information. Keep me updated if there is anything coming about. Or how things are. Or what they expect to happen. So they keep in touch."

"[Temp firm owner] and I have known each other since 1972 and we belong to the same club, we see each other once or twice a week for lunch, on a social basis, if I have a problem, I call him up and he will fix it. ... He has 100% faith in me, and I do in him."

Client Organization Members. The relationships between intermediated temporary workers and individuals at their client organizations also vary in intensity. While some individuals appear to be somewhat isolated, depending on the nature of their assignment, others state a clear affiliation with their client organizations, rather than their temporary firms.

"I wouldn't say include me in lunch, because where I've been it's been either full time so I knew what I was doing. Full time for a short time. Or it was in and out doing interview type things, relating information. I was never, rarely an integrated member of the workforce. But when I was, I was part of it. If they were having a Christmas party or whatnot, I was invited to join in as if I was an employee."

"All my temporary placements gave me good references. I would never use my supervisor at the agency, or my recruiter at the agency, as a reference. I would always use the firm that I would work for. Because I don't even really have a relationship with that person, they don't really know me much past my resume."

Based on these comments, a number of items have been developed to assess participants' primary affiliation with their client organizations and temporary firms, including "In general, I have way more contact with the supervisors at my client assignments than with the supervisor at my temporary agency" and "If I needed a letter of

reference, I would ask someone from one of my client assignments, instead of anyone from my temporary agency".

Threats of Sanctions. A number of interviewees spontaneously mentioned a number of sanctions that they could face, if they behaved inappropriately towards either their client organizations or their temporary firms. According to the comments below, sanctions can exist in a number of different forms.

Threats of Sanctions from the Client Organization. In the context of the client organization, intermediated temporary workers face the threat of having their assignment terminated. However, as the response below indicates, the worker may not perceive this threat as particularly troubling:

> *"You can do whatever. You could do something really bad and even if they knew it was you, you're flying, you're gone. You probably don't want to be there anyway. ... Because if I did lose this job, I don't think that I would be all that heartbroken. So I think you can quite easily take advantage, depending on the situation."*

Furthermore, as the following comments suggest, an intermediated temporary worker may perceive the possibility of being caught as being quite minimal, which may also contribute to a perception of a low threat of sanctions.

> *"Because people don't, especially in the corporate world, they don't have time to pay attention to anything like that. They just don't care to even think about it. That's the last thing on their mind, worrying about some temp or some administrative person. So I think it would be quite simple to get away with little things here and there, whether it would be taking something or throwing out an important fax that came in, and how are they going to know? You just say "I never saw it. The fax never came in." something like that. I think it's quite easy administratively to get away with a lot of little things like that, because you can always claim ignorance."*

Threats of Sanctions from the Temporary Firm. Intermediated temporary workers may also perceive threats of sanctions from their temporary firms. For example, the first

respondent indicates a severe sanction against improper behavior. However, in the subsequent comments, the second respondent indicates a fairly serious threat, but then minimizes the consequences of this sanction.

> *"Do the best that they can, because it only behooves them to do that. If they don't do that, then of course we're not going to get return work. And in turn, they are not going to get work. Because if you're going to shaft us, you aren't going to work in this town again. ...Let's face it, the world is a very small community. If a person is known not to do things accordingly, they're going to be known in Ottawa, Toronto, and anywhere else that we have affiliates. …I'm not using that as a threat. It's just a statement. And that's how it works."*

> *"Although I guess it wouldn't be good for the temp firm, for the agency that you work for, because I'm sure that you wouldn't get another assignment. But there's a lot of temp agencies, and I don't think that you're blacklisted in the temp agency world."*

The impact of intermediated temporary workers' perceptions of threats of sanctions from their client organizations and temporary firms warrants further examination. In general, it appears as though these workers may perceive varying levels of threats of sanctions from both their client organizations and their temporary firms. Measures of threats of sanctions that were developed by Dupre and Barling (2002) in the context of permanent employment will be adapted.

Compensation. As is outlined in Chapter Three, the proposed research model involves measuring the effect of distributive justice from the temporary firm on workers' behaviors towards both their client organizations and their temporary firms. Distributive justice should be measured solely from the temporary firm and not from the client organization, because it is actually the temporary firm that is responsible for setting its workers' rates of compensation. However, based on the available empirical research literature, it was unclear whether intermediated temporary workers were aware of this

division of responsibilities. According to the participants' responses, though, it appears as though they perceive that their temporary firms are responsible for determining their rates of pay. In the following comments, we see that this intermediated temporary worker felt that he received a higher wage because he was with his current temporary firm.

> *"Well, the client themselves would obviously give an idea, of what they feel, but I think that [temporary firm] does play a large role in that, because they pretty well have a standard range for, depending on your level, and your experience. … I mean, the client might say that's way out of my area, but speaking with the guy I worked with at [client], he said [temporary firm] is very expensive in general. For that position, I probably wouldn't have gotten what I did get. Because if you don't have a designation in the accounting world, no matter how much skill level you have and experience, they just don't seem to care. I don't have a designation, but I have more abilities than the majority of CA students or new CAs. They're trained monkeys. …Basically if I had been out there looking for that position, I probably would not have gotten what I did get. It probably would have been a little less, I think."*

Areas for Future Research

In addition to discussing issues that are central to the current study, many participants also spontaneously highlighted a number of other issues that they felt were important, and that may be fruitful areas for future research.

Work Commitment. Some of the interviewees were engaging in what is sometimes known as "bridge employment" (Kim & Feldman, 2000), whereby individuals of retirement age forgo leisure activities to become gainfully employed. These participants' comments indicate a strong sense of commitment to their temporary firms, their professions, and their client organizations.

> *"And maybe that's old-fashioned, but it's the old [profession] system, where we have a sense of pride, and loyalty is important, if we don't sign stuff we shake hands and say that's it, a contract is a handshake and we agree. If I know I can't achieve something on time, I'll call him up and say [temp firm owner] I'm not going to make it and I don't not do it and not tell him, it's a*

total transparent relationship based upon values that are hopefully in the business place today."

"If you're going to work, you're going to work because you want to work. Now, there are people who have to work, after they retire, for financial reasons, but most of us aren't in that category. ...And you retain your own sense of commitment. That sense of commitment will communicate faster and better than anything else you can do.... Well, I'm still committed to what this place does, or I wouldn't be here. I like what they do. I like the people they do it with, I like how they do it, and I think it's terribly important."

In the following quote, this participant explains that his client organization, where he was teaching a class in addition to performing his administrative duties, was unable to pay him for four months. Rather than terminating his assignment, he volunteered his time.

"When my boss came to tell me this, my local boss, not [temporary firm supervisor], it was kind of cute, he came into my office at eight in the morning and said, and I already knew, I had been contacted by [temporary firm supervisor], he said what do you intend to do? And I said well in ten minutes I intend to start the next lecture. We'll sort this out later. So for the next four months, I was a gentleman volunteer."

Advantages of Temporary Employment. A number of respondents also mentioned aspects of their employment that they particularly enjoyed. While some enjoyed the work itself, others were pleased with the flexibility that being a temporary worker afforded, and still others liked the positive feedback that they received from the people with whom they interacted.

"So it's been kind of interesting for me. I rather enjoy it. It's rather fun. At the same time I look at my calendar, and I say I have nothing planned for Friday, and I have nothing planned for Tuesday, and I planned it that way. My weekend will include Friday and Tuesday. My kids have left a long time ago, the dog is dead, the mortgage is paid for, what is it all about? So I say that I'm going off on Friday and I'll be back on Tuesday."

"People who get involved in contract work I find are not stuck in a rut, because they are going from one challenge to another challenge. It's always

different. As the venue changes, so does the situation, the personality, the people that you're involved with. And I think that that keeps your perspective fresh."

"And for the persons involved, it gives us a good feeling too. We feel like we've done something, and handed it back, and said there. And also you meet these people on the street. And they'll stop and talk to you, and say how are things going. And they're quite pleased to see you. That's a good return too."

Challenges of Temporary Employment. Unfortunately, the respondents also raised a number of issues with which they were dissatisfied. Some aspects related to the work itself, while others related to their coworkers. These negative aspects of these intermediated temporary workers' experiences mirror those that are experienced by many permanent employees. For example, this respondent found his work to be boring:

"I like the work, it's very structured, very black and white, that's just the type of person that I am, but I hate it because it's not challenging, it's boring as all hell. I find it dead easy, I don't know how people can have difficulties with it, but for myself I find it pretty easy… it's just not challenging, unfortunately."

In contrast, these interviewee's comments indicate that frustrations can also stem from unclear expectations from a supervisor:

"The greatest difficulty is having a statement of work that is appropriate to the job. The better the statement of work, the easier it is for the contractor to satisfy the client's needs, and the client's expectations should not exceed the statement of work ...some clients tend not to know what it is they want. They want a warm body to do something and until you get there they haven't figured out what it is. Sometimes you write the statement of work and get the client to approve it before the contract."

"In my case I had the problem that my supervisor had incredible difficulty in communicating tasks effectively. Which made my job brutally painful. Because accounting is black and white. There should be no gray area. There should be no questioning."

Unfortunately, intermediated temporary workers may also face challenges that are specific to their indeterminate status. For example, this respondent felt socially marginal:

"It's kind of hard, because I think when you are a temporary worker you are often fairly invisible within the organization, and you're fairly expendable to your agency, because it's like they can always send another temp in there. ...I think a lot of times you would feel fairly insignificant in the greater scheme of things, fairly replaceable, and expendable. You are. I always got that feeling."

Other respondents expressed that temporary workers can feel employment or financial insecurity:

"It can sometimes be unsettling to a person. Some people would prefer security. They've got the nine to five, they've got an annual income coming in, and they would like that. A lot of people yearn for that. They just want job security. They've got their lives in order; they've got their wives and their children and the mortgages and I'm talking from a male perspective but for the ladies I'm sure it's the same thing. They'd like to know that they've got their careers in place, know that they can do these things, you can buy your car, you can go on your trips, I mean, everybody wants this."

"I was doing this because I needed money desperately."

"[Temporary workers] have no benefits, haven't been to the dentist for a few years, like me, and are living on the edge, paycheck to paycheck. It's kind of scary. [loud meowing sound] That's George. He's worried that one day I won't be able to afford the food. Oh it's ok."

Finally, other respondents had a significant preference for permanent employment, and were frustrated that it did not seem to be available to them.

"So the agencies will get back to you, whereas I just find you cannot get a job anymore. Because not just me, I have friends who have looked for ages and just cannot find work. It's brutal. It's really bad. I've been looking for seven months and I haven't found a permanent position. And a lot of these jobs are exactly my skill sets or my experience yet you don't even get calls back."

Summary

The purpose of the interview study was to provide the necessary background information to create measures of organizational citizenship behaviors and counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the temporary firm and the client

organization. While the analysis of the interviews revealed that many of the temporary workers' behaviors are similar to those previously identified in the literature on permanent employee citizenship and counterproductive behaviors, some additional behaviors have been identified that are specifically relevant to the context of temporary work. These "new" measures will be tested in the subsequent survey pretest, and discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER V: SURVEY PRETEST

The survey pretest was conducted to examine whether the items measuring organizational citizenship behaviors and counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the temporary firms and client organizations that were generated from the prior interview study had convergent and divergent validity.

Method

Prior to the administration of the survey pretest, a pilot test of the web-based questionnaire was conducted in order to ensure that the questions being asked were easy to understand, and that the questionnaire would not take too long to complete. The pilot test was conducted with sixteen graduate and undergraduate students or former temporary workers. These individuals identified a number of questions that they found offensive (e.g., some of the social desirability questions), which were removed. Some questions were considered confusing (e.g., which job was being referred to), and these were reworded. The survey also took excessively long to complete (over half an hour), for two reasons: the survey had many questions, and the pages of the survey took a long time to load on participants' computers.

In order to shorten the amount of time that it would take to complete the survey, three different versions were created. While each version included certain "core" constructs, such as citizenship behaviors and counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the client organization and the temporary firm, only one version contained items relating to social desirability, one version contained questions about impression

management to temporary firms, and one version questioned participants about their impression management to client organizations. The survey was also reformatted so that all the questions were on a single page that participants could scroll down, and so that participants selected their responses from drop-down menus instead of by clicking on a radio button. The survey response time was reduced by ten minutes (from 25 - 35 minutes to 15 - 25 minutes).

The survey pretest was conducted with people who were registered with an international on-line employment agency. A search of this company's Canadian resume database was conducted to generate a list of people who had indicated that they were either current or former intermediated temporary workers. People whose resumes indicated that they had worked as a temporary worker, but that did not clearly state that they were affiliated with a temporary firm were not included. People whose experience as a temporary worker ended more than a year prior were also excluded. A link to an online survey was then successfully emailed to 915 people. After one reminder, a total of 110 useable responses were received, for a 12% response rate. As an incentive, the participants could submit electronic ballots for a random draw for $50, $100, and $200. All participants were assured anonymity and confidentiality.

The majority of the respondents (approximately 78%) were female, and the average age of the participants was 35. Most respondents (91%) had either completed or made some progress towards either a college diploma or university degree. While the most common job title among the participants was administrative assistant, other occupations that were represented included accountant, assembly worker, and customer service representative. Participants hailed from a variety of industries, including

government, manufacturing, non-profit, oil and gas, and the service sector. Participants were affiliated with an average of three temporary firms.

Measures

Items for the survey pretest focused on intermediated temporary workers' organizational citizenship behaviors and counterproductive workplace behaviors towards their temporary firms and their client organizations. These items were generated from the results of the previously completed interview study. Other scales, which measure impression management towards the temporary firm and the client organization, as well as social desirability, and organizational identification, were also included, to help assess discriminant validity. Please consult Appendix F for a complete list of items for all scales.

Impression management. Impression management towards the temporary firm was assessed using a measure adapted from the nineteen-item scale developed by Bolino and Turnley (1999) to assess participants' strategies for managing the impressions that they make on other people. While the Bolino and Turnley (1999) scale was designed for the context of non-intermediated permanent employment, the adapted measures are appropriate for the context of intermediated temporary work. Sample items include "I compliment people at my temporary firm so that they will see me as likable", and "I let my temporary firm know that I have been putting in a lot of effort into my work."

As with impression management towards the temporary firm, impression management towards the client organization was assessed using a measure adapted from the scale developed by Bolino and Turnley (1999). The original scale was also adapted

for the context of the organizations where they complete their client assignments. Sample items include “I try to appear like I have been very busy working on my tasks”, and “I pretend not to understand how to do some things in order to avoid having to work on undesirable tasks.”

Social desirability. Many different measures of social desirability have been developed, including the Marlowe-Crowne measure (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), the Assessment of Background and Life Experiences (ABLE) unlikely virtues scale, the PROFILE Social Desirability Scale, and the 16PF Impression Management Scale. However, the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responses (BIDR), developed by Paulhus (1991) is the scale that is most commonly selected by researchers, according to Ones et al. (1996). While Paulhus’ scale includes items related to both self-deception and impression management, only the impression management items were selected for this study. Sample items in the Paulhus (1991) scale include “I have never dropped litter on the street”, and “When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening”.

Organizational identification. This construct assesses the extent to which an intermediated temporary worker’s primary affiliation is with their temporary firm or their client organization, and was developed specifically for this dissertation. Sample items include “I really see myself as a part of my client organization, instead of an employee of my temporary agency” and “When people ask me where I work, I usually give them the name of the organization where I am assigned, instead of the name of my temporary agency.” Responses were assessed with a seven-point Likert-type scale.

Analyses

The psychometric properties of the items in each measure were evaluated through an examination of internal consistency reliability, factor analyses, and correlations. If the variances of any individual items were close to zero, or if the item-total correlations were low, then these items were eliminated. To determine if each new measure (i.e., counterproductive workplace behavior towards the temporary firm, counterproductive workplace behavior towards the client organization, organizational citizenship behavior towards the temporary firm, organizational citizenship behavior towards the client organization) appraised a single construct, its factor structure was examined with a single exploratory factor analysis that simultaneously included all 71 items from the four main new constructs. While 110 survey responses are perhaps inadequate for a factor analysis that includes 71 items, and the factor structure may not be stable, this approach was considered more rigorous than conducting separate factor analyses for each dependent variable, because these constructs may lack divergent validity. The number of factors in each measure was determined by examining the scree plot and the Eigenvalues.

To assess the divergent validity of each measure, the correlations between each construct were also assessed. While some measures may be moderately correlated (e.g., organizational citizenship behavior towards the temporary firm and impression management towards the temporary firm), each measure should represent a separate construct. However, because three different versions of the survey were administered, it was not possible to calculate the correlations between all measures (e.g., social desirability and impression management).

Results

A maximum likelihood factor analysis, with varimax rotation, was conducted on all citizenship and counterproductive workplace behaviors. When eigenvalues greater than 1.0 were included, 20 factors emerged. When items with cross-loadings higher than 0.40 and factors with only one or two items were removed, then eight factors remained which are discussed in more detail below. Client organizational citizenship behaviors had three factors, with an aggregate scale reliability of $\alpha = .71$, while client counterproductive workplace behaviors had two factors and an aggregate scale reliability of $\alpha = .90$. Organizational citizenship behaviors towards the temporary firm had two factors, with an aggregate scale reliability of $\alpha = .90$, while counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the temporary firm had a single factor with reliability of .80. A summary of these items is included in Appendix G.

This factor analysis was conducted to ensure that these variables were being operationalized in a way that would distinguish between these constructs. In essence, it was important to ensure that the new citizenship items, for example, were not in actuality reverse-coded measures of counterproductive behaviors. It was similarly important to see if behaviors in one context (e.g., counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the temporary firm) were distinguishable from similar behaviors in another context (e.g., counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the client organization). Fortunately, the four new behavioral measures did indeed factor as separate constructs, and none of these factors were excessively correlated. For example, the highest inter-correlation, between counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the client and towards the temporary firm was moderate ($r = .45$, $p < .001$). The correlations between the new behavioral measures are indicated below in Table 2.

Counterproductive workplace behaviors. The items that were originally proposed were based on the organizational / interpersonal dichotomy, proposed by Bennett and Robinson (2000). However, the factor structures reflect a different organizing principle: that of organizational harm versus individual gain.

Client Organization. The first factor in the measure of counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the client organization relates to behaviors that have indirect negative consequences for the organization and its members, without having a direct positive benefit for the temporary worker. Sample items include “wasted a co-worker’s time” and “discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person”. One item was rejected although it had an adequate factor loading, because it related to the workers’ behaviors toward their temporary firm. The item (refused to accept assignments I was expected to) may in fact be relevant to both contexts, or participants may have been confused by somewhat ambiguous wording.

The second factor in the measure of counterproductive behaviors towards the client organization relates to activities that do not directly affect other individuals in the firm, yet have immediate direct benefits for the temporary worker, at the expense of the organization. Sample items include “taken property from work without permission”, and “taken an additional or longer break than is acceptable at this workplace”. One item that was originally intended to be an organizational citizenship behavior loaded highly on this personal gain factor, and as such will be included as a reverse coded counterproductive item.

Table 2: Correlations between citizenship and counterproductive behaviors towards the client organization and the temporary firm, social desirability, and impression management towards the client organization and temporary firm

	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Temp OCBs	5.17	1.07	(.90)										
2. Client OCBs	5.73	.71	.45***	(.71)									
3. Temp CWBs	1.50	1.08	-.35**	-.14	(.80)								
4. Client CWBs	1.87	.96	-.24*	-.19*	.45***	(.90)							
5. Social Desirability	4.39	1.02	.41*	.21	-.27	-.47**	(.88)						
6. Client Impression Management	3.19	.77	.16	.21	.21	.38*	n/a	(.82)					
7. Temp Impression Management	3.31	.88	.31*	.34*	.43**	.34*	n/a	n/a	(.85)				
8. Organizational Identification	5.13	1.16	.12	.27**	-.08	-.02	.04	.15	.14	(.77)			
9. Threat of Sanctions – Client	5.15	1.78	.26**	.11	-.16	-.04	-.06	-.30	.14	-.16	n/a		
10. Threat of Sanctions – Temp	5.60	1.46	.33**	.20	-.19	.05	n/a	-.10	.44**	-.03	.56***	n/a	
11. Source of Distributive Justice	5.40	1.85	.06	-.11	.09	.00	-.33	-.12	.13	-.17	.15	.01	n/a

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

α scores are indicated in parentheses where appropriate

Temporary firm. The single-factor measure of counterproductive workplace behavior towards the temporary firm includes both interpersonal and organizational items, and reflects ways in which the worker can impede the effectiveness of the temporary firm. Sample items include "ignored my contact at my temporary firm (e.g.,

didn't return phone calls)" and "went to work directly for a client, without telling my temporary firm".

A number of items that had been intended to measure workers' counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the temporary firm could not be retained, due to poor factor loadings. They related primarily to workers saying negative things about the temporary firm to the public. These items were highly correlated to counterproductive workplace behaviors towards these workers' client organizations. Instead, a number of new items have been proposed, which are included in Appendix G.

Organizational citizenship behaviors. In the contexts of both temporary firms and client organizations, the proposed items had originally been organized according to four separate factors: interpersonal helping, individual initiative, personal industry, and loyal boosterism, as per Moorman and Blakely (1995). However, based on the results of the factor analysis, it appears that the successful items may be more appropriately categorized as either "organizational" or "individual".

For the purpose of testing the hypotheses outlined in Chapter III, it was particularly important that the citizenship behaviors towards one context be distinguishable from the citizenship behaviors towards the other context. That is, citizenship behavior towards the temporary firm and citizenship behavior towards the client organization should not be so highly correlated as to ensure that an outcome akin to "spillover" be guaranteed. As such, each proposed facet of citizenship behavior (e.g., interpersonal helping, personal industry, etc.) is not duplicated in both contexts. This may deepen our understanding of the meaning of citizenship behaviors to temporary workers. While Lepine et al. (2002) suggest that organizational citizenship behaviors are a single

latent construct (i.e., all dimensions are highly correlated), this may not be true for temporary workers who are affiliated with a temporary firm.

An examination of Table 3 (see below) suggests that intermediated temporary workers may not find certain organizational citizenship behavior dimensions to be relevant in the context of either the temporary firm or the client organization. For example, they may have difficulty engaging in interpersonal helping in client organizations since they may not know their colleagues well, they may have poor understandings of their co-workers' responsibilities, and they may be occupied with learning their own job duties. Similarly, temporary workers may have little knowledge of the client organizations where they are completing their assignments, and thus have difficulty engaging in loyal boosterism regarding these companies. In contrast, temporary workers who have long and enduring relationships with their temporary firms may have opportunities where they can be helpful to their temporary firm contacts or supervisors. These workers may also be sufficiently familiar enough with their temporary firms so that they can speak to others in order to enhance these firms' reputations.

Table 3: Summary of Organizational Citizenship Behavior Dimensions most Relevant To Temporary Firm and Client Organization Contexts

Dimension	Temporary Firm	Client Organization
Interpersonal Helping	Yes	No
Loyal Boosterism	Yes	No
Personal Industry	No	Yes
Individual Initiative	No	Yes

Personal industry and individual initiative may also be more meaningful to temporary workers in the context of their client organizations, in comparison to their temporary firms. Specifically, these workers may have many opportunities to

demonstrate thoroughness and diligence, and to offer suggestions on how processes could be improved, while they are completing their client assignments. However, these opportunities may not arise in the context of their temporary firm, simply because this latter relationship is more narrowly defined (e.g., the workers do not complete tasks and do not interact with customers or colleagues; rather, they negotiate their next client assignments).

Client Organization. The proposed items that related to loyal boosterism towards the client organization were not retainable, due to poor factor loadings. It is possible that temporary workers are unlikely to engage in such behaviors, perhaps due to insufficient knowledge of the client organization, which may in turn be due to short tenure and job duties that relate to a small aspect of the company (e.g., data entry, instead of public relations).

Participants' personal industry citizenship behaviors were divided into two separate factors: one that related to traditional issues involving diligence, and a second factor relating to ensuring that the worker understood the requirements of the assigned tasks. This second factor may be particularly relevant to temporary workers, who are continually faced with new situations, and who can help their clients by ensuring that they conform to the organizations' expectations. Representative items of the first factor include "perform my duties with unusually few errors" and "always meets or beats deadlines for completing work". Sample items of the second factor include "ask for clarification if I am unsure what to do" and "double-check with my supervisor if there are changes to my duties".

The proposed items that related to interpersonal helping towards members of the client organization were not retainable, due to poor factor loadings. This may be due to a number of reasons. It is possible that temporary workers are less motivated to help colleagues with whom they are not well acquainted, it may be because they are incapable of helping colleagues due to their lack of knowledge of the organization, or it may be because they have little contact with colleagues due to the nature of the tasks that they have been assigned (i.e., if the client organization is pursuing a segregationist integration strategy).

The individual initiative factor addressed the extent to which workers communicate with other employees in order to improve individual and group performance. Sample items include “for issues that may have serious consequences for my client organization, I express opinions honestly even when others may disagree” and “I frequently communicate to co-workers suggestions on how the group can improve”. One item was rejected because it actually related to the temporary firm, although the wording may have confused participants. Two additional items have been added for the subsequent phase of research.

Temporary Firm. The proposed items that related to personal industry towards the temporary firm were not retainable, due to poor factor loadings. These items may in fact reflect a different construct, such as conscientiousness, agreeableness, or a desire for self-improvement. The proposed items that related to individual initiative towards the temporary firm were also not retainable, due to poor factor loadings. As noted above, many of the newly created items that were intended to reflect ways in which temporary workers would communicate to colleagues how individual and group performance could

be improved actually loaded with the interpersonal helping factor. As such, these individual initiative items were not successful.

The first successful factor addressed temporary workers' actions to improve the reputation of the temporary firm. Sample items include "actively promote this temporary firm's services to potential clients" and "defend this temporary firm when other workers criticize it". One item, "show pride when representing the organization in public" had an acceptable factor loading, but was rejected because it actually referred to the client organization, rather than the temporary firm. Participants may have been confused by the somewhat ambiguous wording of this question.

The second successful factor related to temporary workers efforts to assist their temporary firm representatives. In this context, a willingness to be flexible while providing the representative with the information that was useful to them was a recurring theme. Sample items include "Am flexible about what types of jobs I'll agree to do" and "Am really open with my temporary firm about how my client assignments are going". While some of these items had originally been conceptualized as reflecting workers' individual initiative, upon reflection they appear to more closely relate to ways in which the worker could make their representative's job easier.

Correlates of Counterproductive and Citizenship Behaviors

Social Desirability. Because participants' responses to certain questions (e.g., organizational citizenship behaviors, counterproductive workplace behaviors) may have been affected by a desire to provide answers that are socially acceptable, the social desirability scale (Paulhus, 1991) was included. As demonstrated in Table 3, social

desirability is significantly correlated with citizenship behaviors towards the temporary firm ($r = .41$, $p < .05$) and counterproductive behaviors towards the client organization ($r = -.47$, $p < .01$). However, these correlations were not so high as to suggest that the new measures were indistinct from social desirability.

Unfortunately, the questions relating to social desirability appeared to be interpreted by respondents as a test of moral character, and in some cases may have engendered somewhat hostile responses (see Table 4). While the questions regarding counterproductive workplace behaviors may also have been considered offensive to some respondents, these items will be retained because they relate to the core hypotheses being investigated. In an effort to protect the response rate of the subsequent survey, to reduce the length of time required to answer the entire questionnaire, and to eliminate potentially offensive questions, the social desirability measure will not be included in the main survey.

Although social desirability questions will be excluded from the main survey, two sets of impression management measures will remain. The administration of the survey pre-test in three separate versions precludes the calculation of the correlation between social desirability and impression management, but some similarities have been noted in the research literature. For example, Paulhus (1991) discusses socially desirable responding in terms of two separate factors: self-deception and impression management. Of impression management and social desirability, impression management may be more relevant to this study in that it deals specifically with the work context, while social desirability relates to the participants' actions in a variety of situations. Thus, the

impression management measures will be retained, while the social desirability measure will be omitted.

Table 4: Hostile comments from participants

… I was particularly interested by the last questions suggestive of the moral character of the participant -- there were some creative questions here, such as the one about customs, the speed limit, and the library book or store item!…
… I think by virtue of the fact that you are in academia, you are a member of a socio-economic elite who overvalue the rights of an abstract unit, the corporation, over the rights of workers. The foundation of this study demonstrates a poor understanding of the "real world" on the part of the survey designer. An MBA-PHD study such as this above is utterly useless, because you strive to examine the deficiencies of the workers, when the workers are utterly impressive candidates … You really don't get it, and now you are going to prepare a damning indictment of the temp-workers, as being lazy, disinterested, out to steal from companies, and always out to extract more payroll dollars for themselves. Grow up & get out into the real world…. Temps are not the refuse whom no company wants.
Just my opinion and not to be rude, but questions 27, 28, 29 where particularly personal to answer. I would wonder even though the questionaire is confidential if one would really get 100% accurate data from these 3 questions.

Impression Management towards the Client. This scale, adapted from one developed by Bolino and Turnley (1999), had an acceptable scale reliability ($\alpha = .82$). This aggregate scale consists of five sub-factors: ingratiation, self-promotion, exemplification, supplication, and intimidation, and is significantly correlated ($r = .38$, $p < .05$) with counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the client, but less highly correlated to both measures of organizational citizenship behavior and counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the temporary firm.

Impression Management towards the Temporary Firm. The scale reliability of this measure, adapted from a scale developed by Bolino and Turnley (1999), was acceptable ($\alpha = .85$). The aggregate scale is somewhat correlated with each of the new behavioral measures: organizational citizenship behaviors towards the temporary firm ($r = .31$, $p <$

.05) and the client organization (r = .35, p < .05), and counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the temporary firm (r = .43, p < .01) and the client organization (r = .34, p < .05). Impression management is correlated with both positive and negative behaviors; perhaps because it relates to individuals' propensity to be viewed positively by others, and to manipulate others in order to achieve this.

If impression management towards the temporary firm or the client organization had been highly correlated with the new dependent variable measures, then this would have indicated poor discriminant validity and would have been cause for concern. However, the impression management items will be retained for the main survey study, as potential control variables, and in order to provide additional data for future research.

Client Threats of Sanctions. The reliability of the five-item client threat of sanctions scale was very low (α = .59) and could only be slightly improved (α = .60) by deleting items. A review of the proposed items suggested that they were not in fact addressing the extent to which workers perceived that they would be penalized for inappropriate behaviors. Five new items were created and are included in Appendix H.

Temporary Firm Threat of Sanctions. Similarly, the reliability of the five-item temporary firm threat of sanctions scale was also very low (α = .38) and could not be improved by deleting items. As with the client threat of sanctions scale, a review of the items suggested that they were not in fact addressing the extent to which workers perceived that they would be penalized for inappropriate behaviors. Five new items were created, and are included in Appendix H.

Organizational Identification. The reliability of the four-item organizational identification scale was moderate (α = .77) but could not be improved by deleting items.

In an attempt to further improve the reliability of this instrument, an additional item was created: "If someone were to ask me what I did for a living, I would tell them that I was a temporary worker, instead of talking about the tasks that I'm doing at my current or most recent client assignment."

Source of Distributive Justice. Four items (shown in Appendix H) had been developed to measure the extent to which participants considered their temporary firm to be responsible for their levels of compensation, and thus the source of distributive (in)justice. The reliability of this scale was low ($\alpha = .57$) and could only be improved slightly by removing one item ($\alpha = .67$). Upon reflection, it was decided that the underlying construct could be more accurately assessed by asking respondents to indicate their understanding along a single continuum, and then to pair this response with their responses to a more generic set of questions relating to distributive justice.

Summary

The purpose of the survey pretest was to test the measures of temporary workers' citizenship behaviors and counterproductive workplace behaviors, perceived threat of sanctions, organizational identification, and source of distributive justice that had been based on the prior interview study. Of the items that were originally proposed, some needed to be excluded, in order to improve convergent and divergent validity. The successful items, as well as some additional items and measures, are used in the subsequent main survey study, which is discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER VI: MAIN SURVEY

The main survey was conducted to test the hypotheses identified in the third chapter. The method, measures, and analyses, and results are described below. A discussion of these results follows in the next chapter.

Method

A paper-and-pencil survey was administered to temporary workers who were registered with two separate branches of an international temporary firm. A total of 1078 survey packages were mailed out; each package contained a survey, a letter of information, and two postage-paid envelopes (one to return the survey and one to return the lottery ballot). As an incentive, the participants could choose to participate in a random draw for four prizes of $50, three prizes of $100, and one prize of $200. Participants' ballots, which contained identifying information, were submitted separately from the survey in order to preserve anonymity. All participants were assured anonymity and confidentiality.

After one reminder, a total of 157 responses were received, and 82 surveys were returned by Canada Post as undeliverable, for a 15.8 % response rate. This response rate, although lower than desired, is considered to be adequate considering that the potential participants had no contact with the researcher, the participants did not receive encouragement from their temporary firm to participate, and the mailing list appeared to include a large number of workers who had either moved or who had not completed a client assignment in a long time.

A slight majority of the respondents (approximately 54%) are female, and the average age of the participants is between 30 – 39 years old. Most respondents (88%) had either completed or made some progress towards either a college diploma or university degree. While the most common job categories among the participants were Light Industrial (55 people) and Office Work (45 people), other jobs that were represented included Heavy Industrial, Information Technology, and Skilled Trades. Participants hailed from a variety of industries, including Manufacturing of Durables (50 people), Government (31 people), and Manufacturing of Non-Durables (22). Participants were affiliated with an average of 1.6 temporary firms.

Two surveys were removed from the sample because in a multivariate analysis of outliers, the responses contained an unusual number of outliers. Neither of these respondents provided comments on their questionnaire. Seven surveys were also excluded from the analysis because of substantial missing data. Some of these participants noted in the comments that they did not feel that they had enough experience with the temporary firm to complete the questionnaire fully (e.g., "because I've had only 2 short assignments with [temporary firm name], I feel I cannot answer most questions in this survey and I'm also registered with another agency where I've had longer assignments)." Such responses were similar to those of the nine non-participants who called to explain that they would not be returning a survey. The remaining usable sample contained 148 cases.

Measures

Items for the main survey focused on intermediated temporary workers' organizational citizenship behaviors and counterproductive workplace behaviors towards their temporary firms and their client organizations. These items were generated from the previously completed interviews and survey pretest. Additional scales were included in order to test the hypotheses presented earlier. Please consult Appendix I for a complete list of questionnaire items.

Dependent Variables. All the 51 behavioral items (organizational citizenship and counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the temporary firm and the client organizations) were included in a factor analysis (Maximum Likelihood, Promax rotation). Again, 148 useable cases is perhaps insufficient to perform the required analyses, and the results that follow should be interpreted with some caution. Some items did not load onto the expected factors: items with high cross-loadings, items that loaded as singlets or doublets, and items that loaded with inappropriate factors were removed. Although these factors are moderately correlated (see Table 5), the four dependent variables have adequate discriminant validity and all have adequate internal reliabilities. The 26 retained items and their factor loadings are shown in Appendix J. All items were assessed with a 7-point Likert-type scale.

Organizational citizenship behaviors. Client organizational citizenship behaviors were assessed with ten items, representing three factors, based on the results of the survey pretest. However, only four items were retained for the subsequent analysis. A representative item is: "When I notice something that could be improved, I tell my co-workers how to go about fixing it." The internal consistency of the retained client

organizational citizenship behaviors was acceptable (α = .77). The mean of this scale (4.58) is somewhat higher than that reported by Van Dyne and Ang (1998) (4.43), Pearce (1993) (3.19), and Ang and Slaughter (2001) (4.56).

Organizational citizenship behaviors towards the temporary firm were assessed with twelve items, representing two factors, again based on the results of the survey pretest. Only five items were retained for the subsequent analysis. A representative item is "I actively promote [temporary firm name] to other potential temporary workers." Although an additional factor was identified, it had low internal consistency (α = .67) and was rejected. The internal consistency of the retained factor was acceptable (α = .87). The mean of this scale (4.27) cannot be compared to means reported in previous research, because prior studies have not measured citizenship behavior towards a temporary firm.

Counterproductive workplace behaviors. Client counterproductive workplace behaviors were measured with thirteen items, representing two factors that were created and tested in the survey pretest. This factor structure was repeated in the main survey factor analysis. A representative item of the first factor representing interpersonal deviance is "I have unnecessarily disrupted a colleague's work" and the internal consistency is acceptable (α = .86). A representative item of the second factor representing organizational deviance is "I have taken an additional or longer break than is acceptable at this workplace" and the internal consistency of these items is acceptable (α = .76). Because these two factors were highly correlated ($r = .68$, $p < .001$) and because they represent a single underlying construct, these items were combined into an aggregate measure of counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the client, with an acceptable internal consistency (α = .88).

Counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the temporary firm were initially measured with six items, representing a single factor. Five items were retained for the subsequent analyses. A sample item is: "I have stopped going to as assignment, before telling [temporary firm name]." The internal consistency of the retained counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the temporary firm was acceptable (α = .75).

Justice. A primary focus of this dissertation is the fairness of how the temporary workers are treated by their temporary firms and client organizations. Fairness was operationalized in terms of distributive justice from the temporary firm, procedural justice from the temporary firm and the client organization, and interactional justice from the temporary firm and the client organization. These measures are discussed below.

Distributive justice from the temporary firm. Unlike other justice measures, which were measured from both the temporary and client organizations, distributive justice was only measured from the temporary firm, because it is responsible for determining its workers compensation. Distributive justice construct was measured using a scale created by Kim et al. (1996) to assess respondents' feelings about the fairness of the rewards that they receive. A sample item is "I am rewarded fairly considering the responsibilities I have" and the internal reliability of the scale was acceptable (α = .84). All distributive justice items were measured on a seven-point scale.

Because there is no empirical evidence from the survey pretest that intermediated temporary workers correctly perceive that it is their temporary firm that determines their compensation, an additional item was created to ascertain which organization each participant believed determined their take-home pay. Participants were asked "My take-

home pay is really determined by …" and then asked to circle a number between one and seven, with the temporary firm on the "1" end and their client organization on the "7" end. This additional item was necessary, because an erroneous finding of "spillover" could be inferred if participants actually attributed distributive injustice to their client organizations, although the construct was intended to measure an attitude towards their temporary service firm.

Unfortunately, it was not clear whether participants understood this question. Some individuals circled "7", which would indicate that they felt that their client organization determined their take-home pay, yet they also underlined the name of their temporary firm, which would indicate that they felt that their temporary service firm was the source of their distributive justice. In these instances, the "7" could have been intended to indicate that they "Strongly Agreed" with the statement that their temporary firm determined their take-home pay, which would have been consistent with the anchors that has been used in previous sections of the questionnaire. While the modal response (31.2% of participants) was "1", indicating that most individuals considered their temporary firm to be responsible for the amount of their take-home pay, a large proportion (17.8%) indicated that they considered the client organization to be the responsible party. In addition, a sizable minority of respondents (17.2%) circled "4", which would suggest that they considered their take-home pay to be dependent on both their client organizations and their temporary firm. Finally, this question was also in some cases left blank (12.1%). These findings collectively suggest that distributive justice should not be used in this study to assess how workers' attitudes might spill over between contexts.

Procedural justice. Procedural justice from the temporary firm was assessed with a measure adapted from those created by Folger and Konovsky (1989) and Levinthal (1980) to assess respondents' perceptions of the fairness of the procedures used to determine outcomes. Although the measures developed by Folger and Konovsky (1989) and Levinthal (1980) were not designed for the context of the temporary help industry, the measure used was adapted to be more relevant to the participants. Sample items include "[Temporary firm name] uses consistent procedures to evaluate everyone's suitability and performance" and "[Temporary firm name] has procedures that ensure that everyone is treated ethically".

As with procedural justice from the temporary firm, procedural justice from the client organization was also assessed using a measure adapted from those created by Folger and Konovsky (1989) and Levinthal (1980). This measure was also adapted for the context of the organizations where temporary workers complete their client assignments. Sample items include "my client firm has procedures that allow workers a chance to express concerns about their treatment", and "my client firm uses consistent procedures to evaluate everyone's suitability and performance." All procedural justice items were measured with a seven-point response scale.

Interpersonal justice. Interpersonal justice from the temporary firm was assessed using a measure adapted from the twelve-item scale developed by Donovan, et al. (1998) to assess participants' perceptions of the extent to which their supervisors are fair in their interpersonal interactions. While the Donovan et al. (1998) scale was designed for the context of permanent employment, the adapted measures are appropriate for the context of intermediated temporary work. Sample items include "at [temporary firm name],

temporary workers' questions and problems are responded to quickly", and "at [temporary firm name], supervisors threaten to stop finding future assignments for temporary workers." Although the Donovan et al. (1998) measure originally used a three-point response scale, a seven-point scale anchored at one (strongly disagree) and seven (strongly agree) was used in order to capture a greater proportion of the variance in participants' responses.

Interpersonal justice from client organizations was also assessed using a measure adapted from the twelve-item scale developed by Donovan et al. (1998). Sample items include "at my current or most recent client firm, temporary workers are praised for good work", and "at my current or most recent client firm, temporary workers are trusted." Again, a seven-point scale was used.

Procedural justice and interpersonal justice were highly correlated in both the temporary firm ($r = .76$, $p < .001$) and client organization ($r = .70$, $p < .001$) contexts. Because procedural and interpersonal justice measure a similar underlying construct (the fairness of the treatment by the organization), procedural and interpersonal justice were combined into a single "justice" construct for each organization. The measures for both client organization justice ($\alpha = .95$) and temporary firm justice ($\alpha = .94$) had high internal consistencies.

Volition. Ellingson et al. (1998) suggest that a unidimensional measure is not sensitive enough to accurately measure the degree to which temporary workers have voluntarily or involuntarily chosen temporary employment. Sample items of each sub-scale are "I am a temporary worker because of the flexible hours" and "I am a temporary worker because of my difficulty finding permanent work", respectively. Although these

sub-scales originally used a three-point response scale, a seven-point scale anchored at 1 (no role) and 7 (major role) was used in order to capture a greater proportion of the variance in responses. Both voluntariness (α = .81) and involuntariness (α = .71) had acceptable internal consistency, especially considering the small number of items (4). A comparison with the mean values reported in previous studies is not possible, since prior research has used either an additive composite (Ellingson et al., 1998) or a three-point response scale (Connelly et al., 2003).

Threat of sanctions. Employee perceptions regarding the threat of sanctions has been measured by Dupre (2004) in the context of permanent employees' beliefs concerning the likelihood that their employers will act on employee aggression or violence. This adapted measure demonstrated poor internal consistency in the survey pretest, so new measures were created for the final administration of the survey. New items for the temporary firm context included "if [temporary firm name] were unhappy with my behavior, they would threaten to stop giving me assignments" and "I would receive a reprimand from [temporary firm name] if my client organization didn't like my performance." Participants' responses were measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale. The internal consistency of this measure was acceptable (α = .82).

As with threat of sanctions from their temporary firm, participants' perceptions of the threat of sanctions from their client organizations was also assessed with a similar new measure. Sample items include "If my client organization were unhappy with my behavior, it would complain to [temporary firm name]" and "If my client organization was unhappy with my behavior, they might cut my assignment short". The internal consistency of this new measure was acceptable (α = .72).

Negative trait affectivity. A number of different measures of both positive and negative trait affectivity have been developed and used in the organizational behavior and psychology literatures. For example, the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule – Expanded Form (PANAS-X) that was created by Watson and Clark (1994) has been used by a number of researchers (e.g., Lee & Allen, 2002) although other researchers use an earlier version developed by Watson et al. (1988); either the full version (e.g., Heller, Judge, & Watson, 2002) or a ten-item subscale (e.g., Aquino et al., 1999; Spector et al, 1999). This subscale was selected for this study; respondents were asked to rate, on a scale of one to seven, how each of ten adjectives described how they felt in general. Sample adjectives include "distressed", "irritable", and "ashamed". The internal consistency of this measure was acceptable (α = .90).

Organizational identification. This construct assesses the extent to which an intermediated temporary worker's primary affiliation is with their temporary firm or their client organization. To ensure that this construct was measured adequately, an additional item was added, based on the results of the pre-test (α = .77). Sample items include "I really see myself as a part of my client organization, instead of an employee of [temporary firm name]" and "When people ask me where I work, I usually give them the name of the organization where I am assigned, instead of the name of [temporary firm name]." All responses were assessed with a seven-point Likert-type scale, and the internal consistency (α = .77) was acceptable.

Control Variables. This study measured participants' genders, levels of education, types of jobs, industries, tenures as temporary workers, tenures with their client organizations, tenures with their temporary firms, impression management towards the

temporary firm, impression management towards the client organization, and the numbers of temporary firms with which they were affiliated.

Analyses

Means, standard deviations, internal consistencies, and correlations between variables are presented in Table 5. Organizational citizenship behaviors to the temporary firm and to the client organizations were positively correlated ($r = .28$, $p < .001$), and counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the temporary firm and the client organizations were also positively correlated ($r = .53$, $p < .001$). Justice from the client organizations and from the temporary firm were also significantly correlated ($r = .69$, $p < .001$).

Because many of the control variables were potentially correlated (e.g., tenure with a temporary firm and tenure with a client organization), a multivariate regression was calculated on each dependent variable, with all potential control variables entered simultaneously. No relationships were found, except for a significant relationship ($p < .05$) between (1) citizenship behavior towards the temporary firm and whether the participant was working in a "light industrial" job, (2) counterproductive behavior towards the temporary firm and tenure with the temporary firm, and (3) citizenship behavior towards the client organization and tenure with the client organization and impression management towards the client firm. These variables were included in the subsequent analyses.

Hypotheses were tested with Structural Equation Modeling (SEM), using AMOS 5.0 software (Arbuckle, 2003). At the present time, norms regarding the analysis of

spillover versus segmentation effects have not yet been established. While some researchers have used bivariate analyses (e.g., Dolan & Gosselin, 2003; Sumer & Knight, 2001) and other researchers have used step-wise multiple regression (e.g., Inness, Barling & Turner, in press), still other researchers have compared models that use structural equation modeling (e.g., Aquino, Lewis, & Bradfield, 1999; Liden et al., 2003). Structural equation modeling was chosen here because it allows for an evaluation of mediated models, allows for dependent variables to be correlated, and allows for a comparison of the relative fit of competing models (Maruyama & McGarvey, 1980). These advantages are particularly useful, considering the design of the research project.

One of the challenges of using structural equation modeling is its difficulty fitting large number of variables (e.g., as occurs when the full factor structure for each latent variable is included), especially with a smaller sample size. A common rule of thumb for SEM is a minimum of 200 observations, but this study has only 148 viable cases. A solution is to create composite or aggregate variables where all items are averaged into a single variable, and to take into account the reliability of the measurement (Landis, Beal, & Tesluk). The error in the measurement of each aggregate observed variable is taken into account by fixing the error terms of the measures to VarT(1 - α), where VarT is the variance of the measure, and where α is the internal consistency of the measure, and by fixing the weight of the indicators to 1. This process specifies the proportion of systematic variance in the measure, which allows for a disattenuated estimate of the relationships among the latent variables. Unlike path analysis, this method takes the unreliability of the measurement into account, and allows one to use SEM while using composite measures. An example of this technique is shown in Liden et al. (2003).

Table 5: Correlations, means, standard deviations, and Cronbach's alphas

Variable	μ	σ	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1.Temporary Firm OCBs	4.27	1.36	(.87)											
2.Temporary Firm CWBs	1.79	1.05	-.15	(.75)										
3.Client OCBs	4.58	1.22	.28 ***	-.08	(.77)									
4.Client CWBs	1.84	.89	-.18 *	.53 ***	-.15	(.89)								
5.Temporary Firm Justice	4.61	1.20	.63 ***	-.22 **	.25 **	-.26 **	(.93)							
6.Client Justice	4.68	1.18	.40 ***	-.20 *	.20 *	-.32 ***	.69 ***	(.95)						
7.Voluntariness	2.95	1.52	.41 ***	.12	-.02	.11	.29 ***	.14	(.82)					
8.Involuntariness	1.68	1.68	-.03	-.11	.18 *	-.05	-.05	.04	-.30 ***	(.71)				
9.Negative Affectivity	2.33	1.13	-.30 ***	.19	-.19 *	.30 ***	-.35 ***	-.33 ***	-.20 *	.15	(.90)			
10.Temporary Firm Threat of Sanctions	4.28	1.37	-.11	.06	.13	-.08	-.17 *	-.06	-.03	.07	.15	(.82)		
11.Client Threat of Sanctions	4.71	1.33	-.01	-.10	.22 **	-.19 *	-.15	-.17 *	-.05	.10	.09	.58 ***	(.72)	
12.Organizational Identification	4.65	1.43	-.22 **	.02	.02	.00	-.21 *	.06	-.26 **	.08	.02	.07	.06	(.77)

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

(α) indicated on the diagonal.

Structural equation modeling provides a number of different indicators to assess the fit of any proposed model; both the overall model fit as well as the significance of any path coefficients can be evaluated. Chi-squared to degrees of freedom ratios of greater than two could be said to indicate an inadequate fit (Byrne, 1989). Goodness of fit indices (GFI) and adjusted goodness of fit indices (AGFI) above .90 indicate a good fit to the data (Kelloway, 1998). Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) values of less than .10 indicate a good fit to the data, and values below .05 indicate a very good fit to the data (Steiger, 1990). The normed fit index (NFI) should generally not fall below .90 (Bentler & Bonett, 1980), and the comparative fit index (CFI) should be close to 1.00 (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999). The two models in Figures 1 and 2 are nested, and were compared using a ΔX^2 test.

Moderator hypotheses were tested by first creating composite terms by calculating the products of the centered variables. For example, the composite organizational identification and justice terms were calculated as the products of the centered justice and organizational identification variables, which had been centered by subtracting the mean values from the variables. While the hypotheses concerning the possibility of segmentation versus spillover could be tested by comparing nested models, this is not possible when examining the influence of additional variables, such as moderators. One model is said to be nested in another when the variables are identical but paths between them are deleted. A non-nested model involves either different paths or additional variables, although the data set remains the same. To compare non-nested models, it is inappropriate to employ the ΔX^2 test. Rather, information-theoretic measures such as the AIC (and the ECVI), as well as the BCC (and the MECVI) can be used for model

comparison (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999). The AIC and the ECVI tend to favor saturated models in very large samples, and parsimonious models in smaller samples (McDonald & Marsh, 1990; Mulaik, 1996), and this tendency is more pronounced with the BCC, and therefore the MECVI (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999). For this reason, these measures are being presented in conjunction with other common fit indices. One advantage of information-theoretic measures is that they avoid arbitrary cut-off points (Lefkovitch, 1994). For each information-theoretic measure, smaller values indicate better-fitting models (Kelloway, 1998).

Results

In this analysis, the fit of two competing models, a segmentation model (Figure 1) and a spillover model (Figure 2) were compared, using maximum likelihood estimation as implemented in AMOS 5.0. The spillover model provided an acceptable fit to the data [$X^2(47) = 51.47$, n.s.; $X^2/df = 1.10$; GFI = .95; AGFI = .90; RMSEA = .03; NFI = .89; CFI = .99]. In contrast, the segmentation model demonstrated a fit relatively less acceptable than that of the spillover model [$X^2(51) = 96.16$, $p < .001$; $X^2/df = 1.89$; GFI = .91; AGFI = .84; RMSEA = .08; NFI = .80; CFI = .88]. A comparison of the fit statistics for the two models is shown in Table 6. The spillover model provided a significantly better fit to the data than the segmentation model. Because these two models are nested, we can calculate the $\Delta X2$ statistic, which in this case is significant (11.17, df = 4, $p < .05$).

Table 6: Fit Statistics for Spillover and Segmentation Models

	X^2	d.f.	GFI	AGFI	RMSEA	NFI	CFI
Null Model	276.47	66	.78	.69	.15	.41	.46
Segmentation Model	96.16	51	.91	.84	.08	.80	.88
Spillover Model	51.47	47	.95	.90	.03	.89	.99

Standardized parameter estimates for the spillover model are shown in Figure 3. Deleting the three non-significant paths, between negative affectivity and involuntariness, and between the control variables and citizenship behavior towards the temporary firm, did not result in a significant change to model fit.



Figure 3: Standardized Parameter Estimates for the Spillover Model

An examination of the path coefficients shows that the preliminary hypotheses, H1 and H2, were both supported. That is, justice from the temporary firm predicted temporary firm counterproductive behaviors ($\beta = -.37$, $p < .001$) and temporary firm citizenship behaviors ($\beta = .58$, $p < .001$). Similarly, justice from the client organization predicted client counterproductive behaviors ($\beta = -.32$, $p < .001$) and client citizenship behaviors ($\beta = .21$, $p < .05$).

The fact that these hypotheses were supported does not imply that the segmentation perspective is correct. In fact, the segmentation hypotheses, H3 and H4, were not supported. Instead, the spillover hypotheses, H5 and H6 were accepted. As shown, the inter-context paths are significant. Specifically, client justice predicts temporary firm counterproductive workplace behaviors ($\beta = -.22$, $p < .05$) and temporary firm citizenship behaviors ($\beta = .26$, $p < .001$) in addition to predicting client behaviors. Similarly, justice from the temporary firm predicts client organizational citizenship behaviors ($\beta = .31$, $p < .001$) and client counterproductive behaviors ($\beta = -.31$, $p < .001$), as wells as behaviors towards the temporary firm.

The hypotheses related to the role of trait negative affectivity and justice (H7) and volition also received some support (H8). Negative affectivity is a significant predictor of perceptions of justice from the temporary firm ($\beta = -.40$, $p < .001$) and the client organization ($\beta = -.36$, $p < .001$). The support, however, for H8 is more mixed. While trait negative affectivity predicts voluntariness ($\beta = -.21$, $p < .05$), the relationship between negative affectivity and involuntariness is not significant ($\beta = .17$, n.s.). Therefore, the eighth hypothesis is only partially supported. It should also be noted that a

direct path between trait negative affectivity and the dependent variables is non-significant; the models being tested are fully mediated.



Figure 4: Standardized Parameter Estimates for the Segmentation Model

The hypotheses regarding the role of voluntariness (H9) and involuntariness (H10) in predicting citizenship behavior were supported. Specifically, voluntariness predicted organizational citizenship behavior to the temporary firm ($\beta = .41$, $p < .001$), and involuntariness predicted organizational citizenship behavior towards the client organization ($\beta = .24$, $p < .05$).

Moderators. The hypothesis concerning the role of organizational identification, H11, in moderating the impact of justice on citizenship behavior was not supported. A

comparison of the relevant information-theoretic measures indicates that the fit of the more parsimonious spillover model is superior to the fit of the spillover model that includes organizational identification (see Table 7). Organizational identification did not interact with client justice to predict citizenship behaviors (β = .02, n.s.) or counterproductive behaviors (β = -.04, n.s.) towards the client; nor did it interact with justice from the temporary firm to predict citizenship behaviors (β = -.10, n.s.) or counterproductive workplace behaviors (β = .13, n.s.) towards the client. Organizational identification also did not directly affect citizenship behavior (β = .01, n.s.) or counterproductive workplace behavior (β = -.04, n.s.) towards the client organization. The relative fit of the parsimonious spillover model and the spillover model that includes organizational identification is shown in Table 7.

Table 7: Fit Indices for Moderated Models and the Parsimonious Spillover Model

	X^2	d.f.	GFI	AGFI	RMSEA	NFI	CFI
Spillover Model with Organizational Identification	118.24	80	.91	.85	.06	.81	.92
Spillover Model with Threat of Sanctions from the Client Organization	181.07	70	.88	.79	.10	.82	.88
Spillover Model with Threat of Sanctions from the Temporary Firm	219.40	70	.86	.76	.12	.76	.82
Parsimonious Spillover Model	51.47	47	.95	.90	.03	.89	.99

The hypotheses pertaining to the role of threat of sanctions in moderating the impact of justice on counterproductive workplace behavior towards the client organization (H12) and the temporary firm (H13) were also not supported. A comparison

of the relevant information-theoretic measures indicates that the fit of the more parsimonious spillover model is superior to the fit of a spillover model that includes threat of sanctions from the client organization (see Table 8). The threat of sanctions from the client firm interaction term did not have a significant parameter coefficient (β = -.11, n.s.), and the fit of this model was generally worse than that of the more parsimonious spillover model. The threat of sanctions from the client organization also did not directly affect counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the client organization (β = -.19, n.s.).

Table 8: Fit indices for Testing Non-Nested Models

	X^2	d.f.	AIC	BCC	ECVI	MECVI
Spillover Model with Organizational Identification	118.24	80	232.37	247.54	1.581	1.684
Spillover Model with Threat of Sanctions from the Client Organization	181.07	70	281.07	293.28	1.912	1.995
Spillover Model with Threat of Sanctions from the Temporary Firm	219.40	70	317.40	329.37	2.159	2.241
Parsimonious Spillover Model	51.47	47	165.47	177.45	1.125	1.207

Threat of sanctions from the temporary firm did not interact with temporary firm justice to predict counterproductive behaviors towards the temporary firm. This model had generally worse fit than the parsimonious spillover model. A comparison of the relevant information-theoretic measures indicates that the fit of the more parsimonious spillover model is superior to the fit of a spillover model that includes threat of sanctions from the client organization. Furthermore, the standardized parameter estimate was not

significant (β = -.09, n.s.). Finally, the threat of sanctions from the temporary firm did not directly affect counterproductive behaviors towards the temporary firm (β = .21, n.s.).

All in all, the parsimonious spillover model is considered to have the best fit to the data.

CHAPTER VII: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

This dissertation has developed new measures of organizational citizenship behaviors and counterproductive workplace behaviors that are appropriate for the context of intermediated temporary work. These measures have been used to empirically study how justice from one employment context predicts workers' behaviors in another context. This research both extends previous research on permanent employees to the context of temporary workers, and has implications for how temporary workers are studied and managed in the future.

This dissertation examines counterproductive workplace behaviors towards the client organization as well as citizenship behaviors and counterproductive behaviors towards the temporary firm, which have not been studied previously. The reason for these oversights is not clear. Future research can explore these phenomena further. While the interview study and the survey pretest provide important contributions that will be particularly useful to future research on intermediated temporary workers, their primary purpose was to provide the basis for the main survey study that followed. The results of this study are discussed now.

Discussion

The preliminary hypotheses, concerning justice and organizational citizenship and counterproductive workplace behaviors, replicate existing research, yet they provide the basis for the hypotheses that follow. For example, the finding that justice from the client

organization predicts citizenship behaviors in the client context replicates previous contingent worker research (Ang & Slaughter, 2001; Geber, 1999). Similarly, the finding that justice from the client firm predicts counterproductive behaviors in the client context extends prior research on permanent employees (e.g., Aquino et al., 1999; Skarlicki et al., 1999). In addition, the finding that temporary firm justice predicts both citizenship and counterproductive behaviors towards the temporary firm is an extension of the contingent worker research that has relates specifically to the client organization context, and it also replicates previous research on permanent employees (e.g., Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Tepper & Taylor, 2003).

The next four hypotheses compared the spillover and segmentation models, and indicate that attitudes from one context may "spill over" and affect behaviors in another context. These findings are also in contrast with some of the previous research on the experiences of temporary workers. Specifically, Liden et al. (2003) found that commitment to a temporary firm did not predict citizenship behaviors at the client organization.

These conflicting findings may be due to the way in which organizational citizenship was measured (counterproductive workplace behaviors were not a focus of Liden et al. (2003) research). Whereas Liden et al. measured citizenship behavior in the client organization context with a subset of a scale intended for permanent employees, and which focuses on altruism (e.g., "helps others who have heavy work loads," and "helps others who have been absent"), this dissertation uses items that were specifically developed for temporary workers and which focus on a slightly different dimension, individual initiative (e.g., "for issues that have serious consequences for my client

organization, I express opinions honestly even when others may disagree"). However, any differences in results due to a divergence in the citizenship behavior foci being examined may in fact be less than one might expect, considering that organizational citizenship behavior can be considered a unidimensional construct (LePine et al., 2002).

Spillover from the temporary firm into the client organization may occur because of the attributions that temporary workers make regarding the roles and responsibilities of their temporary firms and client organizations. For example, temporary workers who are treated fairly by their client organizations may attribute these positive experiences to the quality of the temporary firms that provided them with these good assignments, and they may engage in more temporary firm-directed citizenship (e.g., "I actively promote [temporary firm] to other potential temporary workers") and fewer temporary firm-directed counterproductive behaviors (e.g., "I have stopped going to an assignment, before telling [temporary firm]") as a result.

Spillover from the client organization into the temporary firm may also occur because of temporary workers' attributions concerning their own roles and responsibilities. For example, temporary workers who are treated fairly by their temporary firms may feel that their best way to reciprocate this positive treatment is to avoid client organization-directed counterproductive behaviors (e.g., "I have taken property from work without permission") or to engage in client-directed citizenship behaviors (e.g., "I teach my co-workers better ways to do things").

One might argue that temporary workers might direct their behaviors (positive or negative) towards one organization (e.g., the client organization) because they did not have the opportunity to engage in these behaviors in the context of the other organization

(e.g., the temporary firm). Such an argument is not supported by the results in this dissertation. Specifically, because the preliminary hypotheses (regarding a direct relationship between justice and behaviors in the same context) were supported, it may be inferred that "spillover" does not occur due to a lack of opportunities to retaliate or reciprocate treatment by an inaccessible organization.

That "spillover" was found in the context of temporary workers being affiliated with two organizations is consistent with some previous research on permanent employment (e.g., Judge et al., 1994; Leiter & Durup, 1996; Liou et al., 1990; Takeuchi et al., 2002). The "spillover" findings of this dissertation may also be applied to other situations where individuals have dual affiliations, for example workers who report to more than one supervisor, account executives who serve multiple clients, or independent contractors who move from work site to work site. Within the realm of intermediated temporary work, future research can explore if the findings of this dissertation can be extended further by investigating if workers' treatment by one client site affects their behavior on subsequent assignments.

The hypothesis examining trait negative affectivity and justice extends previous research on trait negative affectivity into the domain of contingent work, where it has not been examined to date. While trait negative affectivity's relationship to justice has been explored in earlier studies (e.g., Aquino et al., 1999), the current study is the first to test and find support for this relationship in the context of temporary workers' perceptions of justice from both the client organization and the temporary firm.

The hypothesis regarding trait negative affectivity and volition received partial support. Trait negative affectivity predicted voluntariness but not involuntariness. This

may be due to the nature of the questions that compose these measures. For example, while voluntariness examines a temporary worker's attitudes towards various aspects of contingent employment (e.g., do they like the flexibility of the schedule? Do they like the variety of their assignments?), the involuntariness items may reflect events that were out of the individual's control (e.g., were they laid off? did they lose a job?). In essence, these events, while unpleasant, represent objective occurrences, and thus they may be less likely to be influenced by an affective trait.

The finding that negative affectivity predicts voluntariness is an important development in the study of how temporary workers view their career development. Thus far, volition has progressed from a unidimensional, binary measure (e.g., Krausz et al., 1995) to a more nuanced scale (Ellingson et al., 1998). While the focus on the measurement and implications of volition is important to our understanding of temporary workers' attitudes and experiences, researchers have not yet examined volition's antecedents. That volition is influenced by negative affectivity suggests that it is a less "objective" measure than might have been originally anticipated. Future research could explore whether volition is also predicted by other personality traits, such as locus of control. For example, individuals with external loci of control may be more likely to report that they are temporary workers because circumstances have precluded them from finding permanent employment.

The next two hypotheses explored the relationship between volition and citizenship behaviors. Volition, in the past, has been shown to be an important predictor of job attitudes, such as commitment (e.g., Connelly et al., 2003) and job satisfaction (e.g., Ellingson et al., 1998). This dissertation extends this previous research and

suggests that volition is also a predictor of organizational citizenship behavior towards the temporary firm and the client organization. Essentially, temporary workers who are intentionally pursuing temporary work are more likely to engage in citizenship behaviors towards the temporary firm, and temporary workers who would prefer permanent employment are likely to engage in citizenship behaviors towards the client organization. Future research should explore what other behaviors may be affected by this construct.

The following hypothesis examined organizational identification as a moderator of the relationship between justice and behavior. Organizational identification may play less of a role in moderating (or predicting) organizational citizenship and counterproductive behaviors than might be expected. This dissertation found that workers' identification with their client organization did not predict their behaviors in this context. While it must be acknowledged that it is possible that the construct was poorly operationalized (the measure has not been tested previously), it is likely that other factors, such as volition, justice, and personality are more proximal predictors of workers' behaviors.

The final two hypotheses explored threats of sanctions as a moderator of the relationship between justice and counterproductive workplace behaviors. Threats of sanctions may not influence temporary workers' behaviors to the extent that one might anticipate. This research suggests that temporary workers' perceived threats of sanctions from either their temporary firms or their client organizations do not moderate (or predict) their counterproductive workplace behaviors. These findings conflict with those of Dupre (2004) who studied permanent employees, and with the findings of Dupre et al. (2003) who surveyed part-time teenaged employees. It is possible that in this

dissertation, threats of sanctions were not operationalized properly (e.g., this dissertation did not use the same measure that was used in these previous studies), but it is also possible that temporary workers' behaviors are far more strongly influenced by other factors, such as justice, volition, and personality. Future research should address the nomological net surrounding workers' perceived threats of sanctions.

Strengths and Limitations

This dissertation employs measures of organizational citizenship and counterproductive workplace behaviors that reflect the experiences of temporary workers. These measures were based on a series of in-depth interviews with current and former temporary workers and temporary worker supervisors, in a variety of occupations and industries, and with a variety of demographic characteristics. These new measures were subsequently pre-tested on a wide cross-section of current and former temporary workers, in a variety of industries and jobs. These measures were further refined based on the results of the main survey study.

A strength of this dissertation is that it studies organizational citizenship behaviors and counterproductive workplace behaviors simultaneously. When measures for these two behaviors are developed in isolation, there is a danger that what appears to be a citizenship behavior is actually a reverse-coded counterproductive behavior, although they are in fact separate yet related constructs (Kelloway, Loughlin, Barling, & Nault, 2002).

Furthermore, by including measures of social desirability and impression management towards both the temporary firm and the client organization, this

dissertation also increases the discriminant validity of the new measures of organizational citizenship and counterproductive workplace behaviors. Finally, this dissertation provides a balanced view of temporary workers' behaviors; while they do engage in citizenship behaviors (as has been reported in previous studies), they also engage in low levels of counterproductive behaviors, as do their permanent counterparts.

The new measures that were created for this dissertation are shorter and have fewer dimensions than others that have been used in previous research (e.g., Moorman & Blakely, 1995; Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Future research can refine these measures further. However, in choosing between narrowly-defined behavioral measures with good discriminant validity, versus measures that included a broader range of individual behaviors yet that may have poorer discriminant validity, the more parsimonious measures were considered preferable.

As a result of the new measures that it employs, this dissertation provides a more realistic assessment of "spillover" than has been seen in previous temporary worker research (e.g., Connelly et al., 2003). Specifically, Connelly et al. used measures (e.g., commitment to the temporary firm, commitment to the client organization) that were intended to measure similar constructs but in separate contexts. These measures were so highly correlated (e.g., $r = .77$, $p < .001$) that it is difficult to determine if the findings reflect "spillover" as reported, or if they reflect the high correlations among the variables. In contrast, this dissertation uses new measures for the dependent variables, that have low to moderate correlations ($r = .28$ among citizenship behaviors, $r = .53$ among counterproductive behaviors), and that have less conceptual overlap (e.g., loyal

boosterism towards the temporary firm and individual initiative towards the client organization).

Furthermore, Connelly et al. (2003) used step-wise hierarchical regression to analyze the dependent variables separately. This process does not account for the correlations between these variables, which in this case were relatively high. In contrast, because this dissertation uses an analytic technique, structural equation modeling, that allows variables to be correlated, and because there are low or moderate correlations between the dependent variables, the findings of this dissertation are more reliable than those which have been reported in the past.

While this study does make a number of contributions, some limitations should also be acknowledged. For example, one might argue that the spillover vs. segmentation comparison was in fact an "unfair comparison" (Cooper & Richardson, 1986). The risk of this being a serious limitation has been mitigated in two ways. First, both the segmentation and spillover models have an identical set of items; the variables in each model were measured in the same way. The only difference was the added paths between the constructs. Secondly, as noted above, the measures of the dependent variables were developed so that their correlations were minimized, and a predictor variable (distributive justice) that may have posed a potential confound (participants may have not clearly understood whether their temporary firm or their client organization was responsible for their compensation) was omitted from the analysis. As such, the models have been made as equivalent as possible (from both a distributive and procedural perspective).

A further potential limitation is the fact that the main survey study was cross-sectional. Although structural equation modeling (SEM) is occasionally referred to as

"causal path modeling", this is misleading; it is not possible to infer causation from the results of this study. Future research should endeavor to address this shortcoming, but it must be noted that longitudinal data regarding temporary workers' client assignments can be particularly difficult to collect, given high turnover rates and client assignments that are typically of short duration.

Secondly, the sample used in this research was smaller than anticipated (157 surveys were returned; 148 were usable). Future research should use larger samples. However, it should be acknowledged that a small sample increases the likelihood of null findings, and so the results of this research should not be approached with undue caution. Thirdly, few highly skilled occupational groups are represented in the main survey study. Future research should study the job attitudes and behaviors of contingent workers with a professional affiliation (e.g., accountants, engineers, nurses, etc.) and who may be less likely to engage in counterproductive workplace behaviors because of their more extensive professional socialization and well-developed social norms.

Finally, the main study may also suffer from mono-method bias, because all of the data were collected via self-report surveys. However, if the correlations between variables were due to the way in which the data were collected, then it would be expected that all the variables would be correlated. The presence of non-significant paths as well as paths that are highly significant suggests that this is not the case, and that mono-method bias is not a serious limitation of this dissertation.

Implications for Research and Practice

While this dissertation has furthered our understanding of the experiences of temporary workers, there are additional avenues that still bear exploring. For example, while knowledge sharing in organizations is an emerging topic of interest among many management researchers, it is not clear if the available findings apply equally with temporary workers. Situational factors, such as how these workers are integrated into the organization, as well as their volition and how their colleagues and supervisors treat them, may affect both their propensity to share their knowledge and the likelihood that others will share knowledge with them.

Although this dissertation has shown that justice perceptions can "spill over" and affect behaviors across contexts, it is not clear whether this applies to other attitudes, such as trust, job satisfaction, or temporary workers' psychological contracts with their client organizations or their temporary firms. It is possible that a contractual breach on one assignment might decrease a worker's trust in his or her temporary firm, which may decrease his or her job satisfaction with being a temporary worker. These reactions may be exacerbated by an intermediated temporary worker's role conflict or role ambiguity.

The interviews discussed in the third chapter also suggest future research. The participants spontaneously mentioned a variety of issues concerning the importance of work commitment as well as some of the challenges and advantages inherent in being a temporary worker. Future research can also explore how the experiences of temporary workers may apply to other marginalized groups, such as volunteers, entrepreneurs, and piece workers.

The non-significant demographic measures are instructive for temporary firms that are evaluating their selection processes. In particular, tenure as a temporary worker

and tenure with the temporary firm did not predict workers' behaviors when justice and volition were taken into consideration. This suggests that temporary firms that endeavor to increase citizenship behaviors and decrease counterproductive workplace behaviors, either in the context of the temporary firm or the client assignments, should avoid giving preference to workers who have been registered with them longer, or who have more experience in the temporary service industry. Instead, they should focus on treating all their workers fairly.

Similarly, temporary workers who had registered with a number of different temporary firms simultaneously were no more likely to engage in additional counterproductive workplace behaviors or fewer organizational citizenship behaviors towards the temporary firm. While some organizations may interpret a temporary worker's multiple allegiances as evidence of disloyalty or self-interest, it is possible that these workers are registering with multiple firms because of a strong desire to work as frequently as possible, and this motivation may counteract any others.

In addition, temporary workers' tenure with their client organizations was positively related to their citizenship behaviors towards these organizations. Temporary firms, who indirectly benefit from these behaviors, should try to reassign their workers to the same client organizations, whenever possible. Likewise, client organizations should also try to retain the services of the same workers for longer periods of time, rather than rotating among different temporary firms or temporary workers.

Furthermore, temporary firms should note the reasons why potential temporary workers are pursuing temporary work. While it may be difficult to assess this in a selection interview, temporary workers who are voluntarily working as "temps" will

engage in citizenship behaviors towards the temporary firm, while workers who would prefer permanent employment will engage in citizenship behaviors towards their client organizations. From the point of view of the temporary firm, both types of behaviors may be desirable, but temporary firm supervisors should consider which behaviors are preferable.

Because temporary workers' treatment by their client organizations is a significant predictor of their citizenship and counterproductive behaviors towards their temporary firms, these organizations should carefully consider the implications of which client organizations they agree to provide with workers. While temporary firm managers may assume that it is enough for them to treat their registered workers well, this is necessary but not sufficient. Similarly, client organizations that engage the services of temporary workers should carefully consider which temporary firms treat their workers fairly. While client organizations may assume that it is sufficient to treat temporary workers fairly, these individuals' perceptions of unfairness by their temporary firms may cause them to engage in fewer citizenship behaviors and additional counterproductive behaviors while they are working at the client site.

Conclusions

This dissertation has made a number of substantial contributions to our understanding of the experiences, attitudes, and behaviors of temporary workers, in relation to both their temporary firms and their client organizations. For example, this dissertation replicated and extended existing research and suggests that perceived justice from a temporary firm predicts workers' citizenship and counterproductive behaviors towards this firm, and that perceived justice from a client organization predicts workers' behaviors towards that organization. More significantly, this research also suggests that temporary workers' perceptions of their treatment by their temporary firms predicts their behaviors towards their client organizations, and that workers' perceived treatment by their client organizations predicts their behaviors towards their temporary firms. This "spillover" has wide-ranging implications. An additional finding is that temporary workers' volition is predicted by their negative affectivity, and that volition in turn predicts workers' behaviors towards their temporary firms and their client organizations.

It is hoped that this dissertation will improve the daily working conditions of temporary workers in a number of ways. The findings of this dissertation provide an incentive for temporary firms to treat the workers who are registered with them with fairness and respect; the temporary firm will receive better treatment in return, but so will their clients. This dissertation also provides an inducement for client organizations to treat their temporary workers with dignity and respect; they will receive better treatment in return. While treating these workers fairly will ultimately provide financial benefits to the organizations that employ them, these temporary workers will enjoy better working conditions in the interim.

Many organizations in North America and around the world depend on temporary workers to meet their operational imperatives, and temporary work is becoming increasingly common. While many aspects of these workers' experiences bear a closer examination, the way in which they are treated is particularly important, as it has serious implications not only for these workers themselves, but also for their colleagues, the organizations where they work, and for society at large.

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Appendix A: Empirical publications on contingent work and contingent workers

Author(s)	Year	Methodology	Type of Contingent Worker	Variables Studied	Context	Key Findings
Ang & Slaughter	2001	Quantitative survey: 15 IC, 11 perm supervisors, 37 perm employees; Qualitative interviews: 6 IC, 6 perm employees.	"Independent contractors" (but low autonomy): IS professionals	In-role and extra-role behaviors; performance; job design; loyalty; obedience; trustworthiness; integration; POS; distributive justice; alienation.	Client organizations > 1 year	IC job design affects IC work attitudes, behaviors, performance; permanent employees' job scope adjusted.
Aronsson, Gustafsson & Dallner	2002	Quantitative survey: 1930 temp workers and 1882 perm employees. Stratified from census data.	Substitutes, probationary employment, seasonal workers, employed on projects, on call, vacation workers, trainees, apprentices, 'other'.	Participation, personal development opportunities, training; support and encouragement; ill-health.	Individual level; assignment length not specified.	Temporary workers have less control over their working lives than permanent employees; this negatively affects their health.
Bellemore	1998	Quantitative survey; archival data; approximately 60,000 workers.	Intermediated temporary workers, employees of 'other' organizations; nursing	Gender, race, marital status, age of children, age, level of education, wages and benefits, amount of experience, full-time, part-time, seasonal status, day / evening / night / weekend shifts.	Individual level; assignment length not specified.	Positive predictors of working for an agency: preschool children, age, being female. Negative predictors: spousal income, experience, being white. Intermediated temps had higher wages but lower benefits.
Bergman	2002	Quantitative survey (web and	Type of contingent status not specified.	Withdrawal, organizational	Client assignments;	Contingents had higher levels of psychological contingency,

		pencil and paper): 160 contingent; 194 'core' employees; 24 unclassifiable	May include internships and summer jobs.	citizenship behaviors, affective organizational commitment, job satisfaction, personality, tenure, job stress, in-role behavior, psychological contingency, career development, freedom, family involvement, alternate job opportunities. Did NOT control for age.	assignment lengths not specified.	less conscientious, more extroverted, more withdrawal, same OCBs, less satisfied, less affectively committed; psychological contingency was a better predictor of job attitudes than contingent status.
Bernasek & Kinnear	1999	Quantitative survey: archival data of 465 contingent workers	Contingent workers: industry not specified	Volition, personal characteristics	Individual level; assignments of less than two years.	Involuntary contingent workers are non-white, married, more educated, more affluent, in farming, in fisheries, in forestry, have pensions, are in their contingent jobs for 'economic' reasons.
Chen, Popovich, & Kogan	1999	Quantitative survey: 67 temporary workers also having permanent jobs, 35 temporary workers without additional permanent jobs, 10 temporary workers – presence of	Intermediated temporary workers, some also with permanent jobs.	Communication with supervisor, coworkers, friends, family about positive job-related, negative job-related, and non-job-related issues; life satisfaction; work anxiety.	Individual level; industry not specified.	Work anxiety increased when temporary workers talked about negative job-related things; The positive relationship between life satisfaction and positive communication with coworkers was observed only for the temporary workers who also had a permanent job.

		absence of additional job not specified				
Collinson	1999	Qualitative interviews: 88 contingent 'contractors', 10 permanent executives	Intermediated contingent workers: independent contractors hired by on-site contracting firms: Petrochemical workers	Safety; personal characteristics; social relations of work; home-work balance; gender.	Host organization; average ultimate duration of contracts not specified	Safety policies promote unsafe behavior among contingent workers
Connelly, Gallagher, & Gilley	2002	Quantitative survey: 79 intermediated temporary workers	Intermediated contingent workers: manufacturing and clerical support.	Affective and continuance commitment to the client and THS firms; perceived organizational support from the client and THS firms; volition	Client organization and THS firm	Perceived THS firm support and voluntariness predicted affective commitment to the THS firm; perceived client firm support predicted affective and continuance commitment to the THS firm and the client firm; involuntariness predicted continuance commitment to the THS and client firms.
Davis-Blake & Uzzi	1993	Quantitative archival data: 5089 firms in 1980, 2752 firms in 1982	Temporary (intermediary not specified), seasonal; independent contractors.	Use of temporary and contract labour; industry benefits; firm-specific training; variation in employment; unionization; regulation of industry; bureaucratization; probationary periods; firm size; job complexity; personal characteristics.	Firm-level analysis	Firm-specific training, government oversight, bureaucracy, firm size, job complexity predict less use of temporary workers; variation in employment needs predicted more use of temps; variation in employment needs, bureaucracy, firm size, multi-site firm predicted use of IC.

Ellignson, Gruys & Sackett	1998	Quantitative survey: 174 participants	Intermediated: clerical	Volition; job satisfaction; job performance	Client assignments > 2 weeks	Better volition measure; voluntariness predicts satisfaction; involuntariness does not; volition does not predict performance.
Farber	1999	Quantitative survey: archival data, size of sample not specified.	Independent contractors (independent contractors, consultants, freelance workers); self-employed workers; temporary workers (temporary workers, on-call workers, contract workers); industry not specified.	Volition, job loss	individual	Job loss predicts temporary and involuntary part-time status; both help transition to permanent full-time status.
Feldman, Doerpinghaus, & Turnley	1994	Quantitative: number of participants not specified	Intermediated contingent workers; clerical, light industrial, service / other	Individual characteristics; volition; career plans; job quality; treatment by THS firm and client firm.	Client firm, duration not specified; THS firm, duration not specified.	There are benefits and drawbacks to being an intermediated contingent worker.
Galup, Saunders, Nelson & Cerveny	1997	Qualitative interviews with employees and managers. Quantitative survey of 99 temporary and permanent staff.	Intermediated temporary workers; Local government environment.	General satisfaction, satisfaction with management, job involvement, work involvement, task interdependence.	Client firm, duration not specified.	Knowledge transfer occurred from temps to perms. Temporary workers were more satisfied with management and work in general. Their work was less interdependent. Permanent workers have a broader social network to get information.

Gallagher, Gilley, Nelson, Connelly, & Michie.	2001	Quantitative survey: 79 intermediated temporary workers	Intermediated contingent workers: manufacturing and clerical support.	Work-family and family-work conflict; demographic characteristics; volition	Individual level; duration of assignments not specified.	volition has no direct impact work-family conflict or family-work conflict; if control for demographics, work-family conflict predicted distress; involuntariness interacted with work-family conflict to predict distress
Gaston & Timcke	1999	Quantitative survey: 4746 individuals in wave 1, 2950 individuals in final wave; archival data.	Casual employees defined as 'not entitled to paid sick leave or paid holiday leave in their main job'; industry not specified.	Transition of young workers from 'casual' to permanent full-time employment; gender, age, geographical location, marital status, student status, number of jobs, health, type of job, government benefits.	Individual level; duration not specified.	26.6% transition to permanent, full-time employment; gender, training, receipt of government benefits predicted success in the short term.
Geber	1999	Qualitative focus groups, sample not specified. Quantitative survey, 224 contingent workers.	Independent contractors, intermediated contingent workers; technological specialists and professionals in 'Silicon Valley'.	Fairness (value and integration), commitment, OCBs, demographics.	Client organization. Assignments may last months or years.	Respect predicted affective commitment, being invited to meetings, parties, and celebrations predicted OCBs, being treated as valuable to the organization predicted turnover intentions.
Henson	1996	Qualitative participant observation and interviews	Intermediated contingent workers		Client organizations , THS firms; Length of assignments not specified.	
Ho & Ang	1998	Qualitative: 7	Intermediated	Psychological contract;	Client	Employers retain their original

		focus groups with 67 participants; Quantitative survey: 167 participants	independent contractors; IT / IS professionals who were formerly permanent employees	trust; role stressors; relationship strength; prior outsourcing experience.	organization; duration not specified.	expectations for former employees even after the actual contract is altered.
Houseman	2001	Quantitative survey: archival data. Number of respondents not specified.	Short-term hires, on-call workers, intermediated temporary workers, contract workers.	Reasons why organizations use non-permanent employees.	Organizational level of analysis.	Organizations pursue flexible staffing strategies to adjust for workload fluctuations and staff absences, and to screen workers for regular positions.
Isaksson	1998	Quantitative: 257 participants	Intermediated contingent workers: 159 'office workers', 98 economists	Job characteristics; turnover; turnover intention; volition; support; job satisfaction; personal characteristics.	Client organization: duration not specified.	Turnover predicted by turnover intention; tenure; number of children.
Kalleberg, Reskin, & Hudson	2000	Quantitative survey; archival data, 56,827 respondents.	Non-standard employment (on-call work, day labor, temporary-help agency employment, employment with contract companies, independent contracting other self-employment, part-time employment). Agriculture, mining, construction, transportation, wholesale, retail, finance, real estate, repair and personal	Bad job characteristics, employment insecurity, unionization, occupational complexity, personal characteristics.	Individual-level analysis; assignment lengths not specified.	Non-standard employment increases the likelihood of the employee having low pay, no health insurance, no benefits, even controlling for personal characteristics, family status, occupation, and industry.

			services, entertainment, recreation, professional services, public administration.			
Kidder	1995	Quantitative survey: 55 permanent employees, 15 intermediated temporary workers	Intermediated temporary workers: nurses	Extra-role behaviors, professional training, task variety and complexity.	Client organization	Many extra-role behaviors were considered to be required by the temporary workers, who were as likely to perform ERB as their permanent counterparts.
Kim & Feldman	2000	Quantitative survey: 371 participants	Bridge employment: University faculty	Personal characteristics; retirement satisfaction; overall life satisfaction; other activities	Individual consequences	Health, tenure, working spouses, dependent children predict bridge employment; age, salary inversely related to bridge employment; BE predicted retirement satisfaction, overall life satisfaction.
Kochan, Smith, Wells, & Rebitzer	1994	Quantitative survey: 600 permanent 'direct-hires', 600 'contractors' hired through contracting firms (archival OSHA data)	Intermediated contingent workers: independent contractors hired by on-site contracting firms: Petrochemical workers	Safety; personal characteristics of contract workers	Host organization; duration of terms for contractors and contracting firms varies from 'short duration' to 'extended period of time'	Contractors were younger, less educated, less experienced in the petrochemical industry and with the firm, more likely to be Hispanic; received less safety training; had higher accident probabilities.

Krausz, Brandwein & Fox	1995	Quantitative survey: 90 female intermediated contingent workers; 134 female permanent employees; Qualitative pilot study: 14 interviews.	Intermediated contingent workers: "office" jobs	Work involvement; overall (work) satisfaction; (work) facet satisfaction; role ambiguity; role conflict; volition; tenure (as temp); tenure (in org. for perm employees).	Client organization: average tenure in industry was 26 months, assignment length not specified.	Low average values of involvement, stress, no differences between temp, perm; volition predicted overall satisfaction; involuntary lower than perm.
Lautsch	2002	Qualitative case studies: two organizations, site visits, observation, documents, ~100 interviews	Permanent employees, intermediation status not specified: customer service representatives	Integration, separation, traditional, extended probation models.	Host / client organizations	A number of assimilation strategies are possible, and affect how people react to the organization.
Lautsch	2003	Quantitative: archival data, 875 firms	Direct-hire internal labor market temps; industry not specified.	Benefits for temps and permanent workers, job ladders, seniority, values, absenteeism, turnover, recruitment, HR department, parent company, age of firm, proportion of temp workers, number of permanent employees, union, wages.	Firm-level analysis	Temps are more likely to have access to daycare benefits in HPWS firms. Benefits spill over from core workers to temps. HPWS status does not predict provision of pensions or health care for temps.
Levesque & Rousseau	1999	Quantitative survey: 105 adjuncts	Adjunct faculty (direct-hires?): Universities	Psychological contract; employer fulfillment of obligations; integration; organizational commitment (OCQ);	Host organization: 6.5 year average organizationa	Adjunct contact with faculty also felt their promises were fulfilled, sought more information; socioemotional support predicted commitment;

				volition; other career options.	l tenure.	volition predicted psychological contract.
Liden, Wayne, Kraimer, & Sparrowe	2003	Quantitative: 98 temporary workers; managers of temporary workers	Intermediated temporary workers; from five different temporary firms; programmers, systems engineers, administrative assistants	Organization procedural justice, POS, commitment, altruistic OCB, manager perception of affective commitment; agency procedural justice, POS, commitment.	Agency and client organization	Client PJ predicts client POS, which predicts client commitment, which predicts altruistic client OCBs. Agency PJ predicts agency POS, which predicts agency commitment. Manager perceptions of affective commitment is predicted by agency and client commitment, and OCBs. No spillover was found.
Marler, Woodard Barringer, & Milkovich	2002	Quantitative two surveys: archival data: 614 temporary workers, new data: 276 temporary workers.	Intermediated temporary workers; clerical, technician, engineering, accounting, software / systems, industrial, managerial / executive.	Skill accumulation, education, age, occupation, volition, reasons for being a temp, number of job alternatives, wage, marital status, gender, relative wages, work satisfaction, pay satisfaction, client commitment, task and contextual performance.	Client organizations ; assignment length not specified.	'Traditional' temporaries do not want to be temporary workers, have less skill and experience, have performance that is more sensitive to attitudes, and have higher task and contextual performance than 'boundaryless' temporaries.
McDonald & Makin	2000	Quantitative survey: 102 permanent, 43 temporary	Non-intermediated temporary workers: large organization in the 'holiday' sector, hired to cover the 'holiday' season.	Psychological contract, organizational commitment, job satisfaction	Host organization.	Temporary and permanent workers did not have significantly different types of psychological contracts, and temporary workers had higher levels of job satisfaction and organizational commitment.

Morishima & Feuille	2000	Quantitative surveys: 506 HR executives, 2980 permanent employees in 304 firms.	Permanent employees. Industry not specified.	Integration of temporary workers; effect on permanent employees; job security; workplace morale; trust in employers; demographics.	Client organization; assignment lengths not specified.	Increased use of temporary workers decreases morale and trust in the employer among permanent employees.
Newton McClurg	1999	Quantitative survey: 200 participants	Intermediated contingent workers: industry not specified	Commitment to clients; commitment to THS firm; gender; age; education; job mobility; tenure; other sources of income; intention to remain; perceived THS support; benefits available	THS firms	Age, tenure, frequency of receiving job descriptions, perceived THS support but not benefits available predicted commitment to the THS; commitment to THS firm not related to intention to remain;.
Park & Butler	2001	Quantitative archival data analysis: 11,149 'leased' workers, 10,600 full-time non-contingent direct hires.	Contingent workers: 'regular part-time' and 'leased'.	Safety as measured by workers' compensation costs, time lost due to injury.	Host organizations ; tenure not specified.	Contingent workers' costs for workers' compensation is about three times higher than it is for permanent employees.
Parker, Griffin, Sprigg, & Wall	2002	Quantitative survey: 75 involuntary temporary changed to permanent, 357 permanent, 92 new temporary contract workers,	Direct hires: manufacture and assemblage of large vehicles.	Job security; participative decision making; role overload and conflict; job strain; tenure; age, gender, temporary status.	Host organization; tenure not specified but many temps reported that they had expected to be made	Temp status reduces perceptions of job security and participative decision making, which increases job strain; it also reduces role overload. Net effect is lower job strain.

		34 new permanent contract workers.			permanent already.	
Pearce	1993	Quantitative surveys: 223 permanent employees, independent contractors, intermediated contingent workers. "contractors"	Independent contractors; intermediated contingent workers; Aerospace engineers and engineering technicians	Integration, task interdependence, cooperativeness, organizational commitment (OCQ), extrarole behavior, organizational trustworthiness.	Client / host organization; average organizational tenure: 17 months.	Supervisors shift interdependent tasks to permanent employees when contingent workers are present; employees do not have more involvement than contingent workers; presence of contingents predicted higher organizational trustworthiness.
Porter	1995	Quantitative surveys: 456 permanent and contingent part-time, permanent and contingent full-time	Intermediation status not specified: 32 nursing departments	Employee satisfaction, job design (amount of work), commitment of organization to its employees, personal control / autonomy, stress, burnout, communication, quality of care,	Client / host organization.	Controlling for age, tenure, supervisory status, pay, no significant differences between perm and contingent views of the org's commitment to employees or on quality of care; contingent status predicted attitudes wrt benefits, personal control, stress, burnout.
Rogers	1995	Qualitative: 13 interviews	Intermediated contingent workers: clerical and general labor	Alienation from work, others, self.	Client organizations ; THS firms	Negative treatment of intermediated contingent workers results in resistance.
Rogers	2000	Qualitative	Intermediated contingent workers: clerical staff and lawyers	Gender, skill, control, resistance, implications for workers.	Client organizations ; THS firms.	Negative treatment of intermediated contingent workers results in resistance.
Rogers & Henson	1997	Qualitative: 68 interviews [same data as in Rogers	Proportion of intermediated to non-intermediated	Sexual harassment.	Client organizations	Low status and gender of temporary workers both contribute to high levels of

		(2000) book and Henson (1996) book.]	contingent workers not specified; clerical labor.			sexual harassment.
Sias, Kramer & Jenkins	1997	Quantitative survey: 32 new hires, 42 temporary workers	Presence of intermediary not specified	Similarity between temporary workers and new hires, communication behaviors: knowledge sourcing and knowledge sharing, impression management.	Client / host organization	Temps are less concerned with impression management, seek appraisal information less frequently, give less information than new permanent employees.
Sverke, Gallagher, & Hellgren	2000	Quantitative survey, archival data: 358 permanent full-time, 230 permanent part-time, 35 in-house temps hired on an hourly basis, 77 direct-hire temps with limited contracts, and 11 'other' forms of contingent contracts.	Contingents in-house differentiated from direct-hire, 'other' not specified; health care sector	Job insecurity, role ambiguity, role conflict, role overload, job involvement, organizational commitment, mental distress, somatic complaints.	Host firm / individual-level; duration of assignment not differentiated between types of contingent workers but average was 6.39 years.	Contingent workers had the most job insecurity, role ambiguity; more job involvement than part-time employees; the least organizational commitment and somatic complaints.
Uzzi & Barsness	1998	Quantitative survey and interviews: 1613 firms	No differentiation between fixed term "contractors" and part-time workers: all industries.	Organizational size, age; quality of management – labor relations; governance structures; job design; job control technology;	Client-level analysis	All factors predicted use of 'contingent' workers.

				recruitment options.		
Van Dyne & Ang	1998	Quantitative survey: 45 contingent workers, 110 permanent employees.	Intermediation status not specified: bank officers, credit analysts, nurses,	Organizational citizenship behavior (helping), psychological contract, affective organizational commitment, personal chractristics.	Client / host organization.	Contingent workers engage in fewer OCBs, expect less from their orgs, have lower affective commitment; relationship between AOC, psyc contract and OCBs was stronger for temporaries.
Von Hippel, Mangum, Greenberger, Heneman & Skoglind	1997	Qualitative case studies	Intermediated contingent workers: professional, manufacturing, service	Reasons why firms engage the services of intermediated contingent workers	Client organizations ; duration varies.	Firms benefit from using intermediated contingent workers.
Walsh & Deery	1999	Quantitative surveys: retail, 336 permanent part-time, 366 temporary; bank, 406 permanent part-time; hotel, 108 temporary.	Differentiates between temporary and part-time non-standard employment relationships (presence of intermediary not specified). Banking, hospitality, and retailing.	Personal characteristics; job satisfaction; job motivation. Organizational commitment; career job values; leisure work conflict; external responsibility; alternative job opportunities; prefer changed status; number of hours worked.	Individual level; assignment lengths not specified.	Temporary workers significantly different from part-time workers. Non-students more likely to be dissatisfied. Dissatisfaction was related to a desire for permanent, full-time employment.
Weckerle & Shultz	1999	Quantitative survey: archival data 2771 workers over 50 years old.	Bridge employment includes part-time, self-employment or temporary work after full time employment ends and permanent retirement begins.	Reasons why older workers pursue bridge employment.	Individual level; assignment length not specified.	Bridge employment predicted by voluntariness of retirement, anticipated financial reward and flexibility.

Werber Castaneda	1999	Qualitative interviews: 27 independent contractors	Independent contractors: computer programmers, technical writers, project managers, web site developers, other IT workers.	Social networks, size and strength.	Individual independent contractors: contract work experience varied from 2 to 26 years.	Social ties are good for information gathering; geographical proximity, impersonal, formal ties (including Internet networks) are effective for securing contracts.
Wong	2001	Qualitative case studies: four firms, 60 interviews	Temporary, consignment – presence of intermediary not specified; retail	Reasons firms engage contingent workers	Firm level analysis	Firms' context determines contingent-use strategy: either ad hoc opportunistic or long-term strategic.

Appendix B: Theoretical publications on contingent work and contingent workers

Author(s)	Year	Definition of Contingent Workers / Types Discussed	Issues Discussed	Context
Anderson, Pulich, & Sisak	2002	Non-clinical college and university interns	Advantages and disadvantages of internships for schools, students, and organizations.	Health-care organizations.
Barker	1995	Independent contractors, part-time workers, migrant, seasonal leased, temporary workers, homeworkers.	Definitions. Health & safety; interpersonal, organizational, skills issues; subordination, identity, stigma, meritocracy (fairness), protest (voice).	Adjunct university faculty.
Cappelli	1999	'permanent' employees who may turnover very quickly.	Psychological contract, how to manage 'new deal' at work, no more job security, employability paradigm.	Highly-skilled occupations.
Casey	1988	Consultants / freelancers, labour only subcontractors, casual workers, seasonal workers, fixed-term contract workers, probationary workers, training contract workers, temporary workers, agency workers, direct-hire workers, special program workers.	Organizational use of temporary labour; characteristics of the temporary workforce; effect of temporary employment on unemployment rates; characteristics and experiences of agency workers, casual labour, and seasonal workers.	Clerical, computer, hospitality, a number of other industries.
Connelly & Gallagher	2004	Temporary help service firm workers, direct-hire temporary workers, independent contractors.	Challenges inherent in managing contingent workers; commitment; selection; job design and job quality; status differentials; transformational leadership.	Industry not specified.
Drucker	2002	Temporary work (intermediated) and co-employment.	Reasons for growth of contingent work	'Knowledge workers' in the 'knowledge economy'
Feldman	1995	Part-time / temporary, organization-hired / agency-hired / self-employed, year-	Demographic characteristics; compensation practices; fringe benefits; supervision; training, orientation, development; accurate	Industry not specified.

		round / seasonal, main job / second job / multiple contingent jobs, voluntary / involuntary, satisfactory employment / underemployment.	portrayal of employment contracts; emerging forms of contingent employment; part-time work, temporary work, and productivity; impact of contingent workers on full-time employees; contingent employment and older workers; contingent work, underemployment, and career development.	
Feldman & Turnley	2002	Contingent workers defined as part-time workers	Effect of 'contingent' work on students' educational achievement, earnings, occupational achievement, underemployment, deviant behavior, person-occupation fit, work ethic / work habits (short and long term).	High school and college students
Gallagher	2000	Temporary help service firm workers, direct-hire temporary workers, independent contractors, seasonal workers; NOT part-time, leased, outsourced, subcontracted workers.	Reasons for the growth of contingent employment (supply and demand); impact of contingent employment on individual workers; measurement issues; trust; management strategies; teams and team building; human resource development.	Industry not specified.
Gallagher & Connelly	2003	Temporary help service firm workers, direct-hire temporary workers, independent contractors.	Job insecurity; role ambiguity and conflict; stress and well-being; work-family and family-work conflict; volition; organizational commitment; psychological contracts; integration; impact on service delivery.	Industry not specified.
Gallagher & McLean Parks	2001	Temporary help service workers, in-house temporary workers, independent contractors.	Affective, normative and continuance organizational commitment, job commitment, occupational commitment, and employment commitment for permanent employees and contingent workers.	Industry not specified.
Kalleberg	2000	Temporary help agency and contract company employment, short-tem and contingent work, independent	Trends, control, careers, job quality, measurement issues, staffing practices.	Industry not specified.

		contracting.		
Klein Hesselink & van Vuuren	1999	Job flexibility: part-time jobs, temporary jobs, temporary employment agency jobs, part-time jobs with variable hours, on-call temporary and permanent workers.	Job insecurity, job flexibility (internal, external, quantitative, qualitative), responses of employees and 'flexiworkers', management of job flexibility without creating job insecurity,	Manufacturing industry, temporary employment agency industry, catering (hospitality) industry.
McLean Parks, Kidder & Gallagher	1998	Floats, networked, in-house temporaries, direct-hire / seasonal temporaries, leased, temporary firm workers, subcontracted workers, consultants, independent contractors.	Psychological contract dimensions: stability, scope, tangibility, focus, time frame, particularism, multiple agency, volition) and contingent work arrangements.	Manufacturing, health care (nurse), consultant, family member employees.
Matusik & Hill	1998	Independent contractors, on-call or day labor, outsourced workers.	Use of contingent workers can add knowledge to a firm, or it can cause leakage of proprietary knowledge into the public domain.	Professional and technical functions.
Nollen	1996	Employees of staffing agencies; direct-hire temporaries; also: independent contractors, leased workers, seasonal workers (not discussed)	Economic and social implications of temporary employment for workers and organizations.	Industry not specified.
Pfeffer & Baron	1988	Externalized workers; externalization of place, administrative control, shorter duration of employment	Shifts in internal labor market practices, benefits of flexibility, supply of externalized workers, demand for externalization, implications for theory and practice	Industry not specified.
Reilly	1998	Flexible workforces: numerical, functional, temporal, locational, financial flexibility.	Advantages and disadvantages of 'flexibility' for organizations and workers.	Industry not specified.
Rousseau &	1997	Temporaries (individual	Definitions. Safety, risk, hazardous work	Mining, petrochemical

Libuser		temporary hires and agency labor), independent contractors, seasonal hires, pooled workers.	environments: individual risks (age, experience, training) & context risks (production pressures, labor relations, safety equipment / maintenance / procedures, worker involvement in decision-making). Integration.	industry.
Smither	1995	Direct-hire temporaries.	Benefits to the organization, recruiting and selection, training and career planning, performance appraisal and compensation, layoffs, employee attitudes	Telecommunications industry
Tregaskis, Brewster, Mayne & Hegewisch	1998	Flexible working practices: part-time, shiftwork, non-permanent employment, subcontracting.	Trends in flexible working practices; reasons for this growth; implications for organizations, individuals, governments, and society.	Industries not specified.
Wheeler & Buckley	2000	Part-time employees, temporary employees, employee leasing , job sharing, domestic day work.	Motivating temporary workers: expectancy theory, impression management.	Industry not specified.
Zeytinoglu & Muteshi	2000	Part-time work (permanent or casual), temporary work (casual or fixed-term, full-time or part-time), home-based work (telework, self employment, part-time or full-time).	Implications of gender, race, and class on achieving equity in labor markets; role of unions.	Industry not specified.

Appendix C: Protocol for the Semi-Structured Interview Study

For client organization managers of intermediated temporary workers:

Thank you for agreeing to talk to me. I really appreciate hearing about your experiences with temporary workers. Our interview should take anywhere between twenty and forty minutes. I have only nine main questions to ask you. When I report my findings, I won't be using your name or anyone else's name, or anything that would identify any individual or any organization specifically. I'm really just curious to hear about your experiences, your thoughts, and your ideas about temporary workers. If I ask you a question that doesn't make sense, or that is confusing, please ask me to clarify or give you an example of what I am talking about.

To help me put the rest of our interview in context, could you please tell me a little about your work with your organization?

How long have you been in your current position?
How long have you been with your current organization?
Do you often deal with temporary workers?
How long are their assignments, usually?
Do you tend to have the same people repeatedly?
Do you always use the same temp agency?
How much contact do you usually have with the temporary workers who work for you?

Please tell me about the best temporary workers that you have ever heard about or worked with.

Specifically, what did these people do that was 'above and beyond' their job descriptions and that was positive for your organization?

Were these one-time behaviors or did they do them all the time?
Why do you think they did these things?

Please tell me about your idea of an ideal or perfect temporary worker.

Specifically, what types of things could a temporary worker do that would be 'above and beyond' their job descriptions and that would be beneficial to your organization?

If a temporary worker were trying to make him or herself appear like an ideal worker, what would they do?

We've discussed a number of really positive behaviors.

Can you think of any other behavior that you wouldn't want a permanent employee to do but that would be positive if a temporary worker did it? (e.g. not talking to anyone and only doing their job)

Can you think of any other behavior that would be normal behavior from a permanent employee but that would be really positive if a temporary worker did it? (e.g. doing unpaid overtime)

Can you think of any behavior that would be positive if it were done by a temporary worker but that just wouldn't apply to a permanent employee? (e.g. offering to work without the agency as an intermediary)

Everyone usually has a 'horror' story about temporary workers…Tell me about the worst temporary worker that you have ever heard about or worked with.

Specifically, what did these people do that they weren't supposed to or that was counterproductive or that hurt the organization or its clients or other workers?

Was this a one-time thing or did it happen all the time?

Why do you think they did this?

What types of behaviors do you try to discourage in your temporary workers?

Specifically, what behaviors would cause someone to be fired or not selected for future assignments?

We've discussed a number of really negative behaviors.

Can you think of any behavior that would be really positive if a permanent employee did it but actually somewhat negative if a temporary worker did it? (e.g. asking a lot of questions, trying to get involved in other peoples' work etc.)

Can you think of any behavior that you would actually expect your permanent employees to do but that would actually be negative if a temporary worker did it? (e.g. spending a lot of time getting to know colleagues, parking in the employee parking lot)

Can you think of any other behavior that would be negative if it were done by a temporary worker but that just wouldn't apply to a permanent employee? (e.g. fudging time sheets, etc.)

If a temporary worker were trying not to look like he or she was behaving inappropriately, what would they do?

That is all the questions that I had planned to ask you. Were there any other questions that you think I should have asked, or some other issues that you think should be addressed?

Thank you very much for meeting with me. This has all been very helpful. If, in the next little while, you think of something else that you would like to tell me, by all means call me at (613) 548-7937 or send me an email at cconnelly@business.queensu.ca. I really enjoyed our chat.

I plan to conduct a large-scale survey on this topic in the future. Would you be interested in receiving a summary of the results?

I am also hoping to find more people like you to interview. Do you happen to know of anyone else who might be interested?

For temporary help service firm supervisors of intermediated temporary workers:

Thank you for agreeing to talk to me. I really appreciate hearing about your experiences with temporary workers. Our interview should take anywhere between twenty and forty minutes. I have only eleven main questions to ask you. When I report my findings, I won't be using your name or anyone else's name, or anything that would identify anyone specifically. I'm really just curious to hear about your experiences, your thoughts, and your ideas about temporary workers. If I ask a question that doesn't make sense, or that is confusing, please ask me to clarify or give you an example of what I am talking about.

To help me put the rest of our interview in context, could you please tell me a little about your work with your organization?

How long have you been in your current position?
How long have you been with your current organization?
How long have you been in the industry?
How closely do you work with your client organizations?
How much contact do you have with your temporary workers?

In terms of sending people out on client assignments, please tell me about the best temporary workers that you have ever heard about or worked with.

Specifically, what did these people do that was 'above and beyond' their job descriptions and that was positive for their client organizations?

Were these one-time behaviors or did they do it all the time?
Why do you think they did these things?

Again, in terms of your temporary workers' client assignments, please tell me about your idea of an ideal or perfect temporary worker.

Specifically, what types of things could a temporary worker do that would be 'above and beyond' their job descriptions and that would be beneficial to their client organizations?

If a temporary worker were trying to make him or herself appear like an ideal worker, what would they do?

In terms of having these people as your employees, please tell me about the best temporary workers that you have ever heard about or worked with.

Specifically, what did these people do that was 'above and beyond' their job descriptions and that was positive for your organization?

Were these one-time behaviors or did they do it all the time?
Why do you think they did these things?

Again, in terms of these people as employees in your organization, please tell me about your idea of an ideal or perfect temporary worker.

Specifically, what types of things could a temporary worker do that would be 'above and beyond' their job descriptions and that would be beneficial to your organization?

Everyone usually has a 'horror' story about temporary workers…In terms of sending people out on client assignments, tell me about the worst temporary worker that you have ever heard about or worked with.

Specifically, what did these people do that they weren't supposed to or that was counterproductive or that hurt their client organization or its clients or other workers?

Was this a one-time thing or did it happen all the time?
Why do you think they did this?

When your temporary workers go out on client assignments, what types of behaviors do you try to discourage?

Specifically, what behaviors on their client assignments would cause someone to be fired or to be not selected for future assignments?

In terms of having these people as employees, tell me about the worst temporary worker that you have ever heard about or worked with.

Specifically, what did these people do that they weren't supposed to or that was counterproductive or that hurt your organization or other temporary workers?

Was this a one-time thing or did it happen all the time?
Why do you think they did this?

In terms of having these people as your employees, what types of behaviors do you try to discourage?

Specifically, what things could people do to you or your organization that would cause them to be fired or to be not selected for future assignments?

If a temporary worker were trying not to look like he or she was behaving inappropriately, what would they do?

That is all the questions that I had planned to ask you. Were there any other questions that you think I should have asked, or some other issues that you think should be addressed?

Thank you very much for meeting with me. This has all been very helpful. If, in the next little while, you think of something else that you would like to tell me, by all means call me at (613) 548-7937 or send me an email at cconnelly@business.queensu.ca. I really enjoyed our chat.

I am also hoping to find more people like you to interview. Do you happen to know of anyone else who might be interested?

For intermediated temporary workers

Thank you for agreeing to talk to me. I really appreciate hearing about your experiences and anything that you can tell me. Our interview should take anywhere between twenty and forty minutes. I have only six main questions to ask you. When I report my findings, I won't be using your name or anyone else's name, or anything that would identify anyone specifically. I'm really just curious to hear about your experiences, your thoughts, and your ideas about temporary workers. If I ask a question that doesn't make sense, or that is confusing, please ask me to clarify or give you an example of what I am talking about.

To help me put the rest of our interview in context, could you please tell me a little about your work as a temporary worker?

What types of jobs do you usually do?
Are you looking for permanent employment?
How many different agencies do you work with right now?
How long have you been with your main temp firm?
How long have you been a temporary worker?

How long do your assignments usually last?
How closely do you work with your temp firm supervisor?

Please tell me about your idea of an ideal or perfect temporary worker.

Specifically, what types of things could a temporary worker do that would be 'above and beyond' their job descriptions and that would be beneficial to their client organizations?

Can you think of any other things that a temporary worker could do to help their client organizations that would be really positive and well ahead of what would be normally expected of them?

In addition to those behaviors, what types of things could a temporary worker do that would be 'above and beyond' their job descriptions and that would be beneficial to their temporary help service firms?

Can you think of any other things that a temporary worker could do to help their temporary help service firms that would be really positive and well ahead of what would be normally expected of them?

Is there anything that a temporary worker could do to make themselves appear like an ideal worker?

I am also interested in how a temporary worker could 'get back at' or retaliate against the organization where they were on assignment.

Specifically, have you ever heard stories about a temporary worker who did something that they were not supposed to, when they were at their client assignment?

Hypothetically, if a temporary worker wanted to retaliate against their client organization or their supervisor, or their coworkers when they were on assignment, how could they go about doing this?

I am also interested in how a temporary worker could 'get back at' or retaliate against their temporary help service firm.

Specifically, have you ever heard stories about a temporary worker who did something against their temporary help service firm?

Hypothetically, if a temporary worker wanted to retaliate against their temporary help service firm or their supervisor at their temporary help service firm, how could they go about doing this?

Is there anything that a temporary worker could do to make him or herself appear as though he or she were not engaging in negative behaviors?

That is all the questions that I had planned to ask you. Were there any other questions that you think I should have asked, or some other issues that you think should be addressed?

Thank you very much for meeting with me. This has all been very helpful. If, in the next little while, you think of something else that you would like to tell me, by all means call me at (613) 548-7937 or send me an email at cconnelly@business.queensu.ca. I really enjoyed our chat.

I plan to conduct a large-scale survey on this topic in the future. Would you be interested in receiving a summary of the results?

I am also hoping to find more people like you to interview. Do you happen to know of anyone else who might be interested?

Appendix D: Counterproductive Workplace Behavior Items Developed for Permanent Employees, Compared to those Generated from the Interview Study

Permanent employees (Bennett & Robinson, 2000)	**Temporary Workers: Client Organizations**	**Temporary Workers: Temporary Firms**
INTERPERSONAL DEVIANCE		
Make fun of someone at work		
Said something hurtful to someone at work		
Made an ethnic, religious, or racial remark at work		
Cursed at someone at work		
Played a mean prank on someone at work		
Acted rudely toward someone at work	Acted rudely toward someone at work	Acted rudely to my contact at my temporary firm
Publicly embarrassed someone at work		
	Ignored a co-worker	Ignored my contact at my temporary firm (e.g., didn't return phone calls)
	Wasted a co-worker's time	
	Disrupted a colleague's work	
		Said negative things to other people about my contact at my temporary firm
ORGANIZATIONAL DEVIANCE		
Taken property from work without permission	Taken property from work without permission	
Spent too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working	Spent too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working, or spent time doing things unrelated to my assigned tasks	
Falsified a receipt to get reimbursed for more money than you spent on business expenses	Falsified a time sheet or another document, or lied about the number of hours I worked	Falsified a time sheet or another document, or lied about the number of hours I worked
Taken an additional or longer break than is acceptable at your workplace	Taken an additional or longer break than is acceptable at this workplace	
Neglected to follow your	Neglected to follow my	Refused to accept

boss's instructions	boss's instructions	assignments that I was expected to do
Dragged out work in order to get overtime	Dragged out work in order to have a longer assignment	
Put little effort into your work	Put little effort into my work	
Discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person	Discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person	
Intentionally worked slower than you could have worked	Intentionally worked slower than I could have worked	
Come in late to work without permission	Come in late to work without permission	
	Ended my assignment early without giving any notice	Ended my assignment early without giving any notice
	Refused to perform certain tasks	
	Used company equipment for personal reasons (e.g., phones, faxes, photocopiers, email, etc.)	
	Said negative things about the company to friends, colleagues, or anyone else	Said negative things about the company to potential temporary workers
		Said negative things about the company to potential or existing clients
		Went to work directly for a client, without telling my temporary firm
		Signed up with multiple temporary firms

Appendix E: Organizational Citizenship Behavior Items Developed for Permanent Employees, Compared to those Generated from the Interview Study

Permanent Employees (Moorman & Blakely, 1995)	**Temporary Workers: Client Organization**	**Temporary Workers: Temporary Firms**
INTERPERSONAL HELPING		
Goes out of his/her way to help co-workers with work-related problems	Go out of my way to help co-workers with work-related problems	
Voluntarily helps new employees settle into the job		
Frequently adjusts his/her work schedule to accommodate other employees' requests for time off	Frequently adjust my work schedule to accommodate other employees' requests for time off	
Always goes out of the way to make newer employees feel welcome in the work group		
Shows genuine concern and courtesy toward co-workers, even under the most trying business or personal situations	Show genuine concern and courtesy toward co-workers, even under the most trying business or personal situations	Show genuine concern and courtesy toward temporary firm employees, even under the most trying business or personal situations
	Adapt as much as possible to the way things are done at this place	
	Work late or come in early if I'm asked to	
	Am flexible about what kinds of tasks I'll agree to do	Am flexible about what types of jobs I'll agree to do
		Am willing to take short-term or long-term jobs; whatever is required
		Stay in close contact with the person at my provider firm

Permanent Employees (Moorman & Blakely, 1995)	**Temporary Workers: Client Organization**	**Temporary Workers: Temporary Firms**
INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE		
For issues that may have serious consequences, expresses opinions honestly even when others may disagree	For issues that may have serious consequences for my client organization, I express opinions honestly even when others may disagree	For issues that may have serious consequences for my temporary firm, I express opinions honestly even when others may disagree
Often motivates others to express their ideas and opinions		
Encourages others to try new and more effective ways of doing their job		
Encourages hesitant or quiet co-workers to voice their opinions when they otherwise might not speak up		
Frequently communicates to co-workers suggestions on how the group can improve	Frequently communicate to co-workers suggestions on how the group can improve	
	Perform my duties without being told what to do	
	Jump right in and start working right away	
	Figure things out on my own	
	Think of ways to do my job more efficiently	
		Return all phone calls and emails from my temporary firm as quickly as possible
		Keep my temporary firm updated about my qualifications and availability to work
		Am really open with my temporary firm about how my client assignments are going
		Let my temporary firm know about any potential opportunities for them

Permanent Employees (Moorman & Blakely, 1995)	**Temporary Workers: Client Organization**	**Temporary Workers: Temporary Firms**
PERSONAL INDUSTRY		
Rarely misses work even when he/she has a legitimate reason for doing so	Rarely miss work even when I have a legitimate reason for doing so	Rarely miss work even when I have a legitimate reason for doing so
Performs his/her duties with unusually few errors	Perform my duties with unusually few errors	
Performs his/her job duties with extra-special care	Performs my job duties with extra-special care	
Always meets or beats deadlines for completing work	Always meets or beats deadlines for completing work	
	Learn about the organization where I'll be working	
	Apply what I've learned in other companies to my current assignment	
	Ask for clarification if I am unsure what to do	
	Double-check with my supervisor if there are changes to my duties	
		Keep my skills up-do-date and improve my qualifications
		Spend time learning new things that might help my temporary firm place me at better assignments

Permanent Employees (Moorman & Blakely, 1995)	**Temporary Workers: Client Organization**	**Temporary Workers: Temporary Firms**
LOYAL BOOSTERISM		
Defends the organization when other employees criticize it	Defend the organization when other employees criticize it	Defend this temporary firm when other workers criticize it
Encourages friends and family to utilize organization products	Encourage friends and family to utilize client organization products	Encourage friends and family to utilize temporary workers from my firm
Defends the organization when outsiders criticize it	Defend the organization when outsiders criticize it	Defend this temporary firm when outsiders criticize it
Shows pride when representing the organization in public	Show pride when representing the organization in public	Show pride when representing this temporary firm on assignments
Actively promotes the organization's products and services to potential users	Actively promote the organization's products and services to potential users	Actively promote this temporary firm's services to potential clients
		Actively promote this temporary firm to other potential temporary workers

Appendix F: List of Items for the Survey Pretest

Temporary Firm: Counterproductive Workplace Behaviors

Acted rudely to my contact at my temporary firm
Ignored my contact at my temporary firm (e.g., didn't return phone calls)
Went to work directly for a client, without telling my temporary firm
Falsified a time sheet or another document, or lied about the number of hours I worked
Refused to accept assignments that I was expected to do
Ended my assignment early without giving any notice
Said negative things about the company to potential temporary workers
Said negative things about the company to potential or existing clients
Signed up with multiple temporary firms
Said negative things to other people about my contact at my temporary firm

Temporary Firm: Organizational Citizenship Behaviors

Actively promote this temporary firm's services to potential clients
Defend this temporary firm when other workers criticize it
Defend this temporary firm when outsiders criticize it
Encourage friends and family to utilize temporary workers from my firm
Actively promote this temporary firm to other potential temporary workers
Let my temporary firm know about any potential opportunities for them
Show pride when representing this temporary firm on assignments
Show pride when representing the organization in public
Am flexible about what types of jobs I'll agree to do
Show genuine concern and courtesy toward temporary firm employees, even under the most trying business or personal situations
Am willing to take short-term or long-term jobs; whatever is required
Am really open with my temporary firm about how my client assignments are going
Stay in close contact with the person at my provider firm
Return all phone calls and emails from my temporary firm as quickly as possible
Keep my temporary firm updated about my qualifications and availability to work
Rarely miss work even when I have a legitimate reason for doing so
Keep my skills up-do-date and improve my qualifications
Spend time learning new things that might help my temporary firm place me at better assignments

Client Firm: Counterproductive Workplace Behaviors

Acted rudely toward someone at work
Ignored a co-worker
Wasted a co-worker's time
Disrupted a colleague's work
Discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person
Said negative things about the company to friends, colleagues, or anyone else
Ended my assignment early without giving any notice
Neglected to follow my boss's instructions
Refused to accept assignments that I was expected to do
Taken property from work without permission

Taken an additional or longer break than is acceptable at this workplace
Come in late to work without permission
Spent too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working, or spent time doing things unrelated to my assigned tasks
Jump right in and start working right away (R)
Falsified a time sheet or another document, or lied about the number of hours I worked
Dragged out work in order to have a longer assignment
Put little effort into my work
Intentionally worked slower than I could have worked
Refused to perform certain tasks
Used company equipment for personal reasons (e.g., phones, faxes, photocopiers, email, etc.)

Client Firm: Organizational Citizenship Behaviors

Ask for clarification if I am unsure what to do
Apply what I've learned in other companies to my current assignment
Double-check with my supervisor if there are changes to my duties
Ask lots of questions when I am learning about my new assignment
Make sure I understand exactly what is required before starting
Confirm what my responsibilities are when I start a new assignment
Perform my duties with unusually few errors
Show genuine concern and courtesy toward co-workers, even under the most trying business or personal situations
Always meets or beats deadlines for completing work
For issues that may have serious consequences for my client organization, I express opinions honestly even when others may disagree
Frequently communicate to co-workers suggestions on how the group can improve
For issues that may have serious consequences for my temporary firm, I express opinions honestly even when others may disagree
Go out of my way to help co-workers with work-related problems
Frequently adjust my work schedule to accommodate other employees' requests for time off
Adapt as much as possible to the way things are done at this place
Work late or come in early if I'm asked to
Am flexible about what kinds of tasks I'll agree to do
Perform my duties without being told what to do
Figure things out on my own
Think of ways to do my job more efficiently
Rarely miss work even when I have a legitimate reason for doing so
Performs my job duties with extra-special care
Learn about the organization where I'll be working
Defend the organization when other employees criticize it
Encourage friends and family to utilize client organization products
Defend the organization when outsiders criticize it
Actively promote the organization's products and services to potential users

Impression Management towards the Client Organization (adapted from Bolino & Turnley, 1999)

At my client organization, where I completed my most recent assignment (e.g., at an office, at a factory, etc.)

I praise my colleagues so that they will consider me a nice person.
I compliment other workers so that they will see me as likeable.
I do personal favors for other people in the organization to show them that I am friendly.
I take an interest in my colleagues' personal lives to show them that I am friendly.
I make other workers aware of my talents or qualifications.
I make other workers aware of my unique skills and abilities.
I let other workers know that I am a valuable member of the organization.
I talk proudly about my past accomplishments that might help the organization to be successful.
I let other workers know how hard I have been working.
I let others know that I have been putting in a lot of effort into my work.
I take on more than my fair share of the workload so that other workers will see me as dedicated.
I do tasks that are not really part of my job description so that I will seem flexible or dedicated.
I try to appear like I have been very busy working on my tasks.
I arrive at work on time and stay until the end in order to look dedicated.
I act like I know less than I really do so that other workers will help me out.
I try to gain assistance or sympathy from other workers by appearing needy in some area.
I act like I need assistance on my work so that other workers will help me.
I pretend not to understand how to do some things in order to avoid having to work on undesirable tasks.
I disclose my weaknesses in a particular area so that I can avoid an unpleasant part of my assignment.
I am intimidating with other workers when it is necessary.
I use intimidation to get other workers to do their share of the work.
I speak strongly or forcefully to get other group members to agree to do things the way I think they should be done.
I deal strongly or aggressively with other workers who aren't contributing their fair share.
I let other workers know that I am not willing to be pushed around or dictated to.

Impression Management towards the Provider firm (adapted from Bolino & Turnley, 1999)

At my temporary agency where I received my most recent assignment (e.g., Manpower, Adecco, Kelly Services, etc.)…

I praise people at my temporary agency so that they will consider me a nice person.
I compliment people at my temporary agency so that they will see me as likeable.
I do personal favors for people at my temporary agency to show them that I am friendly.
I take an interest in people at my temporary agency's personal lives to show them that I am friendly.
I make my temporary agency aware of my talents or qualifications.
I make my temporary agency aware of my unique skills and abilities.
I let my temporary agency know that I am a valuable member of the organization.
I talk proudly about my past accomplishments to my temporary agency.
I let my temporary agency know how hard I have been working.
I let my temporary agency know that I have been putting in a lot of effort into my work.
I accept any assignment in order to look flexible or dedicated.
I act like I know less than I really do so that my temporary agency will help me out.
I try to gain assistance or sympathy from my temporary agency by appearing needy in some area.
I act like I need assistance on my work so that my temporary agency will help me.
I pretend not to understand how to do some things in order to avoid undesirable assignments.
I disclose my weaknesses in a particular area so that I can avoid unpleasant assignments.
I am intimidating with my temporary agency when it is necessary.
I speak strongly or forcefully to get my temporary agency to agree to do things the way I think they should be done.
I let my temporary agency know that I am not willing to be pushed around or dictated to.

Threat of sanctions from the provider firm (adapted from Dupré & Barling, 2002)

When I consider my main, current, or most recent temporary agency (e.g., Manpower, Adecco, Kelly Services, etc.), I think that …

The temporary agency I work for takes the conduct of its temporary workers very seriously.
The temporary agency I work for has to have a policy against improper behavior, but it is pretty much a joke among the workers.
At the temporary agency I work for, no one really takes complaints about temporary workers seriously, but they have to "investigate" them anyway.
The temporary agency I work for has been known to discipline temporary workers for improper behavior.
At the temporary agency I work for, if you know who to talk to, you can get "off the hook" when a complaint is filed against you.
Persons found guilty of improper behavior at the temporary agency I work for would probably be disciplined.
All in all, the temporary agency I work for has really gone overboard in reacting to stereotypes about temporary workers' improper behavior.

Threat of sanctions from the client firm (adapted from Dupré & Barling, 2002)

When I consider my current or most recent client firm assignment (e.g., at an office, at a factory, etc.), I think that…

The client firm I was most recently assigned to took the conduct of its temporary workers very seriously.
The client firm where I was most recently assigned needed to have a policy against improper behavior, but it was pretty much a joke among the temporary workers.
At the client firm I was most recently assigned to, no one really took complaints about temporary workers' behavior seriously, but they might have "investigated" them anyway.
The client firm I was most recently assigned to was known to discipline temporary workers for improper behavior.
At the client firm I was most recently assigned to, if you know who to talk to, you could get "off the hook" when a complaint was filed against you.
Persons found guilty of improper behavior at my most recent client firm would probably be disciplined.
All in all, the client firm I was most recently assigned to really went overboard in reacting to stereotypes about temporary workers' behavior.

Social Desirability (Impression management items from Paulhus, 1991)

I sometimes tell lies if I have to.
I never cover up my mistakes.
There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. (R)
I never swear.
I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught.
I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back. (R)
When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.
I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her. (R)
I always declare everything at customs.
When I was young I sometimes stole things. (R)
I have never dropped litter on the street.
Sometimes I drive faster than the speed limit.
I never read sexy books or magazines.
I have done things that I don't tell other people about. (R)
I never take things that don't belong to me.
I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn't really sick (R)
I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it.
I have some pretty awful habits. (R)
I don't gossip about other people's business.

Organizational Identification

In general I have way more contact with the supervisors at my client assignments than with the supervisor at my temporary agency.
I really see myself as a part of my client organization, instead of an employee of my temporary agency.
When people ask me where I work, I usually give them the name of the organization where I am currently assigned, instead of the name of my temporary agency.
If I needed a letter of reference, I would ask someone from one of my client assignments, instead of anyone from my temporary agency.

Demographic Information

_____ Length of time that I have been a temporary worker
_____ Length of time that I have been at my current or most recent assignment
_____ Length of time that I have been with the agency that procured me my current or most recent assignment
_____ Number of agencies with which I am currently affiliated
_____ Job or occupation of my current or most recent assignment (e.g. administrative, accountant, manual laborer, etc.)
_____ Gender
_____ Highest degree/diploma received

Appendix G: Accepted, Rejected, and Proposed Items, Based on the Results of the Survey Pretest

Temporary Firm: Counterproductive Workplace Behaviors

Accepted items	**Factor Loading**
Acted rudely to my contact at my temporary firm	.42
Ignored my contact at my temporary firm (e.g., didn't return phone calls)	.73
Went to work directly for a client, without telling my temporary firm	.81

Proposed new items
Was somewhat callous in my dealings with my temporary firm
Became unavailable for assignments, without letting my temporary firm know
Stopped going to an assignment, before telling my temporary firm

Rejected items
Falsified a time sheet or another document, or lied about the number of hours I worked
Refused to accept assignments that I was expected to do
Ended my assignment early without giving any notice
Said negative things about the company to potential temporary workers
Said negative things about the company to potential or existing clients
Signed up with multiple temporary firms
Said negative things to other people about my contact at my temporary firm

Temporary Firm: Organizational Citizenship Behaviors

Accepted items	Factor Loading
Actively promote this temporary firm's services to potential clients	.85
Defend this temporary firm when other workers criticize it	.78
Defend this temporary firm when outsiders criticize it	.77
Encourage friends and family to utilize temporary workers from my firm	.72
Actively promote this temporary firm to other potential temporary workers	.72
Let my temporary firm know about any potential opportunities for them	.69
Show pride when representing this temporary firm on assignments	.54
Show pride when representing the organization in public	.47

Am flexible about what types of jobs I'll agree to do	.62
Show genuine concern and courtesy toward temporary firm employees, even under the most trying business or personal situations	.56
Am willing to take short-term or long-term jobs; whatever is required	.54
Am really open with my temporary firm about how my client assignments are going	.54
Stay in close contact with the person at my provider firm	.51

Rejected items
Return all phone calls and emails from my temporary firm as quickly as possible
Keep my temporary firm updated about my qualifications and availability to work
Rarely miss work even when I have a legitimate reason for doing so
Keep my skills up-do-date and improve my qualifications
Spend time learning new things that might help my temporary firm place me at better assignments

Client Firm: Counterproductive Workplace Behaviors

Accepted items	**Factor Loading**
Acted rudely toward someone at work	.71
Ignored a co-worker	.58
Wasted a co-worker's time	.80
Disrupted a colleague's work	.73
Discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person	.71
Said negative things about the company to friends, colleagues, or anyone else	.42
Ended my assignment early without giving any notice	.70
Neglected to follow my boss's instructions	.66
Refused to accept assignments that I was expected to do	.50
Taken property from work without permission	.68
Taken an additional or longer break than is acceptable at this workplace	.62
Come in late to work without permission	.73
Spent too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working, or spent time doing things unrelated to my assigned tasks	.62
Jump right in and start working right away (R)	-.42

Rejected items
Falsified a time sheet or another document, or lied about the number of hours I worked
Dragged out work in order to have a longer assignment
Put little effort into my work
Intentionally worked slower than I could have worked
Refused to perform certain tasks
Used company equipment for personal reasons (e.g., phones, faxes, photocopiers, email, etc.)

Client Firm: Organizational Citizenship Behaviors

Accepted items: quick learner	Factor Loading
Ask for clarification if I am unsure what to do	.77
Apply what I've learned in other companies to my current assignment	.59
Double-check with my supervisor if there are changes to my duties	.57

Proposed new items
Ask lots of questions when I am learning about my new assignment
Make sure I understand exactly what is required before starting
Confirm what my responsibilities are when I start a new assignment

Accepted items: good worker	Factor Loading
Perform my duties with unusually few errors	.68
Show genuine concern and courtesy toward co-workers, even under the most trying business or personal situations	.62
Always meets or beats deadlines for completing work	.59

Proposed new items
Get along with all my co-workers, as much as I can
Do a really good job on all my assigned tasks
Get my work done as quickly as possible

Accepted items	Factor Loading
For issues that may have serious consequences for my client organization, I express opinions honestly even when others may disagree	.80
Frequently communicate to co-workers suggestions on how the group can improve	.69
For issues that may have serious consequences for my temporary firm, I express opinions honestly even when others may disagree	.41

Proposed new items
When I notice something that could be improved, I tell my co-workers how to go about fixing it
Teach my co-workers better ways how to do things better
Share my feelings and thoughts about issues in this organization.

Rejected items
Go out of my way to help co-workers with work-related problems
Frequently adjust my work schedule to accommodate other employees' requests for time off
Adapt as much as possible to the way things are done at this place
Work late or come in early if I'm asked to
Am flexible about what kinds of tasks I'll agree to do
Perform my duties without being told what to do
Figure things out on my own
Think of ways to do my job more efficiently
Rarely miss work even when I have a legitimate reason for doing so
Performs my job duties with extra-special care
Learn about the organization where I'll be working
Defend the organization when other employees criticize it
Encourage friends and family to utilize client organization products
Defend the organization when outsiders criticize it
Actively promote the organization's products and services to potential users

Appendix H: Threats of Sanctions, Organizational Identification and Source of Distributive Justice based on the Results of the Survey Pretest

Client Threat of Sanctions

Proposed New Items
If my client organization were unhappy with my behavior, they would threaten to get rid of me.
If my client organization were unhappy with my actions, I would be punished in some way.
I would receive a reprimand if my client organization didn't like my performance.
If my client organization were unhappy with my behavior, it would complain to my temporary firm.
If my client organization was unhappy with my behavior, they might cut my assignment short.

Rejected Items
I don't really care if my client organization complains about my behavior
My client organization doesn't really care how I behave at work.
If I did something wrong, I don't think my client organization would notice.
If I got caught doing something wrong, my client organization would get rid of me.
If my client organization was unhappy with my behavior, it would be hard for me to get more work.

Temporary Firm Threat of Sanctions

Proposed New Items
If my temporary firm were unhappy with my behavior, they would threaten to stop giving me assignments.
If my temporary firm were unhappy with my actions, I would be punished in some way.
I would receive a reprimand if my client organization didn't like my performance.
If my temporary firm were displeased with my actions, they would probably start giving me less desirable assignments.
If my temporary firm were unhappy with my behavior, they might stop sending me on assignments.

Rejected Items
I don't really care if my temporary firm complains about my behavior
My temporary firm doesn't really care how I behave at work.
If I did something wrong, I don't think my temporary firm would find out.
If I got caught doing something wrong, my temporary firm would get rid of me.
If my temporary firm was unhappy with my behavior, it would be hard for me to get more work.

Organizational Identification

Accepted Items
In general I have way more contact with the supervisors at my client assignments than with the supervisor at my temporary agency.
I really see myself as a part of my client organization, instead of an employee of my temporary agency.
When people ask me where I work, I usually give them the name of the organization where I am currently assigned, instead of the name of my temporary agency.
If I needed a letter of reference, I would ask someone from one of my client assignments, instead of anyone from my temporary agency.

Additional Item
If someone were to ask me what I did for a living, I would tell them that I was a temporary worker, instead of talking about the tasks that I'm doing at my current or most recent assignment.

Source of Distributive Justice

Rejected Items
My temporary firm decides how much I am paid for my work
It's the client organizations that dictate how much my temporary firm pays me
My temporary firm gets a portion of my pay, but the total amount is decided by the client organizations.
My temporary firm tells the client organizations how much I will be paid.

Revised format:

My take-home pay is really determined by …

[temporary firm name]	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	My client (e.g., wherever I am doing my job)

Appendix I: Main Survey

(next pages)

Temporary Employee Survey

The following questions are about your working relationship with [temp firm]. Please note that your answers for the whole survey are completely anonymous and confidential, so they will NOT be shared with [temp firm] or any other companies. Only Catherine Connelly will see your completed surveys.

Please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with each of the following statements by <u>circling</u> the most appropriate response:

[temp firm]…	**Strongly Disagree**			**Neither Agree nor Disagree**			**Strongly Agree**
… uses consistent procedures to evaluate everyone's suitability and performance.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… has procedures in place to make sure that the information they collect is accurate.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… has procedures that allow workers a chance to express concerns about their treatment.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… has procedures that ensure that everyone is treated ethically.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… always considers irrelevant factors or things that are beyond my control.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… never takes into account all the people who will be affected by their procedures.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

At [temp firm]…	**Strongly Disagree**			**Neither Agree nor Disagree**			**Strongly Agree**
… temporary workers are praised for good work	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… supervisors play favorites.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… temporary workers are trusted.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… temporary workers' complaints are dealt with effectively.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… temporary workers are treated like children.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… temporary workers are treated with respect.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… temporary workers are lied to.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… temporary workers questions and problems are responded to quickly.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… temporary workers' suggestions are ignored.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… temporary workers' hard work is appreciated.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… supervisors threaten to stop finding future assignments for temporary workers.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… temporary workers are treated fairly.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Concerning [temp firm] …	**Strongly Disagree**			**Neither Agree nor Disagree**			**Strongly Agree**
I actively promote [temp firm] to potential clients.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I let [temp firm] know that I have been putting in a lot of effort into my work.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I defend [temp firm] when other workers criticize it.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I do personal favors for people at [temp firm]to show them that I am friendly.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I defend [temp firm] when outsiders criticize it.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I make [temp firm] aware of my unique skills and abilities.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have been somewhat callous in my dealings with [temp firm].	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am flexible about what types of jobs I'll agree to do.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I encourage friends and family to utilize temporary workers from [temp firm].	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have become unavailable for assignments, without letting [temp firm] know	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I actively promote [temp firm] to other potential temporary workers.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have ignored the [temp firm] staff (e.g., didn't return phone calls).	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have stopped going to an assignment, before telling [temp firm].	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I actively promote [temp firm] to other potential temporary workers.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have acted rudely to my contact at [temp firm].	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I let [temp firm] know about any potential opportunities for them.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I show pride when representing [temp firm] on assignments.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I show pride when representing [temp firm] in public.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I show genuine concern and courtesy toward [temp firm] staff, even under the most trying business or personal situations.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am willing to take short-term or long-term jobs; whatever is required.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am really open with [temp firm] about how my client assignments are going.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I stay in close contact with the [temp firm] staff.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I praise people at [temp firm] so that they will consider me a nice person.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I compliment people at [temp firm] so that they will see me as likeable.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have gone to work directly for a client, without	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Concerning [temp firm] …	**Strongly Disagree**			**Neither Agree nor Disagree**			**Strongly Agree**
telling [temp firm].							
I take an interest in the personal lives of the people at [temp firm], to show them that I am friendly.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I make [temp firm] aware of my talents or qualifications.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I let [temp firm] know that I am a valuable member of the organization.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I talk proudly about my past accomplishments to [temp firm].	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I let [temp firm] know how hard I have been working.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I accept any assignment in order to look flexible or dedicated.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I act like I know less than I really do so that [temp firm] will help me out.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I try to gain assistance or sympathy from [temp firm] by appearing needy in some area.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I act like I need assistance on my work so that [temp firm] will help me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I pretend not to understand how to do some things in order to avoid undesirable assignments.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I disclose my weaknesses in a particular area so that I can avoid unpleasant assignments.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am intimidating with [temp firm] when it is necessary.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I speak strongly or forcefully to get [temp firm] to agree to do things the way I think they should be done.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I let [temp firm] know that I am not willing to be pushed around or dictated to.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
If [temp firm] were unhappy with my behavior, they would threaten to stop giving me assignments.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
If [temp firm] were unhappy with my actions, I would be punished in some way.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I would receive a reprimand from [temp firm] if my client organization didn't like my performance.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
If [temp firm] were displeased with my actions, they would probably start giving me less desirable assignments.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
If [temp firm] were unhappy with my behavior, they might stop sending me on assignments.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

The following questions are about your relationship with the company where [temp firm] sent you on your most recent assignment (your "client firm"). For example, this may have been at a factory, an office, or some other work site.

My current or most recent client firm …	**Strongly Disagree**			**Neither Agree nor Disagree**			**Strongly Agree**
… uses consistent procedures to evaluate everyone's suitability and performance.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… has procedures in place to make sure that the information they collect is accurate.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… has procedures that allow workers a chance to express concerns about their treatment.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… has procedures that ensure that everyone is treated ethically.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… always considers irrelevant factors or things that are beyond my control.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… never takes into account all the people who will be affected by their procedures.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

At my current or most recent client firm …	**Strongly Disagree**			**Neither Agree nor Disagree**			**Strongly Agree**
… temporary workers are praised for good work.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… supervisors play favorites.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… temporary workers are trusted.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… temporary workers' complaints are dealt with effectively.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… temporary workers are treated like children.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… temporary workers are treated with respect.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… temporary workers are lied to.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… temporary workers' questions and problems are responded to quickly.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… temporary workers' suggestions are ignored.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… temporary workers' hard work is appreciated.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… supervisors threaten to not renew temporary workers' contracts.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… temporary workers are treated fairly.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… people help each other out.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… people argue with each other.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… people put each other down.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… people treat each other with respect.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Concerning my current or most recent client firm …	**Strongly Disagree**			**Neither Agree nor Disagree**			**Strongly Agree**
I ask for clarification if I am unsure what to do.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I apply what I've learned in other companies to my current assignment.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I double-check with my supervisor if there are changes to my duties.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have unnecessarily disrupted a colleague's work.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I perform my duties with unusually few errors.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I said negative things about the company to friends, colleagues, or anyone else.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I jump right in and started working right away.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have ended my assignment early without giving any notice.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I frequently communicate to co-workers suggestions on how the group can improve.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have neglected to follow my boss's instructions.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I show genuine concern and courtesy toward co-workers, even under the most trying business or personal situations.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have refused to accept assignments that I was expected to do.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I always meet or beat deadlines for completing work.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have taken property from work without permission.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have taken an additional or longer break than is acceptable at this workplace.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have come in late to work without permission.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I spent too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working, or spent time doing things unrelated to my assigned tasks.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
For issues that may have serious consequences for my client organization, I express opinions honestly even when others may disagree.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have ignored a co-worker.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
When I notice something that could be improved, I tell my co-workers how to go about fixing it.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I teach my co-workers better ways to do things.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I praise my colleagues so that they will consider me a nice person.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have wasted a co-worker's time.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I compliment other workers so that they will see me as likeable.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have acted rudely toward someone at work.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I do personal favors for other people in the organization to show them that I am friendly.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Concerning my current or most recent client firm …	**Strongly Disagree**			**Neither Agree nor Disagree**			**Strongly Agree**
I take an interest in my colleagues' personal lives to show them that I am friendly.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I make other workers aware of my talents or qualifications.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I make other workers aware of my unique skills and abilities.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I let other workers know that I am a valuable member of the organization.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I talk proudly about my past accomplishments that might help the organization to be successful.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I let other workers know how hard I have been working.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I let others know that I have been putting in a lot of effort into my work.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I take on more than my fair share of the workload so that other workers will see me as dedicated.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I do tasks that are not really part of my job description so that I will seem flexible or dedicated.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I try to appear like I have been very busy working on my tasks.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I arrive at work on time and stay until the end in order to look dedicated.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I act like I know less than I really do so that other workers will help me out.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
If my client organization were unhappy with my behavior, they would threaten to get rid of me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I try to gain assistance or sympathy from other workers by appearing needy in some area.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I act like I need assistance on my work so that other workers will help me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
If my client organization were unhappy with my actions, I would be punished in some way.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I pretend not to understand how to do some things in order to avoid having to work on undesirable tasks.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I disclose my weaknesses in a particular area so that I can avoid an unpleasant part of my assignment.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am intimidating with other workers when it is necessary.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I would receive a reprimand if my client organization didn't like my performance.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I use intimidation to get other workers to do their share of the work.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I speak strongly or forcefully to get other group members to agree to do things the way I think they should be done.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Concerning my current or most recent client firm …	**Strongly Disagree**			**Neither Agree nor Disagree**			**Strongly Agree**
If my client organization were unhappy with my behavior, it would complain to [temp firm].	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I deal strongly or aggressively with other workers who aren't contributing their fair share.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I let other workers know that I am not willing to be pushed around or dictated to.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
If my client organization was unhappy with my behavior, they might cut my assignment short.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Considering both [temp firm] and my client firm …	**Strongly Disagree**			**Neither Agree nor Disagree**			**Strongly Agree**
In general I have much more contact with the supervisors at my client assignments than with the supervisor at [temp firm].	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I really see myself as a part of my client organization, instead of an employee of [temp firm].	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
When people ask me where I work, I usually give them the name of the client organization where I am currently assigned, instead of the name of [temp firm].	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
If I needed a letter of reference, I would ask someone from one of my client assignments, instead of someone from [temp firm].	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
If someone were to ask me what I did for a living, I would tell them that I was a temporary worker, instead of talking about the tasks that I usually do on my client assignments.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

The following questions concern your rewards (e.g., money and recognition) for temporary work:

	Strongly Disagree			**Neither Agree nor Disagree**			**Strongly Agree**
I am rewarded fairly for the amount of effort that I put in.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am rewarded fairly considering the responsibilities I have.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am not rewarded fairly in view of my experience.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

My take-home pay is really determined by …

[temp firm]	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	My client (e.g., wherever I am doing my job)

The following questions concern <u>you</u>:

I am a temporary worker …	**Strongly Disagree**			**Neither Agree nor Disagree**			**Strongly Agree**
… because of the sense of freedom.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… because of the tight labour market.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… because of the flexible hours.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… because I was laid off.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… because of the variety.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… because of my difficulty finding permanent work.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… because of the potential to work for a shorter length of time.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
… because of a job loss.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Please indicate the extent to which you feel this way <u>in general:</u>

	Not at All			**Moderately**			**Very Much**
distressed	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
interested	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
upset	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
excited	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
strong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
hostile	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
irritable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
scared	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
afraid	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
ashamed	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
guilty	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
enthusiastic	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
proud	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
alert	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
inspired	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
nervous	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
determined	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
attentive	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
jittery	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
active	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Background Information

Gender:

- ❑ Male
- ❑ Female

Age:

- ❑ less than 30
- ❑ 30 – 39
- ❑ 40 – 49
- ❑ 50 – 59
- ❑ 60 and older

Education:

- ❑ High School
- ❑ Some College
- ❑ College Diploma
- ❑ Some University
- ❑ Bachelor's Degree
- ❑ Some Graduate School
- ❑ Graduate Degree
- ❑ Other _____

In which job category is your typical client assignment? (i.e., what do you do?)

- ❑ Accounting and Finance
- ❑ Call Centre
- ❑ Creative Services
- ❑ Education
- ❑ Electronic Assembly
- ❑ Engineering
- ❑ Health Care
- ❑ Heavy Industrial
- ❑ Home Care
- ❑ Hospitality
- ❑ Information Technology
- ❑ Insurance
- ❑ Legal
- ❑ Light Industrial
- ❑ Marketing
- ❑ Office Work
- ❑ Professional (Other)
- ❑ Sales
- ❑ Scientific
- ❑ Skilled Trades
- ❑ Other_____

Which industry best describes your current or most recent client assignment? (e.g., what did your company do?)

- ❑ Agriculture/Forestry
- ❑ Fishing
- ❑ Manufacturing – Non-durables
- ❑ Manufacturing - Durables
- ❑ Services – Not for Profit
- ❑ Wholesale/Retail
- ❑ Real Estate
- ❑ Education Services
- ❑ Construction/Mining
- ❑ Finance
- ❑ Insurance
- ❑ Services - Profit
- ❑ Transportation
- ❑ Utilities
- ❑ Health
- ❑ Government
- ❑ Energy
- ❑ Other:_____

How long have you worked as a <u>temporary worker</u> (including for [temp firm])?

- ❑ Less than one month
- ❑ 1 month to less than a year
- ❑ 1 year to less than 2 years
- ❑ 2 years to less than 5 years
- ❑ 5 years or more

How long have you been registered with <u>[temp firm]</u>?

- ❑ Less than one month
- ❑ 1 month to less than a year
- ❑ 1 year to less than 2 years
- ❑ 2 years to less than 5 years
- ❑ 5 years or more

How long have you worked at your current or most recent <u>client organization</u>?

- ❑ Less than one month
- ❑ 1 month to less than a year
- ❑ 1 year to less than 2 years
- ❑ 2 years to less than 5 years
- ❑ 5 years or more

Number of temporary firms (including [temp firm]) that you are currently affiliated with: ____

If you have any other comments about being a temporary worker, please list them here (if you need more space, please add another sheet):

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Thank you very much for completing this survey! I really appreciate your help. Please mail your completed survey in the first postage-paid envelope.

If you would like to be included in the prize draw, please fill out the ballot (below) and send it separately in the second postage-paid envelope.

In a few weeks a reminder will be sent to everyone (because of anonymity). At this time you may have already mailed back the survey to me — if so, please ignore this reminder.

If you would like to receive a copy of a summary of my research findings, please contact me at cconnelly@business.queensu.ca or (613) 548-7937 or at

Catherine Connelly, PhD Programme
Queen's School of Business
143 Union Street
Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6

----------cut here----------

BALLOT: As a small token of my appreciation, all participants may enter into a lottery for EIGHT different PRIZES. **The top prize will be $200.00, there will be three prizes of $100.00, and there will be four prizes of $50.00**. To be entered in the lottery, please complete your ballot, detach, and send in the second envelope, so that your answers to the survey are completely anonymous.

Name: _____

Phone number: _____

Email address: _____

Appendix J: Retained and Rejected Items for Each Dependent Variable

Client Organizational Citizenship Behaviors

Accepted items	Factor Loadings
When I notice something that could be improved, I tell my co-workers how to go about fixing it.	.82
I teach my co-workers better ways to do things.	.79
I frequently communicate to co-workers suggestions on how the group can improve.	.57
For issues that have serious consequences for my client organization, I express opinions honestly even when others may disagree.	.49

Rejected items (loaded on counterproductive factor, with high cross loadings)
I always meet or beat deadlines for completing work.
I show genuine concern and courtesy toward co-workers even under the most trying business or personal situations.
I perform my duties with unusually few errors.

Rejected items (doublet)
I ask for clarification if I am unsure what to do.
I apply what I've learned in other companies to my current assignment.

Client Counterproductive Workplace Behaviors

Accepted Items: first factor (α = .86)	Factor Loadings
I have unnecessarily disrupted a colleague's work.	.71
I have wasted a co-worker's time.	.61
I have discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person.	.50
I have taken property from work without permission	.46
I have refused to accept assignments that I was expected to do.	.45
I have ended my assignment early without giving any notice.	.44
I jump right in and start right away (R)	.36

Accepted Items: second factor (α = .76)	Factor Loadings
I have come into work late without permission.	.65
I have taken an additional or longer break than is acceptable at this workplace.	.63
I spent too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working, or spent time doing things unrelated to my assigned tasks.	.54
I said negative things about the company to friends, colleagues, or anyone else.	.45
I have neglected to follow my boss's instructions.	.40

Temporary Firm Organizational Citizenship Behaviors (α = .87)

Accepted Items (α = .87)	Factor Loadings
I defend [temporary firm name] when other workers criticize it.	.89
I defend [temporary firm name] when outsiders criticize it.	.78
I actively promote [temporary firm name] to other potential temporary workers.	.75
I actively promote [temporary firm name] to potential clients.	.72
I encourage friends and family to utilize temporary workers from [temporary firm name].	.55

Rejected Items (separate factor, but α = .67)	Factor Loadings
I show genuine concern and courtesy toward [temporary firm name] staff, even under the most trying business or personal situations.	.60
I stay in close contact with [temporary firm name] staff.	.57
I am really open with [temporary firm name] about how my client assignments are going.	.52
I am flexible about what types of jobs I will agree to do.	.44
I am willing to take short-term or long-term jobs; whatever is required.	.31

Rejected Items (high cross loadings, doublets, singlet)
I show pride when representing [temporary firm name] on assignments.
I show pride when representing [temporary firm name] in public.
I let [temporary firm name] know about any potential opportunities for them.

Temporary Firm Counterproductive Workplace Behaviors (α = .75)

Accepted Items	Factor Loadings
I have gone to work directly for a client, without telling [temporary firm name].	.67
I have stopped going to an assignment, before telling [temporary firm name].	.66
I have ignored [temporary firm name] staff (e.g., didn't return phone calls).	.62
I have acted rudely to my contact at [temporary firm name].	.59
I have become unavailable for assignments, without letting [temporary firm name] know.	.58

Rejected Item (singlet)
I have been somewhat callous in my dealings with [temporary firm name].